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Abstract 
A weak point in many otherwise secure systems is the authentication of the individual claiming to 
be a particular user. This operation is fundamental to all security related decisions. If an incorrect 
authentication decision is made, access control, integrity, confidentiality and non-repudiation may 
all be compromised. Traditionally, authentication has relied upon knowledge of a secret, typically 
a password. This can be strengthened by the use of a biometric, which provides a unique personal 
identifier. In previous works and existing commercial systems the most common approach has been 
to store biometrics centrally. This raises a number of fundamental privacy issues. 
This thesis focuses on privacy concerns, specifically those relating to the storage and use of bio-
metrics. These concerns result from the fact that biometric information is unique. This uniqueness 
makes the biometric a very strong identifier increasing the possibility that it could be used to moni-
tor an individual's activities. An expert can extract considerable information from a biometric scan, 
ranging from the age or gender to whether the individual has certain diseases. 
This work presents a biometric solution, using the fingerprint, which protects the individual's pri-
vacy. In this system the individual is not required to relinquish control of biometric data, since a 
template is extracted from the fingerprint and stored on a smart card, which remains in the pos-
session of the user. This smart card has a procedure installed on it to perform a comparison of the 
resident template and a template obtained from a fingerprint scanner. In this way the template never 
needs to leave the card, which can authenticate the owner via a secure communications protocol to 
many applications, including an ATM or banking network, and Internet shopping sites. 
The system designed and implemented for this work extracts a set of minutiae from a fingerprint. 
. This set of minutiae, which forms a template of the fingerprint, is installed onto an SLE44C160S 
smart card, along with a comparison routine. The template on the card forms a basis for comparing 
future scans to verify the possessor's identity. Effectively, the biometric data needed for authenti-
cation is stored in a distributed database, with each fingerprint template on a smart card and under 
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the control of the possessor. The template, which is securely stored on the smart card, can never be 
removed from the card. 
The card can participate in an authentication operation by verifying that a presented fingerprint 
matches the template stored on it. This matching is performed on the card to eliminate the require-
ment to remove the template from the card. A matching algorithm was designed and implemented 
to provide this part of the presented solution. 
Results were obtained by experimenting with the implemented solution. These tests verified that 
the accuracy and timing of the system were acceptable for real-time authentication. The effect on 
the accuracy of comparing different levels of information about each minutia was also examined. It 
was found that using just the position of the minutiae produced equal acceptance and rejection error 
rates of approximately 40%. By including the other characteristics of the minutiae, in particular 
the direction and type, this error could be reduced to 5.6%. The results were improved when an 
enhancement algorithm was applied to the fingerprint and classification information was used. The 
addition of the classification information in the comparison reduced the equal error rate to 1.6%. 
The time required for the complete authentication process is in the region of five seconds. 
It has therefore been demonstrated that it is feasible to store a fingerprint template on a smart card. 
This system performs the fingerprint comparison on the card in real-time thereby countering the 
privacy objections of individual who wish to retain control over their biometric data. 
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Authentication of individuals by a computer system is a common process that has a number of 
vulnerabilities. The combination of a username and a password has become the prevalent method 
of authenticating personal identity. This combination is often used to verify a user to a personal 
computer or workstation. The combination of username and password is also typically used to 
authenticate individuals to a network or Internet site. Many sites of this nature require high security 
levels, for example banks or stockbroking firms. A username/password combination requires both 
public knowledge (the username) and private knowledge (the password) to perform authentication. 
For many systems this combination provides an acceptable level of security. The risk incurred 
through an incorrect authentication needs to be measured against the cost of increasing the security 
to prevent it. Thus an acceptable level of security must be selected. 
A higher level of security in personal authentication requires a token and a password. The token 
could be a bankcard with a magnetic strip, a smart card, or any other physical device that forms part 
of the authentication process. There are many examples of this type of authentication, which include 
using a bankcard at an Automatic Teller Machine (ATM), combined with a Personal Identification 
Number (PIN), or some access control systems. Sometimes just the possession of the token is 
considered proof of identity; even the possession of a credit card is often presumed to indicate the 
correct user. This provides authentication through the user having a possession (token) and private 
knowledge (password). This method of using a password or PIN and/or a token is the most common 
method to identify individuals to computer systems [35]. 
The difficulty posed by the above systems is that it is possible for passwords to be lost, guessed or 
stolen. It is estimated that about 25% of people write their PIN on their ATM cards [19]. There are 
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companies where the majority of users still use their default password, which is often the same as the 
username, after having been with the company for extended durations. It would not be challenging 
to guess these passwords. There are attacks that exist which are capable of revealing large numbers 
of passwords belonging to users of a system. These attacks could be based upon weak algorithms or 
flaws in the implementation of these algorithms. This can be illustrated with an example of a local 
company that has Windows NT on their computers. The administrator ran IOphtcrackl to check the 
security of the passwords. Within seconds LOphtcrack found about 100 out of 270 passwords using a 
modified dictionary attack. A further 100 accounts were cracked by alphanumeric brute-force when 
left to run for nine hours. LOphtcrack is a freely available point and click program downloadable 
from the Internet. Even a novice user would be able to use it to acquire passwords. Knowledge-
based systems can only determine whether the individual requesting authentication possesses the 
specific knowledge, not whether they are who they claim to be [19]. 
The use of a possession as proof of identity can be forged in some cases. If the token used is con-
tactless and uses a radio link to communicate then there is a possibility that these communications 
could be eavesdropped and replayed. This communication could then be recorded and played back 
in a replay attack to gain access to the system. Even if it is a token that requires contact it might still 
be possible to place a tap on the reading device and allow the reproduction of the token. The use of 
a token can certainly be used to increase security levels, but if the token can be reproduced then the 
technique fails. 
A higher level of security should require the user to be physically present at the time of authentica-
tion. This is superior to other authentication schemes where it is possible that the individual who 
was authenticated had stolen or 'borrowed' the information required to perform the authentication. 
A solution to this is to use a biometric. Biometrics are considered to be the oldest form of iden-
tification [18]. We recognise people by their looks, voice and their signature. Since conventional 
methods of identification are inadequate, why are biometrics not in more common use? One of the 
primary reasons is performance, which is based upon the accuracy, cost, integrity, and ease of use 
of a system [34]. 
A biometric refers to the application of statistical analysis to biological data [48], which could 
refer to any biological, physiological or behavioural characteristics possessed by an individual. 
For a biometric to be useful these characteristics should be unique to the individual and difficult 
to replicate. Among the many biometrics that are currently in use, or experimental use, one finds 
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fingerprints, palm prints, voice pattern, face recognition and signature patterns, retina maps, iris 
patterns and others. 
The use of biometrics has been advocated as the solution to many security problems [16]. There are 
initiatives to use iris or fingerprint patterns to replace passwords, and since biometric data cannot be 
forgotten, or shared with others, they are considered to provide more secure solutions. 
Bruce Schneier [41], on the other hand, is at least one author who warns that biometrics will not 
remove all security problems. The use of biometrics will not solve protocol or network security 
problems. For example, if a protocol is vulnerable to a replay attack, then sending a biometric in 
place of a password will not prevent the replay attack. 
This dissertation focuses on the fingerprint. Fingerprints have been used as a reliable means of 
identification for a long time [27]. The fingerprint of an individual is unique and remains constant 
with age [32]. 
Since a fingerprint, as with all biometrics, cannot be replaced or changed it should not be dealt with 
as a password. A biometric is a unique characteristic and its presence implies the presence of the 
individual to whom it belongs. Since authentication is required over networks, biometrics need to 
be transmitted in a secure fashion to reduce the potential for it to be acquired by an attacker and 
re-entered into the system. 
1.1 A New Approach to Fingerprint Systems 
Biometrics can be used to improve the accuracy of the authentication process. They improve confi-
dence in the verification of a user's identity, as it is considerably more difficult to present a finger-
print of another user than it is to present their password. The advantage that the biometric solution 
has over a non-biometric solution is the increased difficulty an impostor has to be authenticated as 
a valid user by the system. A biometric cannot be forgotten or written down on a piece of paper as 
can a password. This makes it is difficult for an impostor to masquerade as a valid user. 
Fingerprint based biometric solutions have existed for a long time. However, a number of privacy 
concerns have been raised with respect to using fingerprints in civilian applications. These concerns 
will be addressed in the following chapter. The approach presented in this dissertation will be based 
on the use of a fingerprint to authenticate an individual. The fingerprint template will be stored 
on a smart card to create a distributed authentication system. The distribution of the database of 
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authentication information makes it more complicated for an attacker to acquire private information. 
Since the fingerprint is stored on a smart card the owner also has complete control over when it is 
used, while gaining additional security from using a biometric. The smart card would be entirely 
useless to an unauthorised user if it was lost or stolen, since only the authorised user's fingerprint 
can authenticate the user in conjunction with the card, and possibly to allow or deny access to other 
information on the card (for example a private key for signing). 
The use of a smart card or token improves the security over that provided by using a username to 
identify an individual. The reason for this is that if someone knows your username they can attempt 
to enter the system using that username without your knowledge. If, on the other hand, your smart 
card is stolen you will notice that it is missing the next time that you try to enter the system and can 
have it revoked. 
The approach taken in this study is to store the template of a fingerprint on a smart card. This 
fingerprint can never be removed from the smart card protecting the biometric data on it, even if 
the card is stolen or lost. Rather, the card will have functionality on it to perform the comparison 
between fingerprints. This will allow a smart card to store private information, including a user 
identity and digital key, which can only be used when a valid fingerprint is presented. The smart 
card can store a private key that can only be used to sign data digitally when the card has been 
unlocked for a session by being presented with the correct fingerprint and so this approach has 
relevance for digital signing too. 
The implementation of an authentication system needs to conform to a number of critical success 
factors. These factors include the accuracy with which an individual's identity can be verified, 
the time that this takes and the ability to securely pass this confidence in a user's identity to other 
components in a system through the use of a strong communications protocol. 
This system can improve confidence in the authentication process through the use of a biometric, 
while preserving the individual's privacy. Biometric authentication performed on a smart card can 
be integrated into many different systems. Systems that could benefit from biometric authentication 
range from ATM cash dispensing machines through to the purchase of products via the Internet. 
A future generation of credit card could have a biometric template stored on it allowing accurate 
authentication of the owner. 
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1.2 Dissertation Roadmap 
This dissertation describes the privacy motivation for placing the fingerprint comparison process on 
the smart card with the following organisation: 
Chapter 2 shows that the method presented here gives the user of the system complete control over 
when their biometric information is used to provide authentication. Thus, an individual's privacy 
can be protected while at the same time a higher level of security can be attained through the use of 
biometrics. 
A brief evolution of the fingerprint and the smart card as well as existing fingerprint based authen-
tication schemes are introduced in Chapter 3. The growth and development of these technologies 
is presented. After this background a general overview of how the system was designed along with 
the reasoning for these design choices is shown. 
The architecture of the distributed fingerprint verification system is shown in Chapter 4. This 
chapter places the different components of the system in their respective positions. It shows a high 
level overview of the system and how these components interact with each other. The processes that 
occur on the smart card are positioned relative to the other components. 
Chapter 5 explains how the test system was implemented. The different sections of the implemen-
tation each had their own set of challenges that needed to be overcome. This chapter then explains 
how these different sections interact with each other to provide the complete solution. 
The algorithms used in the process, along with the reasoning as to why specific algorithms were 
used, and how they had to be modified and optimised to make them suitable for use with a smart 
card, is shown in Chapter 6. The smart card has specific restrictions on the size and heat generation 
allowed by the embedded microchip. These result in limited computing resources requiring all 
procedures that are installed on the card to be optimised in both CPU and memory requirements. 
The choice and the development of the algorithms is explained along with how they are modified. 
A matching routine was developed to compact the matching code to fit onto a microchip processor. 
The system is examined and the accuracy and time are analysed and logical conclusions are deduced. 
Testing and analysis of the results obtained from this system are presented in Chapter 7. Performing 
batches of comparisons between fingerprints and recording them produced these results, which were 
compared against the results obtained from other batches of comparisons with different parameters. 
A database of fingerprints obtained from NIST was used for obtaining these results. The analysis 
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of these tests shows how the parameters can be modified to produce optimal results. The tests also 
show how the inclusion of different sections of the algorithm can improve the accuracy. These 
empirically obtained results are compared with the results obtained from a statistical model of the 
system. 
Chapter 8 lists possible future extensions and areas of research that have potential for further de-
velopment and research based upon the work in this dissertation. 
Chapter 9 contains the conclusions of this study. 
Chapter 2 
Privacy Motivation 
"The right to privacy is one of our most cherished freedoms." W.J. Clinton l . 
This chapter explores the privacy aspects relating to the maintenance and storage of personal infor-
mation, specifically those pertaining to the use of biometrics. There are unique privacy concerns 
surrounding the use of biometrics that need to be confronted and dealt with. Some of these issues 
are the results of poor public education and misinformed perceptions. Others, although less well 
known to the general public, could still conceivably diminish an individual's personal privacy. 
Many systems need to maintain private information on each user in order to operate correctly and 
efficiently. These systems range from a bank maintaining customer records to an operating system 
storing lists of users. The private information utilized in these systems is supplied to them for 
specific purposes. E.g. the bank needs to have your address so that it can send you statements. 
This private information is stored in databases, and is normally supplied voluntarily by the users 
with the implied understanding that (unless explicitly agreed to) it will not be used for purposes 
other than that for which it was supplied, for example in the legal system a lawyer cannot be ordered 
to divulge information in a court of law that was acquired in private consultation with clients. The 
law has a built-in safe guard protecting the privacy of the client thus allowing the client and the 
lawyer to talk freely with each other. The European Union issued a directive in 1995 on On the 
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement 
of such data [7]. The United States of America has the Federal Privacy Act of 1974 [8]. The United 
1 from the commencement address ofW.J. Clinton at Morgan State University, Baltimore, MD, 18 May 1997. 
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Kingdom has the Data Protection Act from 1984 revised in 1998 [6]. All of these acts specifying 
how personal information can be used and exchanged. 
In the same way, any system that accesses private information should implement safe guards pre-
venting this information from being utilized in ways not originally intended. Thus if the bank has 
your address they should not sell your address to direct marketing companies since that is not what 
you gave it to them for. Sometimes the small print obtains implicit permission. 
Additionally the owner of the information should retain control over how and for what it is used. 
In many countries there are phone directories published by telecommunication companies. These 
directories contain the address and phone numbers of each person that is part of the telephone 
network in the selected area. But each individual should be able to specify how much information 
about them they would like to have in the directory - from having an unlisted number to just the 
name and number to in addition including the address. 
Design principles that protect the clients' privacy should be adhered to. These aim to ensure that 
private information is only used for the purposes for which it was originally supplied. The owner 
of the information should still retain complete control over when and how it is used. Thus any 
system that stores and utilizes an individual's private information should respect the privacy of the 
information. To ensure that the information is afforded the privacy that it should be, the system must 
maintain appropriate security standards and have appropriate procedures preventing unauthorised 
access. Depending on the level of security required it might need to maintain logs of the access to 
the information and unauthorised attempts to access the private information should be reported. 
Procedures should be implemented to give the user control over the information. If the information 
is incorrect and needs to be updated or modified then the user should be able to follow a procedure 
to correct the information. The client should be educated on how to use the procedures to control 
how his private information is used. If there are uses for the information outside of that which it 
was originally intended for then the client should be consulted before the private information is 
used. Utilization of private information for additional purposes should by default be treated as "opt 
out". Thus, unless an individual specifically allows such use of the information then the use of the 
information should be prohibited. 
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2.1 Privacy Issues of Biometrics 
One of the primary concerns about using a fingerprint to authenticate an individual in commercial 
applications is the privacy concern. There is the concern that by using a biometric you are reducing 
the privacy of an individuaL There are a number of both perceived and legitimate concerns regarding 
how the usage of a biometric can affect an individual's privacy. These concerns are addressed in the 
following sections: 
2.1.1 Loss of Anonymity and Autonomy 
A good biometric should be unique to each individual. When an individual submits a biometric 
sample then information is divulged that is truly unique to the individual. 
While a biometric is an accurate identifier it is not the first, nor is it the only, identifier used to match 
or locate information about an individuaL Names and numerical numbers like our identity number 
can also be used. However the c1aim of a specific name or number does not guarantee that the 
correct user supplied it. On the other hand the presentation of the correct biometric does guarantee 
the presence of the particular user. 
2.1.2 Invasive Aspects of the Information 
Biometric information does sometimes contain latent medical information about the owner. This 
information might be sold or otherwise distributed if it is stored in a centralised database. There is 
ongoing research on how to extract more information from biometric scans. 
Invasive information might be obtained. It is possible that some biometric recordings might record 
more than just sufficient information for identification. There might be information about the per-
son's health and medical history. Studies indicate that even a person's fingerprint might disclose 
medical or hereditary information about the person [57]. 
A fingerprint contains a large amount of information about the person to whom it belongs. If the 
hands and fingers are regularly used for manual labour then the fingers and hands develop stronger 
and larger muscles. This influences the circumference of the fingers, increasing the distance between 
adjacent ridges on the finger. Office workers on the other hand tend to have a much finer ridge 
structure. 
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Trained forensic expert can generally identify from a fingerprint the gender of the owner, along 
with a few clues as to the occupation and ethnic group. Some occupations regularly expose the 
fingerprint to chemicals that cause a smoothing of the fingerprint region. Other occupations that 
involve heavy use of the hands might leave the fingerprint region scratched or scarred. 
Examination of the retina or the iris by a medical professional might be able to determine diseases 
like diabetes, arteriosclerosis, and hypertension [57]. A picture of the face could be enough evidence 
for a medical doctor to be able to detect skin diseases along with a number of other diseases. With 
face comparison one would expect the relative positions of eyes, nose, mouth and other features to 
be used in the comparison, rather than the texture of the skin. A medical practitioner would rather 
use the texture of the skin to provide a diagnosis. Thus as is often the case different features are of 
interest to perform a comparison and to extract additional knowledge from the data. 
It is clear that it is possible for trained professionals to gain information from biometrics that was 
not originally intended when a sample was submitted for use with a system. This makes it even 
more important that any biometric data captured for use with a system is securely stored and not 
distributed without the owner's permission. 
2.2 Protecting the Individual's Privacy with Biometrics 
It is not obvious that residual anonymity beyond that remaining after other activities will be lost 
through the use of biometrics. There is normally a reason why a person's identity is required and it is 
normally in their best interest that they are identified accurately. An example of this is withdrawing 
money from an automated cash-dispensing machine. The use of biometrics themselves do not erode 
privacy. However the way in which they are used could, just as other information might. 
It is thus of utmost importance when designing and developing a system to ensure that it will respect 
the individual's privacy. It should be possible to demonstrate this to those resisting the use of the 
fingerprint. 
Some people think that the storage and use of your fingerprint could be used to track your move-
ments. It is unlikely that using a fingerprint will infringe much more upon the residual privacy of 
an individual than a password would. However since the fingerprint would remain the same across 
multiple databases it might allow some extra tracking, if multiple databases are linked together -
but if they could be linked on the fingerprint then they could probably also be linked on a username. 
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The aim of using a fingerprint in place of, or in addition to, a password for persona1 authentication 
would be to increase the individual's privacy. Data could be stored, and access to it protected, 
through a biometric. The biometric cannot be guessed and is much more difficult to forge and 
replicate by an attacker - making it more difficult to assume a fake identity and masquerade as 
another user. 
If the system allows users to authenticate themselves over a network then it is highly unlikely that 
attackers will attempt to make their fingerprint appear like someone else's. Rather they would 
attempt to acquire a digital copy of the fingerprint and surreptitiously inject it into the system via 
the network [18]. Using a biometric should strengthen at least the authentication section of the 
protocol without introducing any additional security vulnerabilities. 
Even though the use of a biometric is unlikely to create a weak link in a protocol the biometric 
should still be securely protected. Particularly if the fingerprints are to be stored centrally in a 
database, the database needs to be secure. Otherwise that database might fall into the hands of the 
wrong people. And unlike a pass phrase that can be replaced your fingerprint cannot be replaced. 
The system can be designed to store enough information to use a template to identify the individual, 
but not enough to be able to inject into the system to cause a match if it is acquired. For example 
a template of the biometric can be stored in the database, but the system can insist on a live scan 
as the acquisition process. Then, even if people do manage to surreptitiously acquire the electronic 
template of your fingerprint, they should still be unable to use it. 
It would also be preferable if the fingerprint did not need to be stored in a large database. Rather 
a system where the fingerprint, or some representation of it, was stored on a smart card and all the 
comparison was performed on the card would be superior. This should both alleviate the need to 
store a central database of fingerprint information and give the user complete control over how and 
when his fingerprint is accessed. This should satisfy most users. 
All the same the more control an individual has over the use and protection of his biometric data the 
more likely that he will accept the system as secure. The privacy of an individual must be protected. 
Critics will still compare the use of biometrics to Big Brother and the loss of individual privacy. The 
pro biometric community stresses the greater security and the improved service that the technology 
provides [57]. There are valid arguments for and against biometrics and while biometrics may pose 
certain privacy issues these issues can be adequately addressed. 
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In many countries the government is taking an interest in biometrics. They would like to use bio-
metrics to improve the delivery of services while at the same time decreasing the costs and level 
of fraud [55]. However the very personal nature of a biometric does still raise concerns about its 
potential impact on personal freedoms. The delivery of services by a government requires positive 
identification to prevent multiple persons from using a single identity, and negative identification to 
prevent a single person from using multiple identities. 
In the system proposed here in this dissertation, a template of a fingerprint is placed onto a smart 
card. This template does not store the original fingerprint, but only the information extracted from 
it. There is not enough information stored in the template to be able deduce any invasive information 
about the user. But even if there were this should still not be an issue, as the template can never 
leave the card. This can be achieved by performing the comparison process on the card. 
The individual who has possession of the smart card then controls the physical access to the card. 
And even then only the person with the correct fingerprint can use the smart card. If the print 
is stored on the card then there is no need to have a central database to verify the identity of an 
individual and by having the comparison on the card there is never a need to remove the fingerprint 
template from the smart card. Since control of the print resides with the subject and no central 
store exists, the implementation of such a model would have to ensure that the fingerprint could be 
correctly associated with the individual to whom it belongs by additional information. 
This should be able to provide a highly secure method to authenticate an individual. And the use of 
the fingerprint if implemented correctly should even increase the privacy of the user. 
It appears that there is a big opportunity for biometrics and digital certificates since certificates 
profess to offer a "higher" level of authentication, but they still rely on the knowledge of a password 
- and worse still they are controlled on the client side and may not pick up multiple guessing 
attempts in the same way that a server would notice this guessing activity. The password can be 
replaced with a fingerprint. 
2.3 Summary 
Individuals' privacy should be protected. There are many systems that utilize personal private in-
formation. These systems should ensure that the privacy of the information utilized is respected and 
maintained. The laws of a country should enforce this safeguarding of private information. 
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Private infonnation stored in databases should be used only for the purposes for which it was gath-
ered. Additionally the owner of the infonnation should have the ability to update it and correct it, 
if needed, along with control over how it is used. All uses other than that for which infonnation 
was originally supplied should require pennission from the owner. This should prevent the abuse of 
personal infonnation. 
There are a number of privacy issues that relate specifically to biometrics. There are concerns that 
the use of biometrics in commercial ventures will have the potential to infringe upon an individual's 
privacy. Some of these concerns are groundless and based on hearsay while others are legitimate 
concerns. The issues arise from the uniqueness of biometric infonnation. This uniqueness can be 
thought to cause a loss of anonymity or autonomy however it is unlikely that a biometric can be 
used to track individuals any more than non-biometric infonnation. 
The other aspect that can affect the privacy is the latent infonnation that could be stored in bio-
metric data. There have been studies that show that fingerprints might reveal medical or hereditary 
infonnation. Medical experts can detect some diseases from the examination of iris or retina scans. 
However the infonnation that is extracted from the biometric and stored might not be sufficient to 
extract this latent infonnation. 
The system described in this dissertation implements a biometric based autbentication system, but 
one that preserves the privacy ideals outlined in this chapter. 
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Chapter 3 
Background 
This chapter provides background information about biometrics and particularly about the finger-
print. This chapter explains how the fingerprint has been used and how they are used to identify an 
individual. It deals with classification schemes and comparison methods. The uses and the limita-
tions of biometrics are also explored. Existing biometric solutions are presented and the work done 
in this dissertation is located in this context. 
Smart cards are introduced to show how they have been used to improve the security in authentica-
tion systems. The background to the smart card is explained and the different categories of smart 
cards are described. The evolution of the interlinking of smart cards and biometrics is expounded. 
Limitations and advantages of using a smart card technology are explored. 
3.1 Biometrics 
There have been major advances and research into biometric systems in recent years [30]. The two 
main focuses of this research have been in the authentication or verification of a user's identity and 
identification of an individual. Authentication involves proving that a person is who they claim to 
be. The other major focus has been in the identification of an individual [13] from a biometric. 
Any biometric characteristic of an individual, whether physical, physiological or behavioural can 
be used for the purposes of identifying them. 
There are many biometrics in use today. These include fingerprints [12, 38], face recognition [15, 
58], hand geometry [19], voice recognition [5], signature recognition [34], iris scans [56,26], retina 
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scans [56] and typing patterns [18]. Each of these methods has different advantages and disadvan-
tages associated with them, along with respective performances. Some, for example face recognition 
and iris recognition, can be performed passively [35] or without needing the user to perform any 
specific activity, while others like hand geometry require the user to carry out specific activities, like 
touching a scanner. 
A biometric should satisfy the following requirements [12,30,20]: 
• Universality: The biometric should be one that is possessed by every person. 
• Uniqueness: The biometric needs to be unique to an individua1. This ensures that there are 
sufficient differences between different individuals to allow a system to discern the difference. 
For example most face recognition systems struggle to differentiate between identical twins. 
• Permanence: The feature should be invariant with time. It should not vary according to the 
condition under which it was captured [37]. 
• Collectability: It must be possible to quantitatively measure the trait. There needs to be some 
representation of the biometric that can be stored for later retrieval and comparison purposes. 
If a particular biometric cannot be used alone to fulfil these requirements in a given system then 
it could be combined with another biometric. The combination of a second biometric can increase 
the accuracy and improve the performance of the system. One such system which makes use of 
multiple biometrics, BioID, is presented by Frischholz and Dieckmann [9]. It uses face, voice 
and lip movement for identification. The recent emergence of standard biometric API's [49] has 
simplified the process of replacing one biometric identifier with another or combining multiple 
biometrics. 
There are a number of other characteristics specific to the method and representation used with a 
particular biometric that need to be considered before it becomes feasible to use it as a means of 
authentication or identification. These issues include [19J: 
• Peiformance: The performance of a system is important. If the system needs to be used in 
real-time then speed becomes animportant factor. The accuracy of the comparison can also 
affect the usefulness of the system. Along with these, the robustness, resource requirements 
and any other operational or environmental factors need to be considered that can affect its 
performance. 
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• Acceptability: The extent to which people are willing to accept a particular system will impact 
on its success. For example if people need to look into a bright light to have a picture of their 
retinas scanned they probably will not like the system and consequently will not use it either. 
It should ideally cause minimal change to people's current routine in order to be accepted. 
• Circumvention: How easy is it to fool the system? If all that is needed is a photo of the person 
then the system is useless as a photo can be covertly obtained. The system should be resilient 
and able to withstand fraudulent impersonations. It also should have counter measures to 
resist circumvention. 
Different biometric technologies can be compared on their accuracy and performance. The main 
methods of comparing the accuracy of biometric solution are: 
• False Acceptance Rate (FAR): The FAR specifies the ratio of successful attempts by invalid 
users, where a FAR of x/y means that on average x out of y attempts which should be rejected 
will be accepted. 
• False Rejection Rate (FFR): The FRR specifies the ratio of unsuccessful attempts by valid 
users, where a FRR of x/y means that on average x out of y attempts which should be accepted 
will be rejected. 
• Equal Error Rate (EER): The EER is the error rate where the parameters are adjusted such 
that the FRR = FAR. 
These values are accepted as the accuracy metrics by which biometric systems are judged [38] and 
ideally they should be very close to zero. 
Whether a biometric could be used for a personal authentication depends upon whether the bio-
metric is universal, unique, permanent and collectable. The performance criteria, the operating 
environment and the acceptability affect the choice of the most appropriate biometric technologies 
for a particular application [43]. The combination of all of these criteria can be used to determine 
the suitability of technologies for particular systems. 
Biometrics can be used either for purposes of authentication or identification. In an authentication 
system the biometric is used to confirm that a supplied identification is correct. An identification 
system seeks to determine the identity of an individual bases on a supplied biometric. This thesis 
concentrates mainly on authentication or verification systems. 
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3.2 Fingerprints 
"The main reason for the popularity of the fingerprint as a form of identification is 
that the fingerprint of a person is unique and remains invariant with hislher age." [32] 
The biometric with the most widespread usage is the fingerprint. There have been commercial 
identification systems based on the fingerprint since the early 1960s [34]. The price of fingerprint 
scanning equipment used to be in the range of $1000 to $2000 for a single scanner. These optical 
scanners would have been about the size of half a loaf of bread. Today the new solid state scanners 
cost less than $100 and are the size of a postage stamp [33]. The low cost of these scanners has 
greatly increased the use and availability of fingerprint technologies and as a result it has become 
feasible to have a fingerprint scanner built into a workstation. 
Until recently fingerprint systems have predominantly been used in forensic applications for inves-
tigating criminals. The uses have, and still are, the subject of leading-edge research. The fingerprint 
has been found to remain constant for a person. The abundance of research into the use of fin-
gerprints has yielded a number of viable algorithms for their electronic storage and comparison 
yielding a very high degree of personal verification accuracy. 
3.2.1 Early Evidence of the Fingerprint 
Some of the earliest evidence of ridge detail has been found on the hands and feet of humans on 
the 4000-year-old mummies from ancient Egypt. The hands and feet of these mummies have been 
examined and there is evidence of a ridge structure on them [27]. 
The scientific study of fingerprints began in the late sixteenth century as cited in [12], with Ne-
hemiah Grew, an English plant morphologist being the first person to study and describe the ridges, 
furrows and pores on the hands and feet. In 1684 he published the first fingerprint research. Besides 
writing on the subject he also published some accurate drawings of the ridge patterns on the fingers 
and areas of the palms. Along with the drawings his writings described the use of the ridge structure 
and pore structure. However, the foundations of modern fingerprint technologies date back to the 
late nineteenth century with the work of Sir F. Galton and E. Henry. Fingerprints, the first biomet-
ric to be used as a method of identification, have been actively used as a method of verifying an 
individual's identity for about 100 years. 
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While many solutions exist they are all centralized in nature. One exception to this, which has 
emerged in recent months, is a combined development by Gemplus and Veridicom. Simultane-
ously to the work towards this thesis they developed a system that performs Veridicom's fingerprint 
matching algorithm on a Gemplus smart card [36]. 
Prior to the early 1980s the task of comparing two fingerprints was performed manually [29]. In the 
early 1980s the first experimental systems were developed and since then the comparison process 
has been further automated. 
3.2.2 Description and Function of the Fingerprint 
There have been many developments in the applications of fingerprints. Most of these have occurred 
in the last several hundred years. To understand the history of the fingerprint some basic knowledge 
from dactyloscopyl should be understood. 
The inside surfaces of the hands, from the fingertips to the wrist, and the bottom surfaces of the feet, 
from the tips of the big toe to the rear of the heel, are covered with minute ridges. A cross section 
of the skin in these areas has a corrugated appearance. These ridges and furrows frequently curve, 
particularly on the fingertips and toe ends. The ridges have sweat pores along their entire length. 
Thus when an article is touched the sweat runs along the entire length of the ridge and leaves an 
exact impression of the ridge structure. This is very similar to how an inked rubber stamp leaves its 
impression on a sheet of paper [27]. 
The ridges and furrows fulfil three functions: 
• Exudation of perspiration: The sweat pores occur along the length of the ridge structure 
at approximately equal distances. The furrows between the ridges provide channels for the 
sweat to disperse. 
• Tactile facility: The ridge structure provides a facility with which to perceive touch. 
• Provision of a gripping sUrface: When the sweat is excreted from the pores it can flow into 
the valleys between the ridges. This allows the finger to continue to grip surfaces even while 
sweating. This is similar to how a tire has ridges and valleys to move water off the road and 
still provide a surface with which to grip. The ridges are raised areas on the surface of the 
skin. They improve the ability to grasp objects with minimal slippage [29]. 
'the practice of using fingerprints to identify someone 
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3.2.3 Fingerprint used for Personal Identification 
Every person in the world has a pattern of ridges and furrows on their fingerprints. Using these 
ridges and furrows of fingerprints provides a method of identification that can be used to uniquely 
identify an individual. This is based on two facts. The first of these is that no-one has ever found a 
sequence of ridge detail on the hands or feet that is identical to the ridge detail of another individ-
ual [27]. The second of these is that the ridge structure remains constant with age after an individual 
has reached maturity [32]. There have been many instances of a person trying to change or de-
stroy the ridge details of their fingers. In most of these instances the ridge structure has still been 
recognisable. Galton, as cited in [12], went further to say that the minutiae provide discriminating 
features that are unique and permanent. There is evidence to suggest that the pore structure of the 
fingerprint is also unique and invariant allowing it to be used in the comparison of fingerprints [38]. 
A study by Galton examined the details that reside in fingerprints. He examined the fingerprints 
morphologically and carried out experiments on different age groups within different races. From 
his work two important conclusions can be deduced. The first of these is that a fingerprint is per-
manent in preserving its characteristics from the birth to the death of an individual. The second of 
these is that the fingerprints of an individual are unique. Even identical twins have different finger-
prints. This has been the fundamental building block upon which research has been performed in 
the twentieth century. 
There are many different minute details that can be distinguished on a fingerprint. Galton's study 
introduced the concept of minutiae as the discontinuities in the ridge pattern. John Berry [27] 
identifies seven basic ridge characteristics which he considered to be the most important varieties in 
ridge detail. These basic characteristics are shown in Figure 3.1. All of these characteristics, also 
referred to as minutiae, can be represented as variations and combinations of the ridge ending and 
the ridge bifurcation, which are the first two characteristics illustrated in Figure 3.1. 
Along with these minutiae, fingerprints also contain special features called core and delta points. 
The core point is generally defined as the topmost point on the innermost curving ridge. This can 
also be thought of as the point of greatest curvature in the ridge structure. The delta points are where 
the ridge structure has a curvature away from itself. An example of these is shown in Figure 3.2. 
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Figure 3.1: Ridge characteristics. 
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Figure 3.2: Singular points, illustrating the core point (0) and the delta points (A). 
3.2.4 Fingerprint Classification 
A major step forward in fingerprint research was the development of fingerprint classification schemes. 
A method of classification allows a large database to be searched for a fingerprint by only perform-
ing the comparison on a subset of the database. One of the first such methods developed was the 
brainchild of Sir Edward Henry, the Henry System, which is now effectively used in many countries. 
His system became operational in Scotland Yard in 1901 [27]. The Henry System is also in use in 
fingerprint bureaus in, amongst others, South Africa, Australia, Greece, Canada, and the United 
States. The Henry System is still an integral part of most identification systems [12]. 
The ridges and furrows on the last joint of the fingers and toes form patterns. These patterns can be 
classified into many different categories. One method of classification divides fingerprints into four 
groups. These groups are illustrated in Figure 3.3. The Henry system splits the loop class into two 
classes. The loop shown in Figure 3.3 would be designated as a left loop. The Henry system has a 
separate category for right loops .. 
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Loop Whorl 
Figure 3.3: Basic fingerprint patterns. 
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3.2.5 Manual Comparison of Fingerprints 
Many different methods for manually comparing two fingerprints have been proposed and tried. 
The first group of methods attempt to align the two fingerprints graphically. One fingerprint might 
be placed on a semitransparent film and then superimposed over the other. 
There are also methods that divide the images up into a grid of squares. These grids need to be 
aligned on the two prints and the corresponding cells are compared for a match. Other methods 
locate ridge characteristics in a fingerprint and then produce a polygon of these minutiae. The 
polygon of these minutiae needs to match for the two fingerprints to match. 
The Conventional Method is the oldest and most accurate method used when comparing two fin-
gerprints. Identification is based on ridge characteristics and their unit relationship with other ridge 
characteristics. This method differs from the other methods as it does not use the spatial position-
ing of the characteristics, but rather it uses the relationship between the characteristic and all other 
ridges in the print. This method allows matching even when there has been considerable distortion 
of the captured print. 
3.2.6 Automated Fingerprint Identification Systems 
Manual fingerprint identification is a tedious time-consuming process that can only be performed 
by trained professionals [12]. In the early 1960's efforts were initiated in the United States, France 
and Great Britain towards automating the comparison process. These efforts were stimulated by 
the development and commercial availability of the computer. Lee and Gaensslen [27] stated that 
this technology was intended to assist or even replace much of the labour intensive process of 
classifying, searching and matching fingerprints. 
The automated methods for comparing fingerprints are based upon the methods used when per-
forming a manual comparison. These methods also use the minute details or minutiae shown in 
Figure 3.1. 
The minutiae can be represented in Cartesian coordinates as an (x,y) pair along with a, the angle 
of the ridge relative to the primary axes. This is illustrated in Figure 3.4. Lee and Gaensslen also 
show that a set of sufficient size of these minutiae will produce a unique record. Extracting a set 
of minutiae from the fingerprint reduces the fingerprint comparison problem to a point-matching 
problem. The early work that tried to match two sets of minutiae revealed difficulties in the process. 
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(0,0) x 
Figure 3.4: A co-ordinate system for minutiae. 
These difficulties are direct results of the fact that two scans of a finger are never produced at the 
same orientation and position relative to the co-ordinate system. Along with this Lee and Gaensslen 
also indicate that the distortion of a scan differs from scan to scan. 
The pattern of the ridges remains constant for an individual once they have reached maturity. This 
pattern consists of the varying thickness and the curvatures of these lines, which is unique to a 
particular finger. 
The process of performing automated matching is based on the techniques used for manual match-
ing. These techniques all use the fact that the biological principles of fingerprints are well estab-
lished. These principles can be summarised as [31]: 
• Individual epidermal ridges and furrows have different characteristics for different finger-
prints. 
• The configuration types are individually variable, but they vary within limits which allow 
classification. 
• The configurations and minute details of individual ridges and furrows are permanent and 
unchanging. 
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Since the configuration of the minute details is unchanging we may use this configuration to perform 
the matching. This configuration is unique to a particular finger. 
3.2.7 LimitationslProblems of Fingerprints 
Fingerprints are used in the identification and verification of an individual's identity. As they are 
a biometric one would hope that the accuracy of the verification process would be significantly 
greater than that of non-biometric solutions. There are instances where this happens, although there 
are also many cases where the use of fingerprints is not the appropriate biometric or method for 
authentication. 
As the fingerprint has been used for a long time many advances have been made in its applications 
and a multitude of difficulties have been overcome. All the difficulties that are mentioned here have 
caused problems in real companies and contributed towards the verification system being rejected in 
favour of a system that does not use the fingerprint. However, there are also example cases of com-
panies that have managed the implementation of the system correctly and overcome or completely 
avoided these problems. 
Identification systems can be split into those that have an operator present at all times when the 
system is operational and those where the system needs to be able to operate independently of any 
operator intervention. An Automatic Teller Machine would fall into the latter category, whereas a 
system that verifies that the correct individual is collecting their pay cheque will probably have an 
operator monitoring the system. Any system that has an operator monitoring the system can have 
the operator override the system. However, systems that do not have an operator present when the 
system is in use need to have more complex procedures for coping with system failures. 
Accuracy and Reliability of the Matching Algorithms 
Computers are now used around the world to maintain large databases of fingerprints for the purpose 
of identifying individuals. These computers certainly do not have a 100% accuracy in the matching 
process. When a fingerprint expert manually searches through a small set of fingerprint cards to 
determine if a sample print is from the individuals that produced the card then he will consider 
his work to be 100% accurate. He will state categorically that the fingerprint is or is not a match. 
On the other hand when the computer performs a match and returns the result there is not a 100% 
confidence in the result [27]. 
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Most of the automated matching systems use a system involving the minutiae acquired from the 
fingerprint. They store these minutiae in some format thereby reducing the complexity of finger-
print matching to that of a point-matching problem. Unfortunately there is a lack of reliable minu-
tiae extraction algorithms and a difficulty in quantitatively defining a match between two sets of 
points [20]. All available minutiae detection algorithms result in spurious minutiae. 
A primary difficulty in performing the comparisons accurately results from variations in the biomet-
ric itself, as well as variations in its presentation [34]. 
Resistance to Fingerprints 
Traditionally fingerprints have been used, and still are associated with the identification of criminals, 
since they are considered to be valuable physical evidence in forensic science [27]. They have 
traditionally been, and still are, used to trace and identify criminals. Due to this fact there is a 
lack of acceptability for fingerprints by a typical user [19]. This has given the fingerprint a stigma 
and causes some apprehension with usage among civilians. Many individuals think that if their 
fingerprints are stored in a database that they might be used against them in an invasion of privacy 
(as discussed in Chapter 2). There is also the perception that the fingerprints will be used to track 
an individual's movements outside of the intended purpose for which the fingerprint was initially 
requested. Fingerprints are already required in many places to obtain a driver's licence or a passport. 
There has been some resistance to the use of the fingerprint in these systems. 
Despite the obvious strengths of biometrics there are still negative preconceptions [34]. The lack of 
clear information about how and when biometrics may be used can lead to ill-informed regulations, 
which could be overly restrictive to businesses [25]. There are a number of organisations such as the 
International Biometric Industry Association (IBIA) and the Biometric Consortium that have been 
formed to regulate and implement safeguards to prevent the misuse and abuse of biometrics. They 
also have policies to protect the confidentiality and integrity of databases containing biometric data. 
There might be individuals that refuse to be registered by the system for some reason. Sometimes 
these people refuse because they have a criminal record and are afraid that the records will be turned 
over to the police and sometimes they refuse for other personal reasons. They might just consider it 
an invasion of their privacy. Many law-abiding citizens are reluctant to allow their fingerprints to be 
stored in any electronic database. In their minds there is the distinct possibility that their fingerprints 
could fall into the wrong hands and that they could be used to invade privacy. The existence of a web 
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site entitled "Fight the Fingerprint,,2 illustrates how many individuals want to prevent others from 
having access to their fingerprints. This privacy issue can be solved through the use of distributed 
storage on smart cards, as this dissertation will proceed to demonstrate. 
Long Search Time 
A large amount of computational resources are required to perform automatic fingerprint identifica-
tion [19]. Another difficulty with the fingerprint arises from the lack of efficient search algorithms. 
It is not known how to order a database of fingerprints consistently. At best a search would have to 
be a brute force on a significant portion of the database. Implementing a classification scheme can 
substantially reduce the segment of the database that needs to be checked. However, the whole of 
the class must be compared against the print being searched for. 
This can be a very time consuming way to search through many thousands or even millions of 
fingerprint records when a comparison of a single fingerprint can take one second. The Verid Fin-
gerprint recognition webpage3 advertises that their system performs a verification in less than one 
second, performing a single fingerprint comparison. 
Missing Fingerprints 
The fingerprints of a small fraction of the population are unsuitable for matching due to genetic, 
aging, environmental, or occupational reasons [19]. 
Fingerprints vary widely in pattern and in quality. There are many activities that may cause dete-
rioration or even complete smoothing of the fingerprint. Although the fingerprint does regenerate 
to the same pattern unless extreme damage has been caused, there are many professions where the 
fingerprint is routinely damaged. These work environments seldom allow the fingertips sufficient 
chance to regenerate to their optimal level. 
Some forms of manual labour, particularly those where the hands are used for heavy labour can 
cause the central region of the fingerprint to rub off and become flat. This central region of the 
fingerprint is the region that is usually used as the predominant section of the print for purposes of 
alignment and comparison. When this section of the fingerprint is non-existent or non-usable that 
individual cannot reliably be authenticated based on their fingerprint. 
2http://www.networkusa.orglfingerprint.shtml 
3http://www.tssLco.ukJproductsifinger.htm 
3.2. FINGERPRINTS 29 
Fingerprints can also deteriorate if the fingers are exposed to certain chemicals, which can cause 
the sections of the fingerprint to become flat. Acids and bleaches among other chemicals have this 
effect. This results in the same set of problems that result from heavy labour. 
This smoothing of the fingerprint is not permanent. If the finger is given the chance to recover 
outside of the influences that caused it to flatten in the first place then it will recover to the identical 
pattern as before. 
There is also a fraction of the population that either does not possess the biometric or the biometric is 
unusable [34]. Some people have lost either a finger or hand and don't have their fingerprints. Other 
people could have exceptionally damaged prints rendering their fingerprints useless for purposes of 
identification. 
Diversity of Characteristics 
There is a wide variety in the fingerprints of individuals. Some have clearly defined ridges, while 
others have a much smoothed ridge structure. The distance between ridges varies with many hered-
itary traits of the user. 
The large variety is not inherently a problem, although in some systems it is. This is due to the 
fact that many systems have been developed in the United States of America or in Europe where 
they have used a database sample containing predominantly European male prints. The difference 
between the profiles of the popUlation that many systems are designed on and the population that 
comprise the actual users can cause problems. The accuracy of a system is sensitive to the target 
population. To have a successful implementation utilizing fingerprint technology one needs to un-
derstand and evaluate realistically the technology in the context of the target application and the 
target population [34]. 
Some systems use the distance between the ridges to detect if a region of the print is actually part of 
the fingerprint. If the range were not sufficient to cover all ethnic and gender differences then there 
could be a section of the population with which the system does not work well. 
There could also be systems that use a smoothing or blurring filter in the detection process. This 
step will help to remove small noise artefacts. If however the ridge structure is very fine, then it 
could cause neighbouring ridges to merge into one single unrecognisable structure. Many systems 
have some form of smoothing in the process to remove noise and to minimise the effect of sweat 
pores. 
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The wide variety in the fingerprints can actually be a good thing if it is correctly handled. The 
greater the variety the greater the discriminating power between fingerprints. Thus if it is handled 
well it will actually increase the accuracy of an authentication. 
Print Quality 
There are a large number of anomalies that occur naturally in a fingerprint [27]. These range from 
stretching through to rotation of the fingerprint. Distortions may be found in a fingerprint as a result 
of pressure and the shear forces involved in rotation. 
When the finger is scanned differences in the pressure or movement while the scanning is occurring 
could also cause a distorted image to be inaccurately captured. These distortions can introduce 
apparent dissimilarities in two prints from the same finger. 
In fingerprints there is commonly some error or noise in the scanned image. Sometimes the correct 
pattern of the print is obscured by this noise. Often the signal-to-noise ratio of inked fingerprints is 
of a very poor quality [27]. Poor quality prints can be a direct result of the conditions that the prints 
were acquired in. Some of these conditions are listed below. 
1. Dry fingers: Depending on the type of scanner the moisture content of the finger has a large 
effect on the quality of the final print obtainable from the scanner. With many scanners a dry 
finger often produces a poor quality print. A simple method that can be used to illustrate this 
difficulty is to place a finger on a clean glass. Then rub the same finger dry and repeat the 
process. There will be considerably less of a mark on the glass from the dry finger. There 
are many climates where there is either a dry winter or dry summer and large sections of the 
popUlation have dry hands. There are systems that struggle to recognise people half of the 
year or simply do not work for half the year. A climate different from one where the scanner 
was developed and tested could cause problems. 
Some scanners are more resilient to changes in the moisture content of the finger. This is 
a result of the fact that the different scanners use different methods to scan the fingerprint. 
They might be using pressure, moisture content, optical methods or electrostatic charge as 
the specific quality that gets measured to detect the ridges. 
2. Dirty fingers: People who work with coal as in coal power stations get the fine coal dust all 
over their hands. This fine coal dust clogs up the troughs between the ridges resulting in a 
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fingerprint scan that comes out smooth. The scan is then useless for electronic comparison 
purposes. 
3. Dirty scanners: There are companies that expect a fingerprint scanner to work magic once it 
is installed. They expect it to last indefinitely completely maintenance free. However, every 
time a finger in placed on the scanner it leaves a grease residue. Over time this accumulates 
on the scanner and can interfere with the accuracy of the scanning process. 
4. Orientation: The finger could be scanned at a different orientation from the one at which 
the reference was captured. There are comparison algorithms that can compare rotated scans 
accurately. The rotation can however easily cause the user to scan a different section of the 
fingertip, which could result in too little overlap to perform an accurate comparison. 
5. Translation: Different positions of the finger in different scans would cause a different area 
of the finger to be scanned. This translation needs to be accommodated. 
6. Pressure: Differences in the downward pressure of the finger during the scan can result in 
spatial scaling of the fingerprint. These differences also affect the contrast between ridges 
and troughs, particularly if the prints are acquired with the inked method [12]. 
7. Shear transformations: There could be different amounts of shear transformations exerted on 
a finger while it is scanned. 
8. Partial contact: Partial contact with the scanner results in only a section of the print being 
scanned. Long fingernails sometimes interfere with the scanning procedure. They sometimes 
grow down and around the front of the finger as illustrated in Figure 3.5. Even if they are 
straight they could get in the way and affect the scanned region. It is not always possible to 
enforce fingernail length on the users of a system and they will blame the system if it does 
not accept their fingerprints. 
Fingerprint region 
used for comparison 
Figure 3.5: The last joint of a finger with the fingernail growing around the front of the finger. 
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Some people have arthritis in the hands and have stiff fingers preventing them from straight-
ening their fingers. They might be unable to straighten the finger anymore than the finger 
depicted in Figure 3.5. This prevents them from placing the correct region of the finger on 
the scanner resulting in a poor quality scan that is often unusable and unrecognisable. 
9. Skin disease: Some diseases can affect the fingers resulting in large areas of it being unusable 
for comparison purposes [12]. 
10. Quantity of ink: The ink used in manual acquisition of the print. An over or under inking of 
a finger will result in a poor quality print. 
These factors all affect the quality of the fingerprint that is acquired for matching purposes. The 
combined effect of these can cause two fingerprints originating from the same finger at first to appear 
to be extremely different. To overcome these factors many of the manual fingerprint-matching 
techniques use the number of ridges between two minutiae as the measure of distance between 
them. This ridge count is often used in preference to the special count in manual comparisons. It 
is however somewhat one-dimensional as the ridges tend to run parallel to each other rather than 
in a crosshatch pattern. Thus the ridge count provides very good measurements in the direction 
perpendicular to the ridge structure, while providing poor measurements in the direction parallel to 
the ridge structure. It can also be difficult to accurately determine the ridge count automatically, 
particularly in poor quality images. 
Long Enrolment Time 
Often the enrolling process for a fingerprinting system involves acquiring many scans of an individ-
ual's fingerprints to generate a base template. This base template needs to be of the best possible 
quality to ensure that the matches against it can be of an acceptable accuracy. To achieve a fit as 
close as possible to the perfect base template, most systems perform many processing steps on the 
image before reaching the final result. This produces a long enrol time, which can be a problem if 
large groups of people need to be enrolled sequentially. 
The event of having large groups of people being enrolled at the same time is likely to occur reg-
ularly in many systems. If a new authentication module is integrated into the system then all the 
users need to be enrolled. Educational institutions will have regular intakes of students and many 
companies have policies of recruiting new employees in batches. These scenarios will all require 
group enrolments. 
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Proxies 
The idea of using a biometric is to ensure that the person claiming an identity can be verified as that 
person. Unlike the system that uses a PIN or password to verify a usemame, other people cannot 
borrow your finger. This can sometimes be a problem. For example if you need a fingerprint to 
log on to a computer network but you are ill, you cannot give your finger to a trusted friend and 
then change it the next day as yon could with a password. This also happens with pension schemes. 
Many of the people on pension schemes are not in a position, due to health reasons, to collect their 
pensions personally on a regular basis. They can often appoint a proxy to collect the pension in their 
place. This is an extra complexity that needs to be tackled in many biometric systems. 
There are subtle features that need examination if proxies are to be enabled. One of the main reasons 
that pension schemes are keen on using a fingerprint is to reduce fraud - a pensioner dies, but is not 
cancelled from the system and the pension is still collected. Using the pensioner's fingerprint would 
ensure that she is still alive. But as it is not always possible for the pensioner to be present physically 
due to health reasons, proxies are needed. However allowing a proxy nullifies the predominant 
reason for implementing fingerprint authentication unless it is implemented in conjunction with 
other controls. 
3.2.8 How Fingerprints can be Used 
It is stil1 a difficult task to identify an individual based on their fingerprints and there is much room 
for improvement. This is not yet viable for real-time identification, but verification of a user's 
identity using the fingerprint is viable. The user will just need to make a claim as to who they are 
and then supply a fingerprint supporting this. Only an individual who is registered with a system, 
which is only verifying his identity rather than identifying who he is, would be able to use it. This 
makes it very difficult to track a person's movements except where he voluntarily identifies himself. 
Fingerprints are very difficult to forge [40]. There is no anecdotal evidence of forgery using modem 
fingerprint scanners. Modem fingerprint scanners can detect many properties about the finger in ad-
dition to acquiring the fingerprint itself. These properties allow the fingerprint scanner to determine 
whether the finger being scanned is a living finger and can be used to ensure that a valid user is 
physically present for the system to operate. 
The use of modem live scan fingerprint capturing equipment should be able regularly to produce 
a high quality scan usable for comparisons. From these prints it is possible to extract a set of 
34 CHAPTER 3. BACKGROUND 
minutiae for use in the comparison process. Extracting these points and then comparing them can be 
performed in reasonable time in automated systems. Various authors have described many different 
types of minutiae. However these classes of minutiae can all be described in terms of ridge endings 
and ridge bifurcations. A typical finger will contain between 50 and 150 minutiae on the complete 
fingerprint. And in automated systems it is generally assumed that 10 points matching is sufficient to 
establish identity, since a pair of fingerprints that are identical, yet come from two different fingers 
has never been founel [12]. 
3.3 Smart Tokens 
"A smart card is ... the size of a conventional credit card, and it has an electronic mi-
crochip embedded in it. The chip stores electronic data and programs that are protected 
by advanced security features." Gemplus4 • 
3.3.1 What is a Smart Token? 
The term smart token refers to a number of different technologies, all of which provide portable 
information storage. A number of different types of smart cards are available on the market. The 
most common of these look very similar to a credit card in appearance, but offer considerably more 
functionality. All smart cards provide some form of secure data storage and most new cards support 
a number of additional services, such as encryption. 
The most common type of smart card is the memory card consisting of a non-volatile memory chip 
that stores data. A typical example usage of these cards is for phone cards. These cards do not have 
any processing power on them. Some people do not consider these cards to be smart cards, however 
since some authors treat them as smart cards they have been included in this discussion. 
The other "smarter" smart tokens have a builtin microprocessor embedded into the card allowing 
the card to provide a wide range of additional functionality, ranging from the ability to manage a 
file system on the card to the encryption and decryption of private sensitive data. These microchip 
cards can be conceptualised as a small processor, with secure private memory and secure non-
volatile storage space. These cards are not full computers, and can only be of use when connected 
to another computer via a smart card reader. 
4http://www.gemplus.comlbasicslwhat.htm 
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A number of standards exist for the design and implementation of smart cards. Of these one of 
the more common is the ISO 7816 standard, which defines the physical specifications of the card, 
along with its behaviour under various operating conditions. This standard specifies the size and 
the positioning of the various components of the card. The card needs to be resistant to ultra-violet 
light, x-rays, magnetic fields, static electricity, and should to be flexible enough to not crack after 
being bent 1000 times. These constraints on the card have direct implications on the microchips that 
can be used. The silicon used in the chip cannot be too thick, as it would then crack if bent. These 
physical constraints provide challenges to the design of fast microchips for the cards. 
3.3.2 Evolution of the Smart Card 
Many early cryptographic systems had some form of protection against the seizure of key material. 
Naval code books were weighted; rotor machine setting sheets were printed using water soluble 
ink; and some one-time pads were printed on cellulose nitrate, so that they would burn rapidly if 
ignited [21]. These forms of secure hardware were a precursor to the smart card. 
These systems relied on the vigilance and trustworthiness of the operator and were often captured 
in surprise attacks [2]. Modern cryptographic equipment has been designed with a view to prevent 
tampering. An example of this is the VISA Security Module commonly used in banks to generate 
and check the personal identification number (PIN) with which customers authenticate themselves 
to the automatic teller machine. These modules use a safe to store a computer that generates the 
PINs. If the safe is opened or tampered with then the contents of the computer are erased [52]. The 
idea is to protect the customer by preventing the bank's programmers from gaining access to the 
customer's PINs and the keys that protect them [1]. 
As early as 1961 the first electronic-based cards were developed and patented. It was not until 
1974 that this technology was first used commercially. A French journalist, Roland Moreno in-
vented a circuit-based memory ring that could be used for secure payments. A bank consortium, Le 
Groupement des Cartes Bancaires realised the potential, but requested that the design be placed on 
a bankcard rather than on a ring. Moreno then approached the French company Cll-Honeywell Bull 
to mass-produce the cards. 
Michael Ugon, an engineer at Bull suggested that an integrated microprocessor chip be used, as 
this would improve the security. The banks agreed and in October 1980 the first microprocessor 
bankcards Were patented and produced. Soon thereafter both Philips and Schlumberger released 
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their own standards for such cards. Microprocessor cards slowly started to gain acceptance in French 
banking and pay TV. 
After retail trials the banks adopted Bull's design, as it was open ended and provided better security. 
Since then smart cards have come to be used for many different applications. These include the 
electronic purse in open and closed payment schemes, debit and credit cards for banking, identifi-
cation cards, driving licences, health care, access control, cellphones, and loyalty cards along with 
many others. For the last three to four years microchip cards have been booming in the GSM phone 
SIM and electronic purse applications. 
Some countries are now using smart card for their credit cards. These cards have a PIN stored on 
them, which is used to verify the use of the card. These credit-card sized devices contain an embed-
ded microchip consisting of a CPU, RAM and ROM. There are many different applications where 
smart cards are now used most of them are in access control, electronic commerce, personal 
authentication and privacy protection. However there has been limited analysis of the security risks 
and threats particular to the smart card [42]. 
The additional security provided by secure hardware should be such that it is difficult for an intruder 
to observe or partake in any information exchange. The communications between the different 
pieces of tamper resistant hardware are not necessarily secure unless they are all combined into a 
single unit of tamper proof hardware. 
The most common form of secure hardware is the smart card. Most smart cards have a program 
loaded in the ROM when they are produced. However, we are seeing more cards that have an 
application loader in the ROM. This allows the development of multi-application cards with applets 
in the EEPROM. These smart cards are produced with a bootstrap loader installed on them. This 
allows the reader to load data or programs onto the smart card and to interrogate different memory 
locations on the card. These applications on the card can have complete control over the access to 
the RAM on the card. 
From this large range of different applications all utilizing smart card technology the idea was 
conceived of using a single smart card that could be loaded with all of these programs. Thus the 
concept of the multipurpose smart card originated. 
Along with this growth and development in smart cards, the processing power and the memory 
storage that is provided by these cards has dramatically increased. This is stin adhering to the 
stringent requirements placed on the physical size and flexibility of the microchip on the card. The 
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very first microchip cards came with an 8-bit processor and a few bytes of RAM. The cards have 
progressed a long way since then. The power of modern cards can be illustrated with the SmartJ [45] 
card. This card contains a 32-bit RISC processor with a peak: performance of 40 MIPS. The card 
was specifically designed to support multiple Java applications on a single card. 
Smart tokens can be differentiated into groups depending on the type of reader that they interface 
with. This would divide smart tokens into two groups - those that require contact with the reader 
and those that interface via radio frequencies with a contactless reader. 
3.3.3 Contact Cards 
These are credit card sized cards that contain a small microchip on the front edge of the card. 
The chip size is limited to about 25mm2, typically 5mm x 5mm attached to a contact area of about 
lOmm x 10mm. This card needs to be placed in a smart card reader and the microchip needs to be 
in physical contact with the reader for it to be usable. This contact allows an electrical signal to be 
transferred between the reader and the card, thereby driving the card. Contact cards do not have 
their own power supply, but rely upon the reader to power them. 
Memory and microprocessor cards are slowly replacing the more traditional swipe cards. For this 
reason they often have a magnetic strip to facilitate the transition between these two technologies. 
The International Organisation for Standardisation (ISO) has defined the exact layout of the contact 
region of the microchip in the ISO 7816 standard. This standard also places size and flexibility 
restriction upon the microchip. 
Memory Cards 
Memory cards act as a storage facility. About half of memory cards are disposable and can be 
discarded once their task is completed [53]. These cards have been in production for about 15 years 
and because they are both simple and in high demand they are relatively cheap to manufacture. 
Memory cards can be differentiated into two groups. The first group is simple memory cards. These 
can store about 2K of data. Magnetic swipe cards can store at most 0.2K of data. However these 
cards provide minimal security, since the memory is not protected from reads. Protected memory 
cards are similar to the simple memory cards, but their memory can only be accessed through the 
use of a secret key. These are a viable option for an electronic purse. 
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Microprocessor Cards 
Microprocessor cards contain a small processor embedded on the front of the card. This provides 
an enhanced fnnctionality allowing higher security levels and finer control. On-card processing 
facilities allow the execution of encryption algorithms or other security features. These cards have 
an operating system executing on the microchip and require software to be developed to enable them 
to support a wide range of cryptographic and security applications. 
The microchip consists of the processor along with three types of memory. The first type of memory 
is the Read Only Memory (ROM), which stores the operating system. This memory is initialised at 
the time of card creation and cannot be modified by the cardholder. The ROM can vary from lK 
or 2K up to 64K. The second is the Random Access Memory (RAM). This is a workspace for the 
programs loaded on the card and is typically from 64 bytes to 1024 bytes. The third type of memory 
is the Electronically Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory (EEPROM), which is non-volatile 
memory used to store persistent data. 
3.3.4 Contactless Tokens 
Contactless smart cards do not need to be in physical contact with the reader. Many different 
technologies are used to power contactless cards. These technologies can be divided into those 
that are active and those that are passive. The active cards have their own power source (usually a 
battery) while the passive cards derive their power from the current produced by converting radio 
frequency energy, which is emitted from the card reader. They have an embedded antenna to allow 
them to communicate with a reader. Con tactless cards are normally driven by transmissions from 
the reader. 
With contactless cards there are additional complexities arising from the need to supply power to the 
cards without resorting to an embedded battery. Instead, the card is powered by a different radio-
frequency electromagnetic wave from that which carries the data. The microchip needs to include 
circuits to extract power from the receiver carrier wave in addition to all the components of the 
contact cards. For practical and economic reasons, the chip should require no external components 
other than a small printed antenna coil that can be easily assembled in a micro-module [46]. There 
are also a number of security issues linked to contactless cards, since their signals are broadcast via 
radio signals and therefore are easier to eavesdrop. 
3.3. SMART TOKENS 39 
3.3.5 Difficulties with Smart Tokens 
Smart cards are intended to provide a tamper resistant environment in which small applications 
can execute in the privacy of the card's microchip. Increasingly many systems are now relying on 
this tamper resistance of the smart card in preference to other security devices. Unfortunately this 
reliance on the integrity of the card is sometimes misplaced, as many of the older cards have been 
broken [2]. In most of those cases this is not a fault of the hardware, but rather a subtle flaw in 
the communications or security protocoL Attacks can be attempted over a range of possible angles, 
ranging from trying to remove layers of the microchip to examine the charge under a microscope 
and thereby determine the state of a bit, to the more common replay attacks. 
Part of the inherent complexity of developing systems that make use of smart card technologies 
result from the nature of the microchip being split from the other components of the system. The 
microchip in the card is essentially a CPU and memory device with no dedicated means of commu-
nicating with the outside world. Thus the smart card is "handicapped". For the card to communicate 
with the outside world it needs to communicate via a smart card reader which is external to the 
card. This can make the design and use of smart cards riskier than similar systems based on self-
contained computers [42]. For example if there is a subverted reader which notifies the user that 
$1,00 has been charged to their card, while in actual fact $2,00 was charged to the card there is no 
way for the owner of the card to verify this except by using another reader. 
One of the primary purposes for utilizing a smart card is to provide a secure storage area for a small 
amount of private information. The hardware and the software embedded on the card needs to be 
able to protect this information, whether it is a private key or biometric information. The card needs 
to be resilient to the attempts of a subverted reader to extract this information. All this needs to occur 
with the card in its own isolated cocoon with its only communication line through the reader - with 
the card having no way of notifying the user if sensitive information is requested from the card. 
If smart card is lost or stolen it might take days or even weeks before the owner realises. The 
thief could even try reverse-engineering the card to defeat the tamper-resistance [2]. A smart card 
is usually designed to be accessed with a PIN. If n incorrect PINs are entered then the card would 
become locked. However if the time for a successful verification is less than the time for an incorrect 
PIN then it could be possible to abort the transaction before the card registers an incorrect PIN. Thus 
brute force and a careful timing attack might be able to recover the PIN. Other attacks could include 
fault analysis [4, 3] and side channel attacks such as power or timing analysis [23, 24, 22]. It is 
therefore advantageous to store the information on the smart card securely in an encrypted format. 
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If an attacker takes a card into a laboratory containing highly sophisticated equipment, he might 
attempt to duplicate or to modify the information on the card. Depending on the circumstances this 
could circumvent security mechanisms. If for example the information on the card was secured with 
a PIN or a fingerprint and the attacker was able to replace the PIN or fingerprint on the card then 
this would allow him to impersonate the valid user. A good system needs to be able to prevent the 
cards from being duplicated and/or modified by an attacker. These subtle attacks can involve the 
use of fake and modified cards running rogue software, with the intent of subverting the protocol 
between card and terminal [28). 
3.3.6 Why Smart Tokens are Used 
Smart cards have some interesting and unique aspects that need to be considered and correctly 
handled. Manufacturers and developers are slowly gaining a better insight into these complexities 
as the design of the cards is improved, both at the hardware and at the software layer. As these 
known attacks are prevented the security and effectiveness of the card is increased. 
Cryptography is an essential component in modem information systems. It helps to provide ac-
countability, fairness, accuracy and confidentiality and can be used to reduce fraud and assure the 
validity of financial transactions. It can prove your identity or protect your anonymity. Cryptogra-
phy needs to be used in conjunction with secure hardware. A smart card or smart token can provide 
an affordable secure hardware suitable for cryptographic applications. The system needs to be de-
signed as an integrated unit since two programs with similar features could have vast differences in 
their security levels and very different subtle security flaws. An experienced cryptographer can tell 
the difference - so can a thief [39]. 
A smart card can be used to provide a personalized security token. The microchip makes it consid-
erably more powerful than a swipe card. It provides both access control to the information on the 
card and can execute small, embedded programs. If for example a swipe card is stolen and the thief 
tries to use it the card might get locked out by the system after five attempts. However the card still 
contains private information about the user's account. Compare this to the use of a smart card. If 
five false attempts are made to use the smart card it can both lock the card and destroy all sensitive 
information that it holds. In other words, the control has been delegated to the card. 
One would like to have a secure tamperproof-operating environment in which it is impossible for 
an attacker to gain access. Schneier [39] points out that subtle flaws can render any security system 
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vulnerable to attack. When designing a security system one needs to consider all possible security 
risks carefully. To increase the level of security one needs to conduct a thorough examination of 
the possible security flaws and then design systems without them. At the same time one must not 
introduce new security holes. 
3.3.7 Security of the Smart Card 
A microchip card contains a small processor and memory, which together can be treated as an 
object. The memory cannot be accessed externally from the card. The only way that information 
can be transferred with the card is by sending it messages and receiving responses. Like all objects, 
the card only understands the set of messages defined for it, providing it with measures to manage 
its data. 
Smart cards are intended to provide a physical level of security to prevent direct access to their 
memory. The smart card consists of a small microprocessor with memory, (both volatile and non-
volatile). The ROM ofthe card has an operating system installed on it at creation time. The Siemens 
SLE44CI60S, which was used, comes with an operating system loaded in the ROM that provides 
functionality to install software on the card. This program loader supports only a single program 
on a card. When it loads a program it erases all data previously in the EEPROM and RAM, before 
installing replacement software. This provides sufficient protection to prevent modified cards from 
accessing previous data stored on the card. If the card is modified or reused then all the data, which 
was on it, is destroyed. 
Attacks exist that utilise micro probing to examine the chip and read the contents off of it. These 
attacks either use an electron microscope to examine the state of the memory or they use micro-
probes to eavesdrop on the bus. To prevent micro probing the chips have reduced feature sizes and 
consist of multiple layers making it difficult to gain physical access to the bus. The communications 
on the bus are encrypted to render them useless even if eavesdropped. 
A second class of attacks comprises the side-channel analysis of the card. These attacks, which 
monitor the power consumption and timing, have been successful against some of the original smart 
cards. Random wait states and the addition of noise to the power consumption are features many 
cards now have to prevent side-channel analysis. Side-channel attacks are one of the most difficult 
attacks to prevent as they utilize implementation peculiarities to gain information. For example, the 
timing of a failed and successful authentication could possibly indicate whether it was a success or 
failure before the transaction completes. 
42 CHAPTER 3. BACKGROUND 
The third group of methods attack flaws in the protocols to gain access to the contents of the card. 
The protocols that the card participates in are usually small. These protocols should be adequately 
tested before a product is released to remove flaws from them. The secnrity of smart cards has 
increased as weak points are identified and removed thereby enhancing the protection that the card 
is able to offer. 
3.3.8 Integration of Fingerprints with Smart Cards. 
One of the potential security flaws of passwords and PIN codes is that they are vulnerable to being 
stolen or guessed. Many people write their passwords down and there is also the possibility of a 
brute force attack being developed. The need for passwords can be removed if one uses a biometric 
instead of a password. 
Such a system can be designed to incorporate the security principles of privacy. This system could 
be designed so that each individual requires a unique user name associated. This username would 
be stored on a smart card along with a biometric template for authentication. The verification 
information could require a password or PIN in addition to the biometric. 
One of the primary concerns many individuals have with a civilian use of the fingerprint is who 
will have access to the fingerprint and what it will be used for. Will it only be used for the specific 
purpose for which it was given or will it be used for other unspecified purposes? By placing the 
fingerprint onto a smart card this should give the user complete control over how and when the 
fingerprint is used, while at the same time enhancing the level of security attainable through a 
biometric solution. 
3.4 Summary 
There are many biometrics that are being used or experimented with for personal authentication 
systems. These biometrics range from fingerprints through to DNA scans. Each biometric has its 
own set of advantages and disadvantages, but all of them need to satisfy a number of requirements 
to be useful. They need to be universal, unique, permanent and collectable. Along with these the 
algorithm used needs to have an acceptable level of performance. The system should be as non-
invasive as possible such that it is acceptable to the public and it should be difficult to circumvent. 
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Biometric technologies can be compared on the FAR and FRR. The Equal Error Rate (EER) is 
the adjustment of the match parameters such that the FAR equals the FRR. These measures of the 
accuracy along with other performance characteristics can be used to determine the suitability of a 
technology for a specific purpose. 
The fingerprint is the most widely used biometric. This is the pattern of ridges and furrows that cover 
the tips of the fingers and toes, giving them a corrugated appearance. These ridges and furrows allow 
the fingertips to perspire while maintaining a tactile and gripping facility. 
Fingerprints contain minutiae, which can be used for the comparison. These minutiae are located at 
the ridge endings and the ridge bifurcations. Macro characteristics of the fingerprints can be used 
to aid in the alignment of fingerprints. Macro characteristics include the classification and location 
of the core and delta points. Manual fingerprint comparison is based on the matching of minutiae. 
There are a number of difficulties with digital fingerprint comparisons that need to be dealt with and 
overcome to provide a good system. These difficulties include complexity of accurately extracting 
the minutiae, particularly from images of degraded quality. The print quality is influenced by fac-
tors ranging from the moisture content to the cleanliness of the finger and scanner. Some people 
have a perception that fingerprints can be used to infringe upon their privacy. There is no highly 
accurate scheme for indexing fingerprints requiring long search times to locate a print in a database. 
Fingerprints have a wide variety and occasionally they are missing from an individual. 
Smart cards provide a tamper resistant hardware that can be used for the storage and comparison of 
fingerprints. Most smart cards conform to the ISO 7816 standard specifying the size, flexibility and 
resilience of the cards. 
Smart cards are replacing the swipe cards for many applications. Smart cards have been in use 
as telephone cards for a number of years already. The simplest smart cards are just a memory 
card, while the more complex ones contain a microprocessor. Typically the microprocessor has a 
combination of RAM, ROM and EEPROM along with an eight-bit processor executing at clock 
speeds of 3.5 - 5 MHz. 
There are still a number of difficulties with smart cards. There have been attacks on smart cards 
that have broken most of the early cards. However the manufactures of the cards are using the 
information gained from these attacks to improve the design making it increasingly more difficult 
to access the card without the valid authentication. Most of these attacks are not however on the 
hardware of the card, but rather on the protocols used in the communications between the card and 
reader. 
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Smart cards have been used in conjunction with fingerprints to provide personal authentication. 
Fingerprint comparisons had not yet been performed on the card itself at the time of this research, 
even though Gemplus have now placed comparison routines on a card. Previous system just used the 
card to store a fingerprint template. The fingerprint template was then transferred to a computer to 
perform the comparison. This combination does not prevent an attacker from acquiring the template 
off of the card. 
Chapter 4 
Architecture and Design 
Authentication of a user's identity is a difficult but crucial task in many contexts. Traditionally the 
use of a username and a password or Personal Identification Number (PIN) has sufficed as proof of 
identity. However passwords and PIN numbers can get lost, stolen, or guessed. Thus to overcome 
this difficulty it is preferable to use a biometric. The fingerprint is used although it is possible to use 
a different biometric, or combination of biometrics in place of the fingerprint. 
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Figure 4.1: Overview of the fingerprint authentication of an individual performed on a smart card. 
The conceptual overview of the architecture of the system developed is shown in Figure 4.1. In this 
diagram there is a high level overview illustrating the processes involved in the authentication of an 
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individual. This begins with the acquisition of the fingerprint image and ends with a final decision 
of whether the fingerprints are a match or not. The scanned image is passed through a series of 
transformations that extract a set of minutiae. These minutiae are each points with an associated 
direction. Sets of these minutiae are stored on a smart card for use as a template to compare against 
the set extracted from the input fingerprint. These points could also be stored in a database - but 
this does introduce extra security issues. 
The output from the comparison process is a match certificate. This match certificate is returned 
from the smart card if a fingerprint successfully matches the print stored on the card and should only 
be used internally to the system to allow a transaction. 
4.1 System Requirements 
Before any system can be designed and developed there are a number of criteria and constraints 
that should to be examined. For the system that was developed in this dissertation a number of key 
issues were examined. These issues are similar to the ones one would expect for any authentication 
system, although they are presented specifically as they apply to a biometric system for the personal 
authentication. 
4.1.1 Security/Accuracy 
When a username/password pair is used to verify an individual's identity the pair needs to be se-
curely stored for purposes of comparison. A number of operating systems encrypt the password 
file. This password file is sometimes shadowed, which prevents hackers from reading it even in the 
encrypted format. Somehow the passwords of all the users of a system need to be stored, while at 
the same time access to the passwords needs to be prevented except for authentication purposes. For 
minutiae to be used a template of the fingerprint needs to be stored along with the username. This 
template also needs to be stored such that it can only be accessed for comparison purposes. 
One does not require an exact match to consider two fingerprints to have originated form the same 
finger. This makes it more difficult to determine if two fingerprints originated from the same finger 
compared with the exact match used in password verification. With fingerprints one determines the 
correlation between the prints and then uses a confidence level to determine whether to declare them 
as a match. 
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These confidence levels are used to specify the False Rejection Rate (FRR) and the False Acceptance 
Rate (FAR) of the system. The FRR is the percentage of the attempts to validate a user where the 
correct user is rejected by the system. The FAR describes the percentage of attempts attempted by 
an incorrect user where she is authenticated as being the correct user. 
In the ideal system both the FRR and the FAR would be zero. In practice there are some false posi-
tives and some false negatives in any system, just like a password is sometimes correctly guessed, or 
incorrectly entered. There is a correlation between the FAR and the FRR. Tightening a parameter to 
reduce the error margin in false acceptance would have the counter affect of increasing the chance 
of a false rejection. 
In the system discussed in this dissertation, the fingerprint template is placed onto a smart card. 
All comparison of the fingerprint will then be performed on the card itself, removing all reasons 
for allowing the template to leave the card. By delegating the decision process concerning the 
match between fingerprints to the card the specialized risks incurred from the use of smart cards are 
reduced. The card should be unusable to all people except the authorised user. Any data stored on 
the smart card and protected by the fingerprint should remain private even when tampered with in a 
fully equipped laboratory. 
4.1.2 Efficiency!Performance 
An effective authentication system should be quick. The amount of time allowed depends on the 
application and frequency of the authentication process. For an Automated Teller Machine the 
maximum that a user would consider acceptable would be about three seconds. For logging on 
to a computer the whole process could take up to about five seconds and still be acceptable. The 
performance requirements for a system can also have an effect on the accuracy of the matching 
process. There are enhancement algorithms that can be applied to a fingerprint, which will reduce 
the FRR and the FAR. These algorithms are typically CPU intensive slowing the whole process. 
To migrate the point comparison step of the matching process onto a smart card will require that it 
is a highly efficient algorithm in terms of both CPU and memory requirements. The point-matching 
algorithm has been examined and modified specifically to reduce space and time to allow it to 
operate on a smart card. The smart cards available for this project have 256 bytes of RAM and an 
eight-bit CPU operating at speeds in the range of 3.5 - 5 MHz. This is at least 100 times slower 
than a modern Pc. 
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4.1.3 Redundancy and Robustness 
A system must be robust. It should contain measures to ensure that the system can function correctly 
under adverse conditions. For any system that authenticates individuals one can safely assume that 
there will be attempts to hack into the system. These attackers will attempt to impersonate other 
valid users to gain unauthorised access. They will attempt to stress the system beyond its breaking 
point. 
Thus any system developed for personal authentication that protects sensitive information should 
be designed to be resilient under extreme pressure. It should be robust enough to cope with most 
events that could happen. There should to be some redundancy in the system to accommodate 
system failures. If a network link goes down then the system should ideally still be able to function 
in an acceptable fashion. The system should be able to cope with errors and recover from these 
errors. Performance should gradually degrade under a loss of resources rather than a complete 
sudden failure. 
How does the system perform under stress? Is there enough redundancy designed into the system 
to provide robustness for it to recover after a failure? Can the system recover from errors and 
seamlessly continue by utilizing alternate methods? 
4.1.4 Scalability 
Many systems in current operational use were designed and implemented for a limited number 
of users. Over time the number of users for these systems has increased resulting in a gradual 
degradation of performance in these systems. Systems, even when they are designed for only a 
small company's use, should still be designed based on the scalability principles. 
The system needs to be designed to cope with large numbers of users. Currently systems that 
identify a user based on a fingerprint take a long time when a large database needs to be searched. 
Those systems have trouble scaling to cover large numbers of users as the search is O( n). There are 
no search algorithms for a database of fingerprints that are O(logn). Systems that use a username 
and a fingerprint are capable of scaling to include large numbers of users, however if the search can 
be performed on a username then it can be found in O(logn) time. 
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4.1.5 Offline/Online 
Some systems are designed to only operate when they are online. These systems include most 
database systems. They are unable to operate if they are unable to contact the database server. Very 
often though the system could be authorised to allow limited transactions to proceed even without 
authorization from the database. Sometimes the only reason to access a particular database is to 
validate a user's identity. 
How efficiently and effectively will the system perform offline, or does it need to be online? One 
would like the system to work efficiently offline thereby making it more robust and reliable under 
failure. Does an authentication server need to online be to authenticate an individual? 
Placing the fingerprint template onto a smart card allows the authentication to be distributed and 
thus performed without the need for any network access. This should allow a system to operate 
offline thereby increase the robustness and scalability of the system. 
4.2 System Overview 
As previously mentioned this dissertation is concentrating on the processes from the acquisition of 
a fingerprint scan through to the final decision of whether they originated from the same finger. The 
last step will be performed on a smart card, while the initial preparation phases, which are used to 
extract the minutiae set, can be executed on a workstation. 
4.2.1 Choice of Smart Cards for this Work 
For this work the Siemens SLE44C160S smart card was chosen. This card has 16KB ROM, of 
which IKB is used for the operating system on the card. The ROM is written at the time of card 
creation and cannot be changed after that. This work does not use the ROM. There is 16KB of 
EEPROM, which was divided into two 8KB blocks. The one block was used for data and the other 
for code. This division can easily be changed. The card has 256 bytes of RAM. 
The SLE44C 160S card contains sufficient resources for the purposes of the work. For additional 
developments to this work the SLE66CX160S card, with its crypto-processor, would add the ability 
to sign data with the RSA algorithm using 1024-bit keys in less than one second. Triple-DES can 
be implemented on either of these cards requiring less than lOOms for the required computation to 
create a digital signature. 
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4.2.2 Data Representation 
The system developed made use of the Siemens FingerTip fingerprint scanner to acquire digital 
fingerprint images. These images contain an intensity field representing the ridge structure. Each 
pixel is an eight-bit value. Low values indicate a ridge with the fingertip closer at that pixel to 
the scanner .. This initial intensity image is used as the input for the matching process. From this 
image a usable representation of the fingerprint is extracted as it is passed through a number of 













Figure 4.2: An overview of the transformations of the fingerprint. 
For the purpose of testing the system it also can take as input an image of a fingerprint from a 
database. This image can be injected into the system in place of the image acquired from the 
scanner. It will only be used for test purposes, but it will allow the system to be compared against 
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other systems that utilize fingerprint technologies. There are a number of standard databases that 
can be utilized for this purpose. For this research the fingerprint databases from National Institute 
of Standards and Technology (NIST) were used. 
The input image, from either the scanner or the database, is passed through a number of steps. The 
first of these stages is the enhancement stage, during which the random noise is reduced and the 
ridge and trough structure is sharpened. 
Figure 4.3: The enhanced fingerprint showing the core and the direction. 
This process produces an enhanced, smoother pressure field of the fingerprint. This enhanced image 
is used as the input to construct an orientation field and a ridge map (see Figure 4.2). The orientation 
field indicates the dominant directions of the ridge structure. From the orientation field the core point 
is extracted and a direction associated with the print is determined. This direction and core point 
can be used in the alignment of two scans from a finger. In Figure 4.4 the orientation field with the 
core point and direction superimposed over the orientations is illustrated. This core point is overlaid 
onto the enhanced fingerprint image in Figure 4.3. The core point is defined as the point of sharpest 
concave curvature of the ridge structure. All fingerprints should have a single unique point that fits 
. this description. 
A ridge map needs to be produced from the enhanced fingerprint as illustrated in Figure 4.2. The 
ridge map is a two-colour image of the fingerprint splitting the image into ridges and troughs. The 
ridges are then further processed to produce a thinned ridge map, which simplifies the extraction of 
the minutiae by thinning each ridge to a single pixel in width. 
From the thinned ridge map a set of minutiae are extracted. These minutiae are comprised of both 
the endpoints of the ridges and the ridge bifurcations or forks in the ridges. These minutiae have 
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Figure 4.4: The orientation field of a fingerprint with the core and direction superimposed on it. 
Figure 4.5: Minutiae from an enlarged section of a fingerprint. 
4.2. SYSTEM OVERVlEW 53 
been highlighted with circles superimposed over the original scanned image in Figure 4.5. They 
are used as the basis of the fingerprint representation that is stored. Only these minutiae need to be 
compared to determine whether or not the prints are a match. 
The minutiae are then converted from Cartesian coordinates (x,y) to polar coordinates (r,9). The 
direction (a) of the ridges from which the minutiae were extracted along with other characteristics 
of the minutiae are recorded together with the position of the point. This information is needed to 
perform the matching step. 
4.2.3 Matching Process 
The procedure described in Section 4.2.2 produces a set of minutiae. These minutiae can either 
be stored as a template for later comparisons or they can be compared with a previously recorded 
template of minutiae. 
If used as a template they would be placed onto a smart card. This set of minutiae needs to be com-
pact in size. The reduction of size in the stored representation is necessary since the Siemens smart 
cards that are used have only 256 bytes of RAM and 16 KB of Electrically Erasable Programmable 
Read Only Memory (EEPROM). This set of minutiae can then be stored in the EEPROM of the 
smart card and reduces space requirements from 256 KB needed for an image scan of size 512 x 
512 with an 8-bit intensity resolution, to less than 512 bytes. In effect the matching problem has 
been reduced to a simple point-matching problem. 
The 256 bytes of RAM create a constraint on the size and complexity of the matching algorithm. 
The desire to perform the matching process on the smart card was a critical factor in the decision to 
use a set of minutiae as the representation. 
The matching process is performed on the smart card. By performing the match on the smart card 
the template of the fingerprint never needs to be removed from smart card. This gives the cardholder 
complete control over the use of her fingerprint. She can then choose exactly when she wants to 
verify herself using her fingerprint and other people cannot access or remove the representation of 
the fingerprint from the card. The fingerprint does not need to be stored centrally in a database. 
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4.3 Summary 
The authentication process can be divided into two main sections those that need to be performed 
on the smart card and other subsidiary processes. For security and privacy reasons the minutiae 
comparison procedure needs to be placed on the smart card. The set of minutiae can be extracted 
before being sent to the smart card without any loss of privacy since the fingerprint must be scanned 
into some intermediate area prior to sending it to the card. The process starts with the acquisition 
of a fingerprint image from a scanner. This image is then transformed into a set of minutiae, which 
are then sent to the smart card for comparison against a template stored on the card. 
Systems implementing this authentication process need to fulfil certain performance requirements 
to be useful. The comparison of fingerprints needs to have a sufficient level of accuracy for it to 
be able to provide a secure authentication solution. The comparison needs to be efficient to allow 
it to be used for real-time verification. As with all security systems there needs to be sufficient 
robustness and redundancy to make it difficult for an impostor to masquerade as a valid user. The 
distributed database created by storing the fingerprints on smart cards allows the systems be very 
scalable and to operate offline. 
Chapter 5 
Implementation 
The process of verifying a user based on his or her fingerprint presents a number of challenges. 
For this system the main challenges were to compress the fingerprint representation and matching 
routines to allow it to be implemented on a smart card. Many of the algorithms were modified in 




Figure 5.1: An overview of the physical separation of the components in the authentication process. 
The whole process has been split into three sections which are shown in Figure 5.1. The first of 
these sections is the acquisition of the fingerprint image. In this section the fingerprint would be 
acquired from a live scan device. For testing purposes, however it can be replaced with a fingerprint 
image, which has been extracted from a database. 
The second phase extracts from the original input image a much smaller template of the fingerprint. 
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This template is created through a number of processing stages to finally produce a set of minutiae. 
The extraction of the template would occur on the computer or workstation. 
The third stage uses the template created in the second phase. This representation is then either 
stored on the smart card or compared against the template already stored on the smart card. The 
comparison in this stage occurs entirely on the card. The results of the comparison are returned to 
the controlling computer. 
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Figure 5.2: A screen shot from the implementation showing the main window. 
A screen shot of the main window of the system that was developed is shown in Figure 5.2. This 
window has buttons in the top left comer to Load, save or acquire a fingerprint scan from the Finger-
Tip scanner. Just below these buttons is an area to display a zoomed in view of the area highlighted 
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with a little white square around it. This area can be selected with the mouse from the main finger-
print display. The text above the fingerprint displays the coordinates and the intensity at the selected 
point. At the right of the window a button has been placed to bring up the batch-processing window. 
The buttons below the zoom box allow the user to control and monitor the stages in the template 
extraction algorithm. 
The "Orientation Field" button opens up another similar window providing a display of the orienta-
tion field. This additional window has buttons to allow the user to locate the core and valid regions 
of the fingerprint along with providing the ability to calculate the quality of the fingerprint. 
The "Minutiae Comparison" button opens up another new window. This window contains a few 
buttons to allow sets of minutiae to be compared both on the workstation and on the smart card. 
5.1 Acquisition of the Fingerprint 
In this, the first stage of the process, a fingerprint needs to be acquired. It can be either inputted from 
a scanner as would happen when the system is deployed, or it could allow input from a database for 
test purposes. 
5.1.1 Fingerprint Scanner 
A FingerTip sensor from Siemens was used for the research towards this dissertation. The FingerTip 
scanner is a small unit of dimensions 18mm x 21mm x 1.3mm with a scan region of 11.288mm x 
14.36mm. The scan region consists of a sensor array of 224 x 288 cells. The sensor works by means 
of a capacitor feedback sensing circuitry. The pixels of the sensor are pre-charged. The charge of 
the pixel is then transferred to a sampling capacitance. If a finger is placed on the chip, the surface 
of the skin acts as a counter electrode. The varying distances of the finger from the sensor surface 
due to the ridges and troughs produce different capacities for ridges and troughs. 
The FingerTip scanner can be connected to a computer via an Extended Parallel Port (EPP). The 
total time required for an image capture is less than 100 ms [44]. 
58 CHAPTER 5. IMPLEMENTATION 
5.1.2 NIST Fingerprint Database 
To allow for the perfonnance testing of the system the NIST Special Database 4 Fingerprint Database 
was used. This database contains 2000 pairs (4000 fingerprints) of 8-bit grey scale images of ran-
domly selected fingerprints. Each of these prints is a 512 X 512 pixel image in a flat file fonnat with 
a small header at the beginning of the file. These images were acquired from inked impressions and 
then scanned in at a resolution of 500 dots per inch [54]. 
Each pixel of the prints requires 8-bits or one byte of storage. A fingerprint from this database 
requires 262144 bytes of storage without the header. This is clearly considerably more than could 
be stored on any smart card currently available. 
5.2 Extraction of a Template from the Fingerprint 
The template extracted should contain some infonnation about the general structure of the finger-
print as well as the minute details needed to perfonn a comparison accurately. 
The general infonnation about the fingerprint extracted could include some sort of classification. 
The more categories of fingerprints provided the better. In addition, fingerprint alignment infonna-
tion can be extracted by examining the complete print. This would be stored with the template on 
the smart card. 
The minute details of the fingerprint also need to be extracted. These minutiae allow fingerprints to 
be compared at a very fine level of detail. The differences between fingerprints at the fine level are 
more pronounced than at the more general coarse levels. This set of minutiae, along with features 
of each minutia, will comprise the remainder of the template of the fingerprint. 
The process of acquiring this infonnation from the fingerprint requires that a number of processing 
stages be applied to it. These stages start from the scanned image and eventually produce the set of 
minutiae and classification infonnation. 
It is important to extract the features as accurately as possible. There is the possibility of a few 
spurious minutiae being detected. False minutiae should be reduced, while at the same time it 
should attempt to locate all of the correct minutiae accurately. 
The main stages in the extraction of a template from the fingerprint are listed below. The effects of 
each of the these stages in the algorithm is reflected in the main fingerprint display area in Figure 5.2, 
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except for the ridge detection, which utilizes its own window, and the minutiae comparison that is 
performed from another window. 
• Enhancement 
• Orientation Field 
• Core Point Location 
• Valid Region Detection 
• Quality of Fingerprint 
• Ridge Detection 
• Removal of Pores 
• Thinning the Ridges 
• Cleaning the Ridges 
• Minutiae Detection 
• Removal of Spurious Minutiae 
The original image was acquired in the process described in Section 5.1 and is used to produce an 
enhanced image using the enhancement algorithm presented by Candela[ll]. This enhancement of 
the fingerprint is intended to reduce random noise resulting from distortion caused by the scanning 
process. The simplest method is to pass the image through a smoothing filter to cause a slight 
blurring of the image. This will remove very small inconsistencies in the image. The difficulty with 
any attempt at enhancement is the possibility of removing valid information. An algorithm has been 
applied to attempt to strengthen the pronunciation of the ridge structure. This algorithm is further 
explained in Section 6.3.1. 
From the enhanced image an orientation field is extracted as is explained in Section 6.3.2. The 
orientation field extraction algorithm is based upon existing algorithms. This orientation field is 
used to calculate the core point and a curvature index for the fingerprint. The author developed an 
algorithm to locate the core point, which is further described in Section 6.3.3. The enhanced image 
is also used to determine the classification of the fingerprint. 
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The image that was acquired from the fingerprint scanner is rectangular in shape. Very often part 
of this image is not in the fingerprint. In the screen capture displayed in Figure 5.2 a fingerprint 
is displayed in the lower right of the screen. This fingerprint does not use the full area available. 
Thus it is necessary to be able to locate the valid region of the scan. For this the orientation field 
can be used. The author's algorithm used to locate the fingerprint in a scanned image is explained 
in Section 6.3.4. 
Sometimes scanning produces images of very poor quality. These might result from finger move-
ment during the scanning process or even the lack of a finger when the scan occurred. It is thus 
important to be able to determine whether a fingerprint was actually presented and whether the scan 
can be used. The algorithm shown in Section 6.3.5 uses the valid region and the orientation field to 
calculate a quality factor of the fingerprint. 
Ridges are extracted from the valid region of the scan. These ridges are extracted using the author's 
algorithm presented in Section 6.3.6 from the enhanced image and the orientation field. 
The ridge map that is produced has small holes in some of the ridges. These holes are from the 
sweat pores that are on the ridges. Scans that are at resolutions of 500 DPI do not have enough 
resolution to be able to identify sweat pores reliably. For this reason the sweat pores need to be 
removed. The algorithm that was used to do this is explained in Section 6.3.7 and is based upon the 
algorithm presented by Megdal [29]. 
After removing the pores from the ridge map it is thinned to produce a thinned ridge map. This 
contains all ridges, each a single pixel in width. Section 6.3.8 describes how the ridge are thinned. 
, 
The thinned ridge map might still contain a few short spikes or bridges. Often these are artefacts 
remain from previous errors in the scanned image. It is therefore desirable to remove these spurs 
from the ridge map to produce a cleaned ridge map. This cleaned ridge map is created by applying 
the algorithm in Section 6.3.9, which is based upon the algorithm presented by Megdal. 
From the thinned and cleaned ridge map a set of minutiae are extracted. These minutiae are extracted 
by examining the structure of the ridges. If the ridges bifurcate or end then the point at which they 
do this is recorded. This point is then stored in Cartesian coordinates. The core point is used as the 
centre of the fingerprint and all of the minutiae are converted into polar coordinates relative to the 
core point. The algorithm used to extract the minutiae from the ridge map is shown in Section 6.3.10. 
Unfortunately the minutiae detection process occasionally detects spurious minutiae. An attempt 
is made to remove the majority of these spurious minutiae without removing valid minutiae. This 
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process has a similar set of hazards to the enhancement stage. If the decision to remove a minutia is 
too lenient then many valid minutiae might be removed, while if it is too stringent then it won't do 
much good. The algorithm to remove the spurious minutiae is explained in Section 6.3.11. 
5.3 Initial Template of the Fingerprint for Smart Card 
This template of the minutiae of a fingerprint needs to get transferred to the smart card where it 
will serve as the basis for matching fingerprints in the future. The minutiae are converted to polar 
coordinates for storage on the card. The use of polar coordinates simplifies the comparison process. 
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Figure 5.3: The layout on the smart card. 
The SLE44CI60S smart card used for this implementation has 16KB of ROM and 16KB of EEP-
ROM. The EEPROM is divided into a data block and a code block each of 8KB. The template of 
the fingerprint uses 516 bytes of the EEPROM on the card. This means that over 7KB remains 
in the data block, which is enough, for example, to accommodate a 1024 bit private key and/or 
subject identification information as required by specific applications. The card was read with the 
"Chipdrive intern" card reader [50]. 
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5.4 Comparison of Fingerprint Performed on the Smart Card 
Due to the nature of smart cards - they have small amounts of processing power and small amount 
of RAM. The matching algorithm therefore needs to be highly efficient both memory and speed. 
If the classification of the fingerprint does not coincide with the classification of the print on the 
card then the print is rejected as incorrect. Similarly if the curvature at the core of the print is too 
different from the template print then it can be rejected as belonging to different fingers. This should 
considerably reduce the number of false prints where the minutiae need to be compared. 
Extracting a set of minutiae from the fingerprint reduces the remainder of the matching process to 
that of a 2-d point-matching problem. Since the core has been located on both the template and the 
finger provided one could implement a highly efficient algorithm. This algorithm is described in 
detail in Section 6.4, which was developed by the author to reduce the memory and CPU require-
ments. 
5.5 Summary 
A system was developed in C++ using C++ Builder that implemented concepts presented in this 
dissertation. The algorithms, which consist of existing algorithms with extensions developed for 
this project, are described in Chapter 6. The system was developed to demonstrate the viability 
of performing fingerprint matching on a smart card. The complete process was modelled from 
the acquisition of fingerprint images from a FingerTip scanner through to the comparison of the 
biometric templates on a smart card. 
From an implementation perspective the process can be divided into three sections. The first of 
these sections interacts with the fingerprint scanner through a parallel port to acquire the fingerprint. 
The ability to save and load images from file was added to the system to facilitate the testing of the 
separate components. 
The second section of the implementation extracts a set of minutiae from the scanned image. This 
section passes the scanned image through a number of processes to produce a set of minutiae with 
reasonable accuracy. These minutiae are compared in the third phase of the process. This system 
allows the comparison of the minutiae to be compared either on a workstation or on a smart card. 
Smart card software was developed that performed the comparison of the fingerprint minutiae on 
the card. This software handled the transfer of the biometric template between the computer and the 
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card. Once this software was loaded into the EEPROM of a smart card the card could then be loaded 
with a biometric template. The smart card accepted a second set of minutiae to compare against the 
template installed on the card. The security of the card was such that all biometric infonnation that 
was transferred to the card could not be read off of the card. 
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Chapter 6 
Fingerprint Comparison Algorithm 
A fingerprint consists of a pattern of ridges and troughs, as was explained earlier. These ridges 
and troughs curve to form a pattern that is unique to a finger; even identical twins have different 
fingerprints. The pattern consists of the varying thickness and curvature of these ridges and troughs. 
A counter example has never been found showing two different fingerprints from two different 
fingers to have a matching pattern. 
In addition to this the pattern created by the ridges and the troughs of the fingerprint remains constant 
throughout an individual's lifetime. This allows us to use the pattern of the ridge structure along 
with any information that can be extracted from it in personal identification. 
This unique pattern formed on the fingertips contains a set of minute details. The configuration 
of these minutiae forms a pattern that is also unique to a particular finger, providing a richness of 
information. This set of minutiae can be extracted from a fingerprint and used in comparisons. Most 
automated fingerprint matching systems use the minutiae set as the basic data to compare fingers. 
At an even finer level of detail the fingerprint contains sweat pores on the ridge structure. These 
sweat pores are also thought to provide a unique pattern that can be used for comparison. How-
ever since these pores are smaller than the ridges they need a higher resolution scan to be reliably 
extracted from the fingerprint. 
At a slightly higher level the curvature pattern of the ridges can be examined to extract classifica-
tion information. This information is general information about a given fingerprint. It is however 
not unique to a fingerprint, but rather divides the fingerprints up into a number of classes. This 
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infonnation can be used to complement the infonnation stored in the set of minutiae representing a 
fingerprint. 
6.1 Feature Selection 
Fingerprints contain a rich store of infonnation in the pattern of the ridge structure. This pattern 
on the fingerprint is composed of a series of curved ridges and troughs. Each ridge has a series of 
sweat pores extending along its length. It is the sweat from these pores that leaves an impression of 
the fingerprint on surface touched by it. 
The most obvious features of the fingerprint to use for the comparison stage are the ridges them-
selves. They can be used, but it is not a simple task to compare a set of ridges. For this reason many 
other features have been examined and studied to detennine whether they are suitable to uniquely 
identify an individual. 
The ridges are thin curved regions of the fingerprint that are raised above surrounding region. These 
ridges run in an almost parallel fashion with troughs separating them. Along the length of a ridge 
there are pores in an almost regular fashion. The ridges have a start point and an end point. These 
are known as ridge endings. Sometimes ridges that are next to each other combine and continue as 
a single ridge. These are known as ridge bifurcations. There are numerous other minute features 
about the ridge that could be listed, some of which are shown in Figure 3.1. However, most of these 
can be represented as combinations of the ridge ending and ridge bifurcation. For example a short 
ridge is just two ridge endings. 
A third feature set that can be used to determine the match between two fingerprints is the pore 
structure [47]. The pores are smaller features and require a higher resolution scan to detect them 
accurately. They are also numerous and can be used to provide an accurate comparison. 
These different features are not by any means unrelated to the others. The pores are on ridges and 
the ridge ending and ridge bifurcations are also on the ridges. These features can be used separately 
or combined together to provide a more accurate match. 
Most electronic fingerprint comparison methods use a set of minutiae as this reduces the comparison 
from an image comparison down to a point comparison problem, and since the configuration of the 
minute details is unchanging we may use this configuration to perfonn the matching. This configu-
ration is unique to a particular finger. This thesis has focused on minutiae matching techniques. 
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6.2 Minutiae Matching Technique 
The most common method used in the digital comparison of fingerprints uses the minutiae as the 
main features in the comparison. In this dissertation I have concentrated on the minutiae matching 
techniques. These minutiae are extracted from the input image. The scanned image of a fingerprint 
is at a resolution of 500 pixels per inch and is in the form of a 256-colour grey scale image, where 
the intensity of the shade of grey is used to differentiate the details of the ridges and the troughs. 
This input image needs to be passed through a number of processing stages to extract the set of 
minutiae. 
Figure 6.1: The core point of a fingerprint along with the alignment direction of the fingerprint. 
The core point as illustrated in Figure 6.1 can be used as a reference point for the fingerprint. The 
core point can be thought of as the centre of the fingerprint. This core point along with the direction 
associated with it is used in the alignment of two fingerprints to facilitate the comparison. This 
direction is the direction of the ridge structure at the centre of the ridges that have been folded back 
on them. If there is no such structure then the ridge on which the core was located is examined. 
This ridge has two directions leaving the core point. The middle direction between these two ridge-
directions is then taken as the direction at the core point. This direction is used to perform an 
approximate alignment of the fingerprints for the minutiae comparison. 
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The minutiae are calculated from the original fingerprint in the standard Cartesian coordinate system 
using the core point as the origin for the Cartesian plane. The coordinates of these minutiae are 
then converted into polar coordinates. Each minutiae can then be represented as a tuple (r,8) with 
coordinates for the radius and the angle respectively to capture the positional information. All of 
the minutiae are converted into polar coordinates to simplify the minutiae-matching algorithm. 
Each minutia has a position in polar coordinates. This position is shown relative to the core point 
for a single minutia in Figure 6.2. Along with this positional information about the minutiae there 
is also a wealth of information that can be gathered about the minutiae. This other information is 
critical to the comparison process as it greatly increases the accuracy of the matching algorithm. 
This information varies from minutiae to minutiae and includes as the main features the direction of 
the minutiae. This is the direction of the ridge that the minutia was extracted from. Other features 
could include the type of minutiae or the number of ridges between it and its nearest neighbour. 
Figure 6.2: A minutia illustrated in relation to the core point. 
Figure 6.2 illustrates a single minutia. This figure further shows a circle of radius R which is the 
radius of a larger circle that is used to define the maximum region of the coordinate space. R = 256 
has been chosen to provide a suitable maximum area for minutiae detection bases on the expected 
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size of a fingerprint. A smaller inner circle is indicated on Figure 6.2 surrounding the core region. 
This circle indicates a small region that is not used for minutiae detection as small variations in the 
position of a minutia inside this circle can have a large impact on the polar coordinate. The region 
between these two circles is retained to extract minutiae. All the rest of the area of the fingerprint is 
discarded, which is usually only a small area. 
Along with each point a direction a is stored as is illustrated in Figure 6.2. The direction was 
calculated from the orientation of the ridge on which the minutia was located. The direction along 
with other properties of the minutiae can be used in the comparison process. The only other feature 
that has been examined in this dissertation is whether the point on the fingerprint associated with 
a minutia represents a ridge ending or a ridge bifurcation. These features can be compared to 
determine whether a particular pair of minutiae from two fingerprints match each other. 
The sets of minutiae extracted from the fingerprint image are each stored along with all their specific 
information. Comparing these sets of minutiae then compares fingerprints. For a comparison be-
tween fingerprints to be considered a success a particular number of these minutiae needs to match 
between two sets of minutiae. Thus for a minutia to match a particular point from another finger-
print image it needs to match on the radius (r), the angle (8), the direction of the minutiae (a), and 
whether it is a ridge ending or ridge bifurcation. 
Each scan of a fingerprint will acquire the fingerprint slightly differently. Therefore the comparison 
cannot be implemented as an exact comparison, as the relative positions and features of each minutia 
can vary. There may also be some pairs of minutiae that do not match even when the two scans 
originated from the same finger. There could be a few spurious minutiae, which have accidentally 
been included in the list of minutiae associated with the finger. These are the results of distortion 
and noise, which sometimes prevent minutiae from being accurately detected. In Table 6.1 the 
arrangement of minutiae from two scans of a finger are compared. The two columns are from two 
different scans of the same finger. The shaded regions illustrate the minutiae that have been detected 
in the image. These minutiae can be divided into two groups - those that were correctly detected 
and those that were spuriously detected. The alignment of the columns shows the minutiae that 
match between the scans. 
To overcome this difficulty a pair of points is considered to match on position if they occur within 
some pre-specified distance in the polar coordinate system. Along with position matching the minu-
tiae also need to match within a specific tolerance for the direction of the minutiae (a) and they must 
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Table 6.1: Arrangement of minutiae. 
both have originated from a ridge bifurcation or from a ridge ending. The more stringent the toler-
ance the fewer false points will match. At the same time we suspect that a minutia which should 
have matched might be declared a non-match if the tolerance is too tight. If the tolerance is too 
relaxed then the chances of declaring a false match for a pair of minutiae also increases. 
The algorithm used to perform the comparison can be split into two main sections. The first of 
these creates a template of the fingerprint from the input image. This template contains the set of 
minutiae along with the classification information. In the second stage this template is compared 
against templates created from other fingerprint images. If these templates match then the original 
fingerprints should have originated from the same finger. 
6.3 Minutiae Extraction 
An original scanned image is shown in Figure 6.3. As the different processing algorithms are applied 
to the data a number of global characteristics are produced as by-products of the algorithms. These 
are recorded along with the set of minutiae for use in the comparison stage. 
The process of extracting the salient information from the fingerprint has different stages. Each of 
these different stages has been included in the complete process either to create the template or to 
improve the quality of the final template produced. 
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Figure 6.3: The scanned fingerprint image. 
6.3.1 Enhancement 
The scanned fingerprint needs to pass through a number of different stages to extract the final set of 
minutiae. The first step in this process is usually an enhancement stage. This stage is included as the 
first part of the process as it should improve the accuracy of each minutia that is finally extracted. 
The purpose of an enhancement is to improve the quality of the image so that the following steps in 
the process will be able to execute more accurately. With this aim the enhancement step attempts to 
reduce minor inconsistencies on the ridge structure. These could be the artefacts of the pores, but 
since the pores are not used in this comparison an attempt is made to remove or lessen the effects of 
them. 
The other reason for including the enhancement stage is that it is possible to use ridge information 
to enhance the ridges and valleys. One would like this to close small gaps in the ridge structure. For 
any enhancement to improve the final result it needs to remove more inaccuracies in the image than 
it introduces. Thus it is important that the enhancements are not over applied. 
The first processing step applied to the fingerprint attempts to eliminate or reduce the affects of noise 
and distortion in the image. The simplest method reducing noise effects is to use a smoothing filter. 
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The smoothing filter removes small irregularities. A typical smoothing filter for this purpose is the 
Sobel smoothing filter as shown in Figure 6.4. A 5 x 5 Sobel filter could also be used to increase 
the blurring. However it is important not to use too large a filter as this could then cause adjacent 
ridges to merge into each other. Rather one would like to reduce the effects of the pores in the ridge 
structure and correct errors in scanned image. The smoothing filter will improve the accuracy of the 
set of extracted minutiae. 
1 2 1 
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Figure 6.4: A 3 x 3 Sobel Filter. 
The first and simplest method of removing minor inconsistencies in the image is to apply a smooth-
ing filter over the image. This will have the effect of blurring the image slightly. This should remove 
many rough edges from the ridges that could have been detected as short ridges spikes along with 
reducing the affects of the sweat pores. One would expect the smoothing to have a noticeable effect 
on the accuracy of the final set of minutiae. However it does not improve the accuracy as much as 
one would like it to. 
Using a simple smoothing filter does not utilize all the information that could be used. There is a 
wealth of directional information that can be gleaned from the fingerprint at a higher level, without 
looking at the minute details. Enhancing the print in the direction of the local orientation of the 
ridge structure would bridge short gaps in the ridge structure of the print. Very often these short 
gaps would have been the result of errors in the scan at that region. This enhancement also allows 
for a larger region of the fingerprint to be used in the minutiae detection process. 
There are other methods of enhancing the image that improve the ridge structure. These methods 
use the known ridge structure and assume that the nearby ridge structure will possess a similar 
orientation and ridge spacing. Each area of the image can then be enhanced at the approximately 
correct orientation and ridge spacing for it. This should significantly improve the ridge detection 
routine. 
Candela et al [11] present an enhancement algorithm which uses the ridge orientation and ridge 
spacing to improve the ridge structure. It should enlarge and improve the quality of the usable 
region of the fingerprint. 
This algorithm divides the input image up into a sequence of squares, each 32 x 32 pixels in size. 
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Figure 6.5: The enhanced fingerprint image. 
These squares are overlapping such that the central 24 x 24 pixels cover the image in a non-
overlapping fashion . This overlapping of the squares is necessary to reduce the edge effects that 
are introduced at the cell boundaries. 
The enhancement routine is sequentially applied to each these squares. As it is applied to a cell the 
32 x 32 square is used to determine the parameters, but only the central 24 x 24 pixels are extracted 
to produce the enhanced image. The results of the enhancement are illustrated in Figure 6.5. 
The enhancement converts the spatial representation to a frequency representation using a fast 
Fourier transformation. The frequency representation is passed through a non-linear function which 
increases the useful information relative to the noise. The reverse fast Fourier transformation is then 
applied to convert the frequency information back into spatial information. 
6.3.2 Orientation Field 
The enhanced image is used to create an orientation field for fingerprint. At each point in the 
orientation field the orientation should be tangent to the direction of the ridges. This orientation 
information can be used to improve the accuracy of the ridges in the following stages. 
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Figure 6.6: The pattern of directions used to detennine the orientation field. 
The method used to detennine the ridge orientations calculates an orientation at each pixel. These 
orientations at the pixel level are calculated as one of eight possible directions. These eight direc-
tions are depicted in Figure 6.6. 
The direction at a pixel is calculated by examining each of the eight discrete directions. These are 
examined by placing the centre, C, of the grid in Figure 6.6 on the pixel and then summing the pixels 
along each direction, Sj, i = 0 .. 7. If C is in a valley the smallest slit Sj would be in the direction of the 
ridge structure. Otherwise if C is on a ridge then the largest slit Sj would be on a ridge and represent 
the direction of the ridges. Comparing C to the surrounding pixels can be used to decide if it is on a 





This (6.1) can be used to decide whether to use the smallest or largest slit in deciding the direction. 
This is effectively using a localised threshold to differentiate between ridges and troughs. This does 
provide a better result than using a single threshold value for the whole image as it takes the gradual 
fluctuations of brightness in the fingerprint into account. 
However this only uses the centre value and does not use the whole slit thus making it sensitive to 
short breaks in the ridge structure. The whole slit can be used to detennine if it is on a ridge by 
checking if the average of the slit sums is greater than the average of the minimum and maximum 
slits. 
(6.2) 
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(6.2) uses the minimum and maximum values for the slits. One would expect one of these to be an 
outlier if the pixel falls either on a ridge or in the valley. On the ridge the minimum slit would be 
small causing the average of the slits to be larger than the average of the minimum and maximum 
slits. Similarly if the slit were in a valley then the maximum would be large causing the average to 
be less than the average of the minimum and maximum slits. 
3 7 
4C+Smin+Smax> 8' LSi 
i=O 
(6.3) 
(6.1) and (6.2) can be combined together to form a weighted average. This weighted average should 
calculate a more accurate orientation than either of the parts separately. (6.3) is simply a weighted 
average of (6.1) and (6.2), with the first one weighted twice the second. 
_::;'igure 6.7: The orientation field with the core point marked. 
This produces an orientation field at the pixel level. This orientation field however contains many 
small perturbations and inconsistencies. Thus rather than utilize the orientations at the pixel level 
these orientations can be averaged over small squares. 
This averaging process should remove most of the minor inconsistencies in the orientations field, at 
least if it originated from a fingerprint. The averaging process converts the direction at each pixel 
into a vector format comprising an x and a y component. 
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The fingerprint region is split into squares. For each of these squares a direction is calculated. The 
direction uses the vector directions of each of the pixels in the square. The x component of the 
square is the sum of the x components of each pixel in the square. Similarly the y component is also 
calculated. 
This summation of the components should result in short vectors where there are large inconsistency 
in the pixel vectors and long vectors where there is a high consistency in the pixel directions. The 
length of this vector can be used as an indication of the accuracy of the orientation at a given 
point. These orientations are then smoothed to improve the consistency between adjacent squares. 
The orientation field that results from this process is shown in Figure 6.7. These vectors can be 
converted to angles. 
6.3.3 Core Point Location 
The orientation field is used to calculate the location of the core point. The core point can be defined 
as the point of sharpest concave curvature in the ridge structure of the fingerprint. The orientation 
field can be used as an approximation of the ridge structure. 
Every fingerprint should contain a single point that satisfies the criteria of a core point. This core 
point is needed in the minutiae comparison stage since it is the primary data for the alignment. 
Figure 6.7 illustrates a core point overlaid on the orientation filed. The core point location detection 
routine uses a template of what it expects the core point to look like. This template is overlaid on 
the orientations and rotated until a best match is found. 
Figure 6.8: The template of size five that is used to detennine the core point. 
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There are two templates that are used to locate the core point. The first of these is shown in Fig-
ure 6.8. This template is used when the lower half can be matched very accurately. Loops and 
whorls and tented arches are likely to match this template as they have a very sharp curvature at 
the core with the ridge orientation forming an almost straight line away from the core as it leaves 
the core area on the lower. This results from the ridge structure reaching the core and then almost 
folding back on itself. This template was matched in Figure 6.7. Here the "tail" of the template can 
be seen to align with the orientation at the core. 
Sometimes, particularly in fingerprints of type arch, the fingerprint does not contain a feature that 
the "tail" of the template can match. In these instances an alternate template can be used. The 
second template is shown in Figure 6.9. 
Figure 6 .9: The secondary template of size five that is used to determine the core point. 
This second template does not require the folding over of the ridge structure that is needed to form 
an orientation almost perpendicular to those just above them in the fingerprint. 
The reason for choosing these templates is that if there is a loop or a whorl in the fingerprint then 
the lower tail of the first template will attach to the top of this macro feature of the print. If however 
the fingerprint is of type arch then there is not any section of the print with which the lower tail can 
align. Rather the section of greatest curvature in the ridge structure is located. This point will occur 
in the central point of an arch structure. 
The comparison of the template and the orientation field returns a curvature index for the point 
at a given orientation. This curvature index is determined be summing the absolute differences 
between the orientation in the template cells and the orientation of the ridges. The curvature index 
is calculated at different positions in the fingerprint. The position of minimum of these is chosen as 
the core point. The curvature index is found to be fairly consistent for the core point of a finger. 
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This process is repeated at different resolutions starting at coarse resolutions and repeating the 
process on finer resolutions on a small area surrounding the position of the coarser resolution. It 
was found that averaging the orientation field into blocks in the sequence of sizes 16 x 16, 8 x 8 and 
4 x 4 produced good results. It was also necessary to get a rough estimate of where the core point 
should be to avoid using minor fluctuations to locate a core point erroneously. The area surrounding 
the estimated core point was then resampled at a finer level of detail. This allowed the core point to 
be determined to within 4 pixels of its true position. 
The core point found has been shown in Figure 6.7. This Figure also shows the orientation of the 
template relative to the orientation field that created the best match. The orientation of the template 
can be used in the alignment of fingerprints in the final stage of the comparison process. 
6.3.4 Valid Region Detection 
The consistency of the orientation of the ridges can be used to determine which sections of the 
image are from a fingerprint. Adjacent ridges are almost parallel. This correspondence between 
ridges can be used to locate the valid region. The orientations calculated outside of the fingerprint 
region would have random orientations varying widely within a small area. 
The orientation field, 0, where each element represents the orientation of the ridge structure in a 
small square of the fingerprint can be used. An array of the valid regions, R, needs to be created and 
initialised at the same size as the orientation field. 
The magnitude of the direction vector, d, is evaluated for each block in position (x,y) of the orien-
tation field. If this magnitude is less than some pre specified constant, dmin , then the cell is marked 
as invalid in R. 
Idl < dmin (6.4) 
The absolute magnitude of the direction vector is compared against dmin in (6.4). This measures the 
consistency of the orientation inside the square that d was extracted from. If all the pixel orientations 
had aligned then d would be large, otherwise d would be small. 
These orientation blocks are then compared to the surrounding blocks to determine the level of con-
sistency in the ridge orientation. Summing up the differences in the orientation of the surrounding 
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cells compared to the cell in question does this. If this summation is greater than some maximum 
difference, maxd, then the square should be marked as invalid. 
x+size y+size 
maxd < L L min(abs(O[x]lY]- O[i:l[j]),3600 -abs(O[x]lY]- O[i][j))) (6.5) 
i=x-size j=y-size 
In (6.5) the smallest possible change between the angle of orientation in one square and the sur-
rounding squares is summed up. Thus for example the difference between 358° and 6° is 8°. The 
complete algorithm can be seen in Figure 6.10. 
Initial step: 
initialise R to indicate all regions as valid 
for each square do 
if Idl < dmin 
or maxd < Li~:~~izeL~~~~:izemin(abs(O[x]lYl- O[i][j]),360° -abs(O[x:llY]- O[iHj))) 
then 




Figure 6.10: Algorithm to determine valid region. 
The algorithm presented in Figure 6.10 examines each square in the orientation field. Based on this 
information it then calculates the valid region of the fingerprint. 
This algorithm does sometimes incorrectly mark regions of the fingerprint as invalid and it some-
times misses regions that it should mark. To handle this, small regions surrounded by invalid regions 
should be also marked as invalid. Valid regions can be treated in the same way. The algorithm in-
dicates regions of sharp curvature as invalid regions. This is not a problem since these regions are 
small in area compared to the whole valid region. Figure 6.11 indicates the region of valid finger-
print. It has indicated a small section of the central region to be invalid. This is a side effect from 
sharp curvature of the ridges in that region. It was decided to not remove these regions as most of 
the small region of invalid area inside the fingerprint region result from smudges or otherwise poor 
qUality images in the local region. 
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Figure 6.11: The valid region of the fingerprint. 
6.3.5 Quality of Fingerprint 
Input images vary in quality from very good to very poor. Images of high quality will work well 
with most systems and produce very accurate results, but the poorer the quality of a fingerprint, the 
less the chance that it could be used successfully for a match. This makes it important to be able to 
calculate a quality factor quantitatively. There are a number of different methods that can be used. 
In this dissertation the quality of the fingerprint was calculated by examining the valid region of 
the fingerprint. For the fingerprint to be accepted as valid input for the rest of the process the valid 
region needs to be of sufficient size. A quality factor is calculated by calculating the ratio of the 
valid region to the complete fingerprint region. 
The fingerprint region can be reduced by up to 25% of the image region on each side. This is to 
allow for the fact that often the fingerprint does not occupy the whole region of the scanned area. 
There is a limit in the amount that it can be reduced to prevent it from becoming too small. Inside 
this reduced area the ratio of valid region over the total area is calculated. This ratio needs to 
be sufficiently low to be satisfied that the print contains sufficient accurate infonnation to use for 
matching purposes. If the quality factor that is calculated is too low to be of use then the fingerprint 
is rejected. A very low quality factor indicates with a high probability that what was scanned was 
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not a fingerprint, or that the finger was in motion during the scanning. 
6.3.6 Ridge Detection 
The enhanced finge-:print image is still in a 256-colour intensity image. From this image the ridges 
need to be detected to produce a 2-colour image of the ridges and valleys between them. There are 
different methods or extracting the ridge structure from the intensity image. 
The first of these methods is to use a simple threshold to split the image into two colours. This 
can be improVed with the second method by using an adaptive threshold to take local perturbations 
on pressure and intensity into account. The third method uses orientation information by making 
the assumption that ridges are more likely to occur in the direction of the ridge orientation than 
perpendicular to it. 
In the first of these methods a simple threshold is calculated from the image. The minimum and 
the maximum values in the image can be found and the mean of these values is used. This gives an 
approximate of the median of the image. Ideally the median of the image would be used to cause 
half of the image to be labelled as ridge and the other half as Valley. 
This was found to produce a poor result since the simple threshold is sensitive to local perturbations 
in the intensity of the fingerprint image. These perturbations could have been caused by the varia-
tions in pressure of different regions of the finger on the scanner. This could cause whole sections 
of the fingerprint to be incorrectly calculated as ridge or trough, making it impossible to select a 
good threshold that works throughout the whole image. 
One method of overcoming the local variations is to use an adaptive threshold to divide the image. 
To do this the image is divided into squares. These squares could be of size 32 x 32. In each of these 
squares the threshold value is calculated using the same method as used in the global threshold, but 
it would only be applied to a particular square. This method adjusts to the fluctuations of intensity 
in different areas of the fingerprint. However this method still struggles to correctly determine the 
ridge structure in areas of smudging and in poor quality scans. 
The third method that was used to find ridges uses the orientation field as well as the enhanced 
fingerprint. The predominant direction of the ridges is assumed to be parallel to the direction of the 
orientation field. This process of deciding if a pixel is part of a ridge examines the pixels in short 
segments in the direction of the orientation field. 
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Figure 6.12: The pipes overlaid on the image. 
Pixels need to be split into those that occur on the ridges and those that occur in the valleys between 
the ridges. The calculation to determine whether a pixel is on a ridge or not places a set of pipes over 
the image centred at the pixel as illustrated in Figure 6.12. These pipes are aligned in the direction 
of orientation. The average value for a pixel is then calculated for each of these pipes. 
The average of these pipes is used as a threshold. This average is an adaptive threshold over the 
image coping with fluctuations in intensity. The average pixel value in the central pipe is compared 
against the threshold value to decide whether the pixel is on a ridge or in a Valley. If the pipe 
containing a pixel is above the threshold then the pixel is marked as part of a trough, otherwise it is 
part of a ridge. 
The length and the number of pipes used affects the accuracy of the ridges produced. A sufficiently 
wide area needs to be covered by these pipes, so that at least the width of one ridge and valley pair 
is covered. Spanning a ridge and a valley should ensure that the average is a fair estimate dividing 
the image into about equal amounts of ridge and Valley. 
The use of pipes in calculating the ridges greatly reduces the effects of the pores in the ridge struc-
ture, although it does not completely remove them. These pipes will also be less likely to record 
short breaks in a ridge incorrectly. This gives a fairly reasonable ridge structure and is sensitive 
to local perturbations in intensity. These threshold values can be recorded and passed through a 
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Figure 6.13: The ridges of the fingerprint. 
smoothing filter instead of being used directly. This results in the ridge map shown in Figure 6.13. 
The invalid regions calculated in the previous section are shaded. The valid region has produced a 
clear ridge map. 
6.3.7 Removal of Pores 
There are sweat pores that naturally occur within the ridge structure. These pores can be used in 
the comparison process, but they require that the scan be performed at a much higher resolution 
than that used in this dissertation. They are not used in the comparison process presented here and 
therefore it is desirable to remove them to prevent them from being incorrectly detected as minutiae. 
7 0 1 
6 C 2 
5 4 3 
Figure 6.14: The eight connected pixels surrounding a pixel. 
It is not necessary to remove the pores since many of them will have been removed by the enhance-
ment stage and the method of ridge detection. Using an adaptive threshold to calculate the ridges 
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would have left many more pores in the image, but there will still be some pores remaining. These 
pores can still leave loops in the ridges. Removing these pores will improve the thinned ridges 
produced in the next stage. 
for each pixel in image do 
if pixel not on a ridge 
then 




set direction d such that 
the pixel in direction + 7 mod 8 is a ridge 
and the pixel in direction is a non-ridge pixel 
while area of marked pixels < a threshold 
or pixel already marked 
mark the pixel as visited 
move in direction d 
increment d mod 8 
until pixel in direction d is not part of a ridge 
end while 
if looped back to a marked pixel 
then found a hole 




Figure 6.15: Algorithm to find holes in the ridges. 
The holes are located using the ridge map. Each pixel in the ridge map is examined. If it is not part 
of a ridge it is then tested to determine whether it is part of a hole. If it is part of a hole then the hole 
is filled. 
The sweat pores are first located by an examination of the ridges. This process examines every pixel 
in the image to determine whether it is on a ridge edge. If it is on the ridge edge then the edge is 
followed to decide if the edge is a pore. 
In Figure 6.14 the eight pixels surrounding a pixel are shown. They are numbered starting from 0 
in a clockwise direction. These eight directions are used to trace the edges between the ridges and 
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A pore The pore removed 
Figure 6.16: Removal of pores. 
non~ridge regions. A direction d is chosen such that the pixel in that direction is a ridge pixel. This 
direction is incremented modulo eight until the pixel in direction d is not a ridge pixel. The position 
is moved in this direction. This process is repeated while recording the minimum and maximum x 
and y coordinates. 
The process ends when the edge loops back on itself to form a closed hole or the difference between 
the minimum and maximum x or y coordinate of the edge is large enough to indicate that it is not 
a hole, but rather an edge between a ridge and Valley. If it ends by detecting a hole then the hole is 
filled and the process continues at the next point in the fingerprint. 
The algorithm to detect and remove holes is shown in Figure 6.15. This algorithm is applied to the 
ridge map to detect and remove the pores. The application of this algorithm is shown in Figure 6.16. 
This example shows an enlarged section of the ridge structure that contains a pore. The edge of the 
pore is then traced and the pore removed. This process should clean the ridge structure and reduce 
substantially the number of remaining pores and hance reduce the number of spurious minutiae 
detected. 
6.3.8 Thinning 
The thickness of the ridges can vary considerably in a fingerprint. These differences result from 
differences in the pressure exerted during the scanning process and variations in the threshold used 
to distinguish between the ridges and the valleys. Thus the apparent width of the ridge varies. It 
is therefore desirable to eliminate the ridge width information. The other advantage of thinning 
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Figure 6.17: Possible configurations of pixels to form a ridge edge. 
The first step in the thinning of the ridge map locates the edges of the ridges. The edges of the 
ridges are identified by a chain of ridge pixels with a chain of non-ridge pixels adjacent to it. Once 
this edge of the ridge has been located then the ridge needs to be examined to determine whether it 
is more than a single pixel wide. If it is, then the edges need to be marked as such and removed. 
Figure 6.17 shows two 3 x 3 configurations that can be used to locate ridge edges and the pixels that 
need to be removed. These two templates can be rotated to produce eight different templates. If any 
of these eight configurations of cells are found in the ridge map then the pixel that is at the centre of 
the configuration can be marked for deletion. The process is repeated until all the ridges are a single 
pixel in width. 
An equivalent result can be obtained through a different process that counts the length of the chains 
of ridge pixels and non-ridge pixels in the pixels adjacent to a ridge pixel. The algorithm shown in 
Figure 6.18 shrinks the ridges from both sides until a single 8-connected ridge structure remains. In 
an 8-connected line each pixel forming the line is attached to its neighbours by a minimum number 
of pixels surrounding it. The eight pixels surrounding it are illustrated in Figure 6.14. This process 
of shrinking the ridges was chosen as it minimises the impact of small local perturbations in ridge 
width and direction. If the local perturbations are not minimised then many spurious short ridge 
spikes can occur as the image quality degrades. 
The algorithm uses as input the ridge map that has had the pores in it removed and produces as 
output an 8-connected thinned ridge map. The algorithm does a number of passes over the ridge 
map and on each pass it shrinks the width of the ridges by one pixel from each side. This process is 
repeated until no more modifications need to be made. 
The first stage examines the ridge map and marks all the pixels on the edges of ridges. This process 
of detecting the pixels on the edges of the ridges examines every pixel. Then based on the eight 
pixels surrounding the pixel it is either marked as a ridge edge of left as it is. 
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for each pixel in ridge map 
if pixel on a ridge 
then 
r = length of chain of ridge pixels 
n = length of chain of non-ridge pixels 
ifn ~ 3 
then 
if r ~ 3 and (r ~ 4 or n ~ 4) 
then 
mark pixel 
else if chain chains of non-ridge pixels rounds a comer 
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Figure 6.18: First phase of algorithm to shrink the ridges from the edges. 
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In Figure 6.17 the possible configurations of pixels are illustrated that could form a ridge edge. In 
these configurations 1 represents a ridge pixel, while 0 represents a non-ridge pixel. The C indicates 
the pixel being examined. These configurations can occur in any of the four configurations formed 
by rotating them by either 900 , 1800 or 2700 , thus producing eight possible edge conditions. From 
these configurations of pixels a method presents itself of detecting these configurations by counting 
the maximum number of ridge pixels forming a chain, along with the maximum length of the chain 
of non-ridge pixels around the central pixel, C. 
for each pixel in ridge map 
if marked as on edge of ridge 
then 




Figure 6.19: Second phase of algorithm to shrink the ridges from the edges. 
The length of a non-ridge chain must be between three and five. If the length of the ridge chain 
is three or more then the central pixel is marked as on an edge. Otherwise, if the non-ridge chain 
rounds a corner as illustrated in Figure 6. 17(b ), then the two pixels next to the opposite corner pixel 
must be checked. Pixels that have been marked as on the edge of a ridge are not counted in the 
chains for other pixels. This algorithm is presented in Figure 6.18. 
The algorithm has so far located all the pixels on the ridge edges. These pixels must be deleted and 
marked as non-ridge pixels. The rest of the process to delete these pixels from the ridge structure is 
presented in Figure 6.19. 
The process of detecting the edges of the ridges and then shrinking the ridge needs to be repeated 
until no more pixels are marked in the section shown in Figure 6.18. This final output of this 
algorithm is shown in Figure 6.20. 
6.3.9 Clean the Thinned Ridges 
The thinned ridge structure sometimes contains short branches or spikes in it. These spikes would 
cause spurious minutiae to be located. These are artefacts of the thinning process and not genuine 
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Figure 6.20: The thinned ridges of the fingerprint. 
features of the fingerprint. The overall accuracy of the set of minutiae would be improved if these 
ridge spikes were removed. 
The cleaning process uses the thinned ridge map as input. Short ridge segments are located and then 
removed. This produces a thinned and cleaned ridge map, which should improve the accuracy of 
the minutiae detection process. 
(a) Example spikes and branches (b) Cleaned ridges 
Figure 6.21: Removal of short spikes and branches. 
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In Figure 6.21(a) an enlargement of the thinned ridge structure is shown. In Figure 6.21(b) the 
cleaned· ridge structure is shown. The algorithm to clean the ridge structure examines each pixel 
that is on a ridge. If it is part of a ridge then it is tested to determine whether it is ridge ending or a 
ridge bifurcation. 
for each pixel in ridge map do 
if end of ridge or intersection of ridges 
then 
direction = 0 
length =0 
repeat 
whlle pixel in direction not on a ridge 
direction = (direction + 1) mod 8 
end while 
move active position in direction 
direction = (direction + 5) mod 8 
length = length + 1 




Figure 6.22: Algorithm to remove spikes and branches from the thinned ridge map. 
Each of the ridges is then traced up to a predefined length. If the end of the ridge is encountered 
or another ridge is intersected before reaching the pre-specified limit then the ridge segment is 
identified as a ridge spike and removed. 
The ridges are traced in a similar manner to the way the edges of the pores were traced in the 
pore removal. The eight directions illustrated in Figure 6.14 are again used as the basic directions. 
Figure 6.22 shows the algorithm used to trace the short ridge spikes and ridge braches. 
When a short segment is found and identified as an artefact of the previous processing stages then 
it is removed using the same algorithm as is used to trace the ridge segment and each pixel is then 
marked as a non-ridge pixel. 
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6.3.10 Minutiae Detection 
The minutiae detection process uses the cleaned and thinned ridge map to locate the minutiae. This 
should produce a set of minutiae that can be used in the comparison of fingerprints. This set should 
be unique enough to be used as the primary feature set for comparison. 
The minutiae extraction then becomes a simple process of detecting the minutiae from a thinned 
ridge map. Each pixel in the ridge map is examined. If it is on a ridge then the number of neigh-
bouring ridge pixels is counted. If there is only one neighbouring ridge pixel then that pixel is 
at a ridge end. If there are two pixels then it is in a ridge and if there are more than two pixels 
neighbouring it then it is a ridge bifurcation. 
Figure 6.23: An enlargement of the thinned ridge pixels of a fingerprint. 
In Figure 6.23 the pixels in the thinned ridge map are shown in enlargement. On the ridges the 
number of pixels surrounding a ridge pixel is two if it is on a ridge segment. At the ridge end, 
which has been circled only one pixel, is adjacent to it. At the ridge bifurcation, which has also 
been circled we can see that there are three adjacent pixels. 
In Figure 6.24 each of the minutiae is shown. When the minutiae are detected the ridge on which 
they fall is followed for a short distance. The method of tracing the ridge is the same method used 
to trace a ridge in the cleaning of the ridge structure. For a ridge ending this ridge is traced for ten 
pixels to determine the direction of the minutia. For a ridge bifurcation all the paths are traced and 
the one that is most different from the other two is chosen as the direction. 
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Figure 6.24: The minutiae detected overlaid on the thinned ridges of the fingerprint. 
6.3.11 Removal of Spurious Minutiae 
The set of minutiae that was produced in the previous step can now be used in the comparison 
process. Unfortunately there are sometimes extra minutiae that have been acquired in the process 
that are spurious. If possible it would be desirable to remove these spurious minutiae. The difficulty 
is in determining which minutiae are accurate. 
The algorithm presented here uses the small area surrounding a minutia to decide if the minutia is 
valid or not. All other minutiae on this area are located. If there are no other minutiae in this area 
then the minutia is assumed to be valid. 
If the minutiae in the surrounding area appear to have a random direction associated with each one 
there is a great probability that they are spurious. If they align in direction then they can be married 
into a single minutia. The minutiae that were produced in the previous stages are examined to deter-
mine if any of them are false. If they are found to be false then they are removed. In Figure 6.25(a) 
an example of false minutiae caused by a short ridge break is shown. In Figure 6.25(b) the spurious 
minutiae have been removed. 
The algorithm to remove false minutiae stores all the minutiae in a two dimensional array at their 
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(a) Some minutiae caused by a short break (b) The spurious minutiae removed 
Figure 6.25: Removal of spurious minuitae. 
location. This array is scanned for minutiae. For each minutia in the array a small section of the 
array surrounding the minutiae is examined. If any minutiae are located in this section then all of 
these minutiae along with minutiae in the centre are either removed or welded together into a single 
point. 
This does have the possibility of falsely removing correct minutiae, but most of the time it will 
remove the minutiae generated by the presence of short ridge spikes, short ridges, and short ridge 
breaks. Most of the features that it does remove are artefact of noise in the scanned image or the 
algorithms used in the previous steps. Thus it will predominantly remove spurious minutiae. 
6.4 Minutiae Comparison 
The minutiae extraction stage produces a set of features that can be used to nniquely identify a finger 
from the fingerprint. This set of features needs to be compared reliably against other feature sets to 
determine whether or not they originated from the same finger. 
Two sets of minutiae need to be compared to decide if they originated from the same finger. This 
process needs to be orientation independent and needs to tolerate distortions of the fingers. One can 
also expect the sets of minutiae to contain some spurious points and to have missed some correct 
points. The comparison of these sets of minutiae is shown in Table 6.1. 
In designing the point comparison algorithm in this thesis, the two main objectives were to optimise 
the comparison in terms of speed and in terms of memory. There were very specific criteria to which 
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the matching routines needed to adhere. The memory requirements had to be restricted to 256 KB 
of RAM. This is because the smart cards used for this research only contain 256 KB of RAM. The 
template of the fingerprint also needed to be limited in size. There is a storage space on the smart 
card of 8 KB in the form of EEPROM memory. This does place some limits on the size of the 
template, but it did not appear that this would be a problem with respect to a point representation. 
Another constraint was the speed of the microchip on the smart card, which runs at speeds of 3.5 to 
5 MHz. This is in the order of magnitude of 100 times slower than a modem PC. 
The minutiae comparison routine makes use of the core point as a reference point in each print. It 
is adjusted to the origin and all the points are then converted into polar coordinates. This helps to 
simplify the matching process. 
The matching process examines each coordinate from each set of points to determine whether there 
is a match on that point. First the distances from the core points are compared. These need to match 
within a tolerance. If they match on distance then all the other properties except for the angular 
coordinate of the pair of minutiae are compared. If all of these properties match, then the angular 
coordinate is used. 
The calculation of the matching angle between the pair is recorded. This difference in angle is the 
angle required to rotate one set of minutiae to allow the pair of minutiae in question to match. This 
angle is used as the index into an array of all possible angles. This angle position in the array is 
then incremented. An examination of this array for a peak value indicates the rotation angle of best 
match along with the number of minutiae that match at that angle. 
This is an O( n2 ) algorithm as every point needs to be compared with every other point to see if they 
match. It can be improved to an O(n) algorithm by ordering the minutiae. The minutiae can be 
sorted on the radius from the core point. This sort can be performed in O(n) time by implementing 
a "bucket sort" as the possible values of the radius are discrete and of a limited range. 
The comparison of the sorted lists of minutiae can be performed in O(n) time. This is done by 
maintaining indices into the two arrays of the minimum possible position, which could cause a 
match on radius of the point. This effectively limits the minutiae that need to be compared to those 
that could match on the radius. 
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6.5 Summary 
The fingerprint is comprised of a pattern of ridges and troughs that curve to form a pattern. These 
unique patterns remain constant throughout an individual's lifetime providing a biometric that can 
be used to identify or verify an individual's identity. 
There are a number of different possible features on the fingerprint that can be used in the compar-
ison process. The first of these features is the ridge structure itself. This can be used to provide 
a highly accurate comparison, but it is difficult to implement ridge comparisons on a computer. 
The second method is to use minutiae. These minutiae are the fine details of the ridge structure. 
They occur at the points of ridge endings and ridge bifurcations. The comparison of the minutiae 
is the most common method of digitally comparing fingerprints. A third method is to use the pore 
structure of the print. These pores occur on the ridges in an approximately regular fashion. 
This dissertation focuses on the techniques that utilize minutiae as the basis for the comparison 
process. The comparison of the minutiae is the most common method of digitally comparing fin-
gerprints and is based upon the methods used in manual fingerprint comparison techniques. The 
algorithms used in the comparison process can be divided into two sections. The first extracts a set 
of minutiae from the fingerprint while the second compares this set of minutiae with another set of 
minutiae. 
The process of extracting a set of the minutiae uses a scanned image as input. From this input image 
an enhanced image is generated. The enhancement stage is intended to improve the accuracy of the 
minutiae. Orientation vectors are extracted from the enhanced image, which are used to locate the 
core point and determine the fingerprint region and the quality of the image. A two-colour image 
is extracted from the enhanced image using the orientations in the orientation field as the expected 
ridge direction in their respective region of the image. These ridges are cleaned to remove the effects 
of the sweat pores, since they are not used in the comparison process. The cleaned ridge structure 
is thinned to a single pixel in width to aid the minutiae detection process. This thin ridge structure 
is despurred to remove short ridge ending and short ridge spikes that usually are side effects of the 
algorithms used. 
From the thinned ridge structure a set of minutiae is extracted. These minutiae are located at the 
ridge endings and the ridge bifurcations. A number of characteristics are calculated for each minutia. 
These are needed to allow accurate comparisons to be performed. The set of minutiae that are 
calculated are examined to remove any that could be considered sPUrious. 
96 CHAPTER 6. FINGERPRINT COMPARISON ALGORITHM 
The minutiae detection process attempts to acquire an accurate set of minutiae. It is however impos-
sible to consistently extract the same set of minutiae. This is a direct result of the differences in the 
area and orientation of the print along with the other factors that reduce the qUality of the scanned 
image. The combined effect of these factors is that the two sets of minutiae that are compared will 
have some different minutiae and the accuracy of the characteristics of the minutiae might vary. 
The comparison stage uses the set of minutiae in polar coordinates with the core point as the origin. 
These sets of points can be efficiently compared on a smart card. The complete set of minutiae 
extracted from a finger is stored in a format that uses 516 bytes. This makes it suitable for storage 
and comparison on the smart card. 
Chapter 7 
Testing and Analysis 
In the research towards this dissertation a system was developed to implement and test the ideas 
presented. This chapter describes how the ideas were tested and analysed. All the results presented 
in this chapter are from the system developed by the author. 
The first performance characteristic that was tested is the accuracy of the system. The accuracy 
of the fingerprint matches was one of the primary aims in the development and implementation of 
these ideas. 
Along with the accuracy the timing of the authentication process needs to be analysed to determine 
whether it is suitable to provide real time authentication. The timing was an important require-
ment in the development of the ideas. since the intended use of the ideas was to provide real time 
verification of an individual's identity through the use of a smart card and their fingerprint. 
7.1 Accuracy 
The accuracy of a system is a primary concern when determining its suitability for the desired 
purpose [43]. We therefore need to calculate the accuracy. The system should also be examined 
for weak points. If the system allows users to authenticate themselves over a network, then it is 
highly unlikely that they would attack the system by attempting to make their fingerprint appear as 
someone else's fingerprint. Rather they would acquire a digital copy of the fingerprint and attempt 
to inject it surreptitiously into the system via the network [18]. 
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A complete personal authentication system should be able to verify two things in order to be suc-
cessful. Firstly it needs to verify the freshness of the scan from which the fingerprint originated 
(i.e. that the biometric was actually scanned from the person at the time of verification) Secondly, it 
needs to determine whether the fresh biometric matches a master template that is stored on file [18]. 
Biometrics are not secrets. Fingerprints are left on everything that you touch, while face or iris 
patterns can be observed every time that you can be seen. Thus you also need to be able to verify 
the freshness and the owner's identity of the scan. 
The analysis of the accuracy of the fingerprint matching routines is examined first statistically and 
then empirically. The statistical analysis seeks to predict the degree of coincidence between two 
random sets of points. This coincidence can then be used to predict the probability of fingerprints 
from different fingers incorrectly being declared a match. We require the probability of a chance 
false match to be very small before the converse proposition is assumed and the fingerprints are 
declared a match. 
The statistical analysis can predict the number of minutiae that are expected to coincide between 
different fingerprints. This can be used as a guide to determine a threshold level of minutiae that are 
required to match before the fingerprints are declared as a match. If the fingerprints originated from 
the same finger then one would expect there to be a high level of coincidence between the minutiae 
extracted from them. 
The empirical analysis uses pairs of matching fingerprints and executes batch comparisons to deter-
mine the FAR and FRR. The empirical determined FAR is then compared to the predicted FAR. 
7.2 Statistical Analysis of FAR 
One would like for any pair of fingerprints from the same finger to have a large number of minutiae 
matching, while at the same time one would prefer pairs of fingerprints from different fingers to have 
very few points matching. The statistical model developed here attempts to predict the frequency of 
falsely declaring a match between non-matching prints. 
In comparing fingerprints only the minutiae need to be compared. The minutiae will be assumed 
to have about equal probability of occurring in any position on the fingerprint. To simplify the 
process the circle of radius R will be treated as if it is split into a number of cells each with an 
equal probability of having a minutia in it. Although the probability of a minutia appearing in an 
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outside segment might be larger due to the fact that the area of an edge segment is larger, there is 
often a counter-weighting phenomenon of more minutiae per unit area in the inner bands. Thus the 
presumed equivalence of probabilities for each cell might be a reasonable approximation, which 
could be the subject of later optimisations. It will also be assumed that each cell will have at most 
one minutia in it. The implementation does not guarantee that there will not be two minutiae in the 
same cell, however the chances are negligible as there is some post processing on the minutiae to 
prevent them from occurring too near to each other. If two points are within a certain distance of 
each other then they are married together to form a single minutia and are treated as such. 
In order to determine whether two fingerprints originated from the same finger we need to compare 
the two sets of minutiae. If sufficient minutiae from the two sets match then they can be assumed 
to have originated from the same finger. The question to ask is how many points need to match for 
us to be 99% confident that the prints are from the same finger. To answer this question we will 
examine the case where the minutiae are compared at a particular orientation. 
By making the assumptions that all N cells are equally likely to be filled by one minutia the number 
of the minutiae that are expected to match can be modelled by the hypergeometric distribution [51]. 
N is dependant on the maximum radius of the circle R. 
P{common minutiaeIN,m,n) = 
where, N total number of cells in the fingerprint other than the core. 
n = the number of minutiae in the reference fingerprint. n ~ N 
m = the number of minutiae in the fingerprint being compared. m ~ N 
r = the number of points that match. r ~ min{ m, n} 
(7.1) 
This fixes the probability for the coincidence of r cells chosen for possible matching from the n 
occupied cells matching due to chance alone. This formula does not take the orientation a or the 
character (bifurcation or ridge ending) of the minutiae into account. Intuitively we would expect 
that low values of r would be associated more frequently with non-matching prints and high values 
of r to be associated more frequently with matching prints. To determine the FAR the probability 
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of at least x cells coincidently matching is needed. This probability can be calculated by summing 
(7.1) up from x through n. 
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If orientation ex. is independent of basal direction e and of radius r then adding the direction of the 
minutia into the comparison can be thought of as reducing the chances of a match for a particular 
cell by the ratio of the range of acceptance divided by the full revolution. Even if ex. is not completely 
independent it would still be expected to have some selective power to remove false matches. The 
addition of ex. in the comparison process has the effect of increasing N. Le. N = N(R, ex.) 
The other characteristic that is recorded with each minutia is the type or more specifically whether 
it is a ridge ending or a ridge bifurcation. In the simplified case one can assume that the probability 
of each ridge feature is equal. This assumption would effectively double the size of N. i.e. N 
N(R, ex.,t) 
This argument illustrates the probability of x or more pairs of minutiae matching coincidently from 
different fingerprints at a preset orientation. However since the approach thus far assumes a par-
ticular orientation for each fingerprint to be chosen without any bias of how many minutiae. This 
approach needs to be generalized to allow one image to rotate at any angle. The best matching 
angle would be the angle used for the match. The secondary print needs to be allowed to rotate to 
any angle with respect to original print. As it does this rotation the maximum match is taken as the 
match between the two prints. Allowing rotation will increase the number of coincidental matches. 
7.2.1 Example 
N represents the total number of cells into which the print can be divided. This number can be 
approximated by the number of angular subdivisions multiplied by the number of divisions of the 
radius. These subdivisions need to be large enough to ensure that the majority of points that should 
match do, while at the same time ensuring that minutiae from different fingers do not match. If 
the angular coordinate is split into 16 segments each of 22.5° and the radius is also divided into 16 
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bands each of 16 pixels, then the total area would be divided up into 256 distinct regions giving 
N = 256. For simplicity we will assume all regions to be equally likely. 
If n = 100, m = 100 and N 256 then from Equation 7.2 x = 49 yields P(x) = 0.01 with a 1% 
chance of a match declared on the basis of x ~ 49, if chance only is operating (i.e. the fingerprints 
are from a distinct pair of fingers). Similarly x = 59 yields P(x) = 0.000001, with a chance of order 
10-6 that randomly chosen fingerprints will yield the signal x ~ 58 which we choose (reasonably, 
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Figure 7.1: The FAR that is predicted by the hypergeometric distribution. 
The example has been presented to illustrate that using just the positions of minutiae is insufficient 
to match fingerprints accurately. The number of random points that coincide on just position would 
require far too many points to match. The graph in Figure 7.1 shows the high FAR when just 
position is used to compare minutiae. Fortunately there are characteristics about minutiae that can 
be recorded such as the type of minutiae and the angle, ex that the ridge from which the minutia was 
acquired, was directed. 
Thus if ex is independent of the location of the minutia and the range of acceptance is 22.5° then 
dividing a single revolution by ex can be conceptualised as further subdividing each cell into another 
16 parts. This division would reduce the chance of a coincidental match involving ex between a pair 
of minutiae to l6 the chance without ex. In the previous example, N would increase from 256 cells 
up to 4096 cells, assumed equally likely. 
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Now x = 8 in (7.2) with N = 4096 yields P(x} = 0.01 so that x 2:: 8 can be used to signal a match. 
Were there no match of the prints by pure chance, then x 2:: 8 will occur less than 1 % of the time. 
Similarly if we are more strictly taking x 2:: 13 as the signal for a match, since P(x 2:: 13) = 0.000001, 
then the chance of a false match is less than 10-6 . This additional requirement has achieved a 
significant reduction in the number of minutiae required to match in order to achieve the desired 
accuracy. The improvement and corresponding reduction in the FAR is shown in Figure 7.1. 
The other characteristic of each minutia that was recorded was whether it was a ridge ending or 
bifurcation. This information can be used to strengthen the matching procedure. The effect would be 
to further .subdivide each cell into two cellsresulting in.a total of N = 8192 possible cells (assumed 
equally likely) in a fingerprint. This increase in the number if divisions of the area would reduce 
the minutiae required to declare a match to 5 and 9 with FAR of 10-2 and 10-6 respectively. Using 
all three of these characteristics one would expect almost 30% of random fingerprints to have 0 
matching minutiae and most prints to match few point coincidently. 
Using the type has the effect of reducing the FAR. This is illustrated in Figure 7.1 where the effect 
on the predicted FAR of using different amounts of information in the comparison of minutiae is 
shown. 
7.3 Empirical Analysis of FAR and FRR 
The empirical accuracy of the system was measured by running batch comparisons on sets of fin-
gerprints from a database and recording the rate of matching. The batch comparison could either 
compare all the fingerprints that were supposed to match, or those that were not supposed to match. 
The fingerprints from the NIST Special Fingerprint Database 4 were used as test fingerprints. 
In the implementation of the ideas presented in this dissertation a facility to run batches of com-
parisons was included. This batch feature was used the accuracy and timing of sections and the 
complete authentications process. 
7.3.1 Description of the Procedure to Test FAR and FRR 
All the tests recorded the accuracy of the matching process when just the position (r, 9). or the 
position and direction of each minutiae (r, 9, ex) or the position, direction and type of each minutiae 
(r, 9, ex, t) was used for comparison. 
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The FRR is the percentage of valid users that are rejected by the system. The FRR is compared to 
the number of minutiae required for the fingerprints to be declared a match. In this testing different 
fingerprints originating from the same finger are compared. 
In contrast the FAR is the percentage of successful attempts by invalid users. Tests to determine the 
FAR empirically used fingerprints originating from different fingers and recorded the results. 
The tests in the remained of this chapter examine the FRR and FAR relative to the number of points 
that are required to match for the pair of prints to be declared a match. This experiment is repeated 
using various sets of characteristics of a minutiae pair to consider them a match. 
These experiments execute a batch of fingerprint comparisons and output a list of how many finger-
prints pairs have a given number of minutiae matching. This list would have the layout of Table 7.1. 
Exact number of minutiae matching Number of distinct comparisons 





Table 7.1: The results generated from a batch fingerprint comparison recording how many pairs 
matched. 
The sum of all fingerprints that match is the total number of comparisons that are performed in a 
particular test batch. 
127 
Number of comparisons 2mi 
i=O 
(7.3) 
The results illustrated in Table 7.1 can be used to calculate the ratio of comparisons that are falsely 
declared a match. This calculation involves the total number of all the comparisons that had at least 
n minutiae matching, divided by the number of comparisons in the batch. 
. mi acceptance ratlO = __ --=-:...--'-"-----
Number of comparisons 
(7.4) 
The same results can be used to calculate the rejection rate. The comparisons that are rejected as 
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not having sufficient minutiae matching are those that have less than n minutiae matching. This 
rejection ratio can be calculated as 1- acceptance ratio or 
rejected ratio 
Number of comparisons 
(7.5) 
The FAR can be determined by calculating the acceptance ratio on a batch of fingerprint compar-
isons that should be rejected by using (7.4). The FRR is determined when (7.5) is applied to the 
results of a batch where pairs of matching fingerprints are compared. 
The empirical testing of the FAR an FRR of this system starts with the simplest system and then 
proceeds to show how the addition of sections of the algorithm and the modification of the tolerance 
parameters affect the accuracy of the matching process. 
The results from these tests are presented in the remainder of this chapter. They were intended to test 
the effect of varying the algorithm and parameters used by it. The following tests were performed 
and the FAR and FRR recorded: 
• Compare the use of different amounts of information in the matching of minutiae. 
• Compare the effect of allowing the orientation between the fingerprints to vary. 
• Examine the effect of varying the tolerances in matching minutiae. 
• Compare the inclusion of enhancement stage in the minutiae extraction algorithm. 
• Examine the effect of using classification information in the comparison process. 
• Examine the effect of the quality of the fingerprint scans. 
• Examine the effect of classification when quality fingerprint scans are used. 
In these tests a minutia is treated as a 4-tuple specifying its position and characteristics. 
(r, 9, C(,type) (7.6) 
where, r = the radius of the minutiae from the core point. 
9 = the angular component of the polar coordinate specifying the position. 
C( = the angle specifying the direction of the ridge from which the minutiae was extracted. 
type = the type of the minutiae. (bifurcation/ending) 
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The 4-tuple shown in (7.6) shows the characteristics that define a minutia. The radius, r, has a 
range of (0 .. 128). Both e and a. specify angles. For these angles the units are ~~r. This effectively 
divides the full revolution into 256 units. The type of minutiae is either a ridge ending or a ridge 
bifurcation. 
7.3.2 No Rotation 
The simplest method presented here uses an orientation calculated from one fingerprint to align it 
with another fingerprint. The first comparison examines the effect of using different characteristics 
of minutiae in the comparison process. 
The tolerances used in deciding if a pair of minutiae match for this test are: 
Tolerance of r = 11 pixels; 
Tolerance of e = 11 x 
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Figure 7.2: The FRR and FAR when only position is used to match minutiae. 
! 
Comparing the sets of minutiae extracted from the fingerprints produces the following results. 
The first test produces an equal error rate (EER) of about 40%. This EER is the point where the 
FAR is equal to the FRR. The results of the first batch of comparisons uses only the position, or the 
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first two coordinates in the 4-tuple representing a minutia to determine if a pair of minutiae matches. 
The FAR and FRR have been graphed in Figure 7.2. 
It is undesirable for this many points to match between fingerprints from different fingers. It is 
therefore necessary to use more than just the position of the minutiae in the comparison. The 
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Figure 7.3: The FRR and FAR when position and alpha are used to match minutiae. 
In Figure 7.3 the FRR and FAR are graphed when both the position and the direction a are used to 
compare minutiae. The new information has the effect of reducing the number of minutiae matching 
between both matching and non-matching pairs of fingerprints. It does cause a larger reduction in 
the number of minutiae that are declared to match yet originate from different fingerprints. Its 
inclusion in the matching process does reduce the associated error rates and is therefore desirable. 
In addition to the direction, a, the type of each minutia can be included in the criteria for deciding 
whether or not a pair of minutiae matches. One would expect this to reduce the FAR further while 
not increasing the FRR substantially. 
Figure 7.4 shows a graph of the FRR and FAR for fingerprint comparisons performed using type, 
direction and position to decide if a pair of minutiae matches. Unfortunately the inclusion of the 
type here has also increased the FRR while reducing the FAR resulting in little change in the EER. 
The use of the EER in comparing methods assumes that the FAR and FRR are weighted equally. In 










rY- ----/ .••. --- .--~-,~'--'.... 









o 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 a 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 25 27 25 29 30 
Number of Minutia<> Required 10 Dec"'", a MlIIl:h 
I 
Figure 7.4: The FRR and FAR when position, alpha and type are used to match minutiae. 
practice the FAR would most likely have a greater weighting. 
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This test has empirically shown that using the position alone is insufficient to differentiate between 
the sets of minutiae extracted from different fingerprints. Further more this test has shown that 
the inclusion of more characteristics about a minutia reduces the FAR and therefore the number of 
minutiae required to declare a match. This finding is in agreement with the results produced by 
the statistical model and as expected there is a corresponding increase in the FRR when the same 
number of minutiae is used to declare a match. 
7.3.3 Limited Rotation 
Each fingerprint has a core point that is located near the centre of the fingerprint. The ridge in-
formation at this point can be used to determine the orientation of the fingerprint. This orientation 
might not be completely accurate, therefore it is desirable to allow some rotation between the pair 
of fingerprints being compared. It is not necessary to allow complete rotation. Rather the rotation 
can be limited to a certain range. 
This test attempts to determine how much rotation should be allowed for an optimal matching 
process. The complete set of 2000 pairs of fingerprints is used in this test. The FAR is calculated 
by attempting to match non-matching pairs of fingerprints and the FRR is calculated by attempting 
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to match matching pairs. In the calculation of the FAR 7 996 000 comparisons are performed and 
for the FRR 2000 comparisons are made. This batch of comparisons is repeated with different 
tolerances in the maximum amount of rotation allowed between the pair of prints. The number of 
minutiae n, in a fingerprint is ignored in these tests. The only factor used in deciding if the prints 
match is whether a minimum number of minutiae match and not the number of minutiae in each 
print. 
The tolerances used in deciding if a pair of minutiae match for this test are: 
Tolerance of r = 11 pixels; 
Tolerance of 9 11 x 360
0 
256 
360 0 Tolerance of a = 13 x 256 
Tolerance in the rotation ranging in [0 .. 100] x ~~r 
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Figure 7.5: The FRR and FAR when the rotation between fingerprints is varied. 
For the batch of comparisons used to calculate the FAR and FRR ten minutiae matches were used to 
signal a match. The complete 4-tuple representing a minutia was used to compare a pair of minutiae. 
The maximum rotation allowed between the calculated orientations of the two fingerprints was 
started at 00 and incremented in units of 2 x ~~o until it reached 100 x ~~r. For each of these 
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increments the batch process was executed to calculate the FAR and the FRR. The results from 
these batches was plotted as a graph in Figure 7.5 to allow comparison between the tolerance in the 
rotation and the respective error rates. 
From the graph in Figure 7.5 one can see that the FRR decreases as the tolerance is increases. 
Unfortunately the FAR increases as the tolerance is increased. From the graph it looks as if allowing 
the fingerprint to rotate by about 20 x ~~~ 0 gives a good balance. Below this point the FRR decreases 
rapidly, while after this point the FRR decreases gradually indicating that this is about the maximum 
error in the orientation calculation. The FAR continues to increase as this tolerance is increased. 
The tolerance should thus be restricted to minimise the error rate. 
7.3.4 Varying the Matching Tolerances 
Each minutiae detected in the fingerprint is recorded as a 4-tuple describing the location and char-
acteristics of the minutiae. In the comparison of a pair of fingerprints these tuples of minutiae are 
checked to identify a correspondence between them. The number of pairs of minutiae, (with one 
minutia from the one and the other minutia from the other fingerprint), which match on the all of 
the characteristics of the 4-tuple is used to indicate the probability that the fingerprints originated 
from the same finger. 
This set of tests examines the tolerances within which the minutiae need to match to be designated 
as matching. They need to allow some tolerance in the matching since there is a level of inaccuracy 
in extracting them. These tests seek to determine the optimum values for the tolerances. 
Radius Tolerance 
The first value in the 4-tuple (7.6) of characteristics representing a minutia is the radius, r, in polar 
coordinates. There is a level of error in the extraction of the position. This error could be the result 
of smudges or interference in the input image or error in the location of the core point. Whatever the 
reason the comparison process needs to cater for a limited level of error. This test has been designed 
to examine the effect of changing the tolerance with which the radius is matched. 
Batches of comparisons are performed and the results recorded. These batches are repeated with 
varying tolerances used in the matching of the radius component of the minutiae. 
The tolerances used in deciding if a pair of minutiae match for this test are: 
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Tolerance of r ranging in [0 .. 100] pixels 
360 0 Tolerance of e = 11 x 256 
Tolerance of a 13 x ~~r 
Tolerance in the range of rotation = 20 x ~~ 0 
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Figure 7.6: The FRR and FAR when the tolerance in matching the radius is varied. 
The complete 4-tuple representing a minutia was used to compare a pair of minutiae and ten minu-
tiae matches between a pair of fingerprints was used to declare the fingerprints from the same finger. 
From the graph in Figure 7.6 it appears that the tolerance in the radius should be in the range of 
10 - 20 pixels. For values less than this value the FRR decreases rapidly, while the FAR does not 
increase as rapidly. On the other hand for values greater than this value the FRR does not decrease 
at the same rate as the FAR increases. 
Choosing a tolerance in this range appears to produce the best results by minimising the error rates. 
For the remainder of the tests the tolerance used for matching the radius has been chosen as 11 
pixels. This tolerance seems to perform with a balance between the FAR and FRR. 
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Tolerance in e 
The second value in the 4-tuple (7.6) of characteristics representing a minutia is the angular coordi-
nate, e. This coordinate will also have an associated level of error that will be similar to the error 
of the radius. This error will be similar to the error in the radius as the same Cartesian coordinates 
were used and converted to polar coordinates. 
This test was developed to determine the optimum tolerance in e. The batch process was repeated 
with different tolerances in matching e and the results recorded. These results indicate the effect of 
varying the tolerance on the FAR and FRR. 
The tolerances used in deciding if a pair of minutiae match for this test are: 
Tolerance of r = 11 pixels 
Tolerance of e ranging in [0 .. 100] x ~~r 
360 0 Tolerance of a = 13 x 256 
Tolerance in the range of rotation = 20 x ~~r 
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Figure 7.7: The FRR and FAR when the tolerance in matching a pair of minutiae on e is varied. 
The complete 4-tuple representing a minutia was used to compare a pair of minutiae and ten minu-
tiae matches between a pair of fingerprints was used to declare the fingerprints from the same finger. 
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The graph in Figure 7.7 shows that FRR decreases rapidly as the tolerance for the angular coordinate 
e in the comparison is increased. This indicates that there is a measure of error in the detection 
process of the minutiae. Thus this error needs to be catered for in the comparison process. The 
FAR also increases as this tolerance is increased making it undesirable to make it any larger than is 
absolutely needed. From the graph it appears that a tolerance of betweeu 10 x ~~r and 20 x ~~r 
gives a best result. 
Tolerance in a 
The third value in the 4-tuple (7.6) of characteristics representing a minutia is a, the direction of 
the ridge from which the miuutiae was extracted. The extraction of this attribute also has a certain 
level of error. This test runs batches of comparisons with the same set of fingerprints varying the 
tolerance in a between batches and recording the results. 
The tolerances used in deciding if a pair of minutiae match for this test are: 
Tolerance of r = 11 pixels 
Tolerance of e = 11 x ~~r 
Tolerance of a ranging in (0 .. 100] x ~~r 
Tolerance in the range of rotation = 20 x ~~ 0 
A match is declared if 10 minutiae match. 
The complete 4-tuple representing a minutia was used to compare a pair of minutiae and ten minu-
tiae matches between a pair of fingerprints was used to declare the fingerprints from the same finger. 
The graph in Figure 7.8 shows how the FRR and the FAR change as the tolerance in the minu-
tiae matching process changes. As the tolerance on a increases the FRR decreases and the FAR 
increases. It appears that tolerance of between 12 x ~~o and 20 x ~~r produces a good result. 
7.3.5 Enhancement 
There is an enhancement stage in the algorithm that was not applied in the previous tests. This 
enhancement sharpens the scanned images before any of the extraction algorithms are applied. 
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Figure 7.8: The FRR and FAR when the tolerance in matching the (X. is varied. 
This stage can be added and then compared with the results produced without it. The criteria used 
in the previous sections that produced the best results have been used except that an enhancement 
of the fingerprint images has been added to the beginning of the minutiae extraction process. 
The tolerances used in deciding if a pair of minutiae match for this test are: 
Tolerance of r = 11 pixels 
Tolerance of a = 11 x 
360 0 Tolerance of (X. = 13 X 256 
Tolerance in the range of rotation = 20 x ~~~ 0 
The enhancement stage improves the accuracy and reduces the EER to less than 30%. This reduction 
indicates that there was considerable error in the determination of the position and characteristics 
of the minutiae in the previous stage of the testing and that the enhancement reduces this error. The 
corresponding results are depicted in Figure 7.9. 
7.3.6 Classification 
All of the previous tests used only the minutiae in the comparison process. It is however possible to 
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Figure 7.9: The FRR and FAR when the enhancement stage is used. 
to reduce the FAR without increasing the FRR. 
The tolerances used in deciding if a pair of minutiae match for this test are: 
Tolerance of r = 11 pixels 
Tolerance of e = 11 x ~~ 0 
Tolerance of ex = 13 x ~r 
Tolerance in the range of rotation = 20 x ~~r 
The classification that is based on the Henry system is used to divide the prints into classes. This 
will prevent a large section of the prints from matching. The other globa1 feature that was used in 
this test is the curvature index. This curvature index represents the curvature of the ridges at the 
core of the fingerprint, and needs to match within a sma11 tolerance. In Figure 7.10 the classification 
information rejects about 91 % of the fingerprints that shou1d not match before even comparing a 
single minutiae, but it also rejects 17% of the valid matches. Using a minimum level of 9 points to 
declare a match rejects over 99% of non-matching fingerprints. 
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Figure 7.10: The FRR and FAR when the classifications are used. 
7.3.7 Quality Fingerprints 
115 
In the previous tests it was shown that the FAR could be reduced to less than 1 % if 10 points 
are used to declare a match. Unfortunately the FRR that corresponded to this FAR is larger than 
was desirable. It was conjectured that this inadequacy was due to the poor quality of some of the 
fingerprints in the database. To test this hypothesis 200 pairs of good quality images were visually 
selected from the database. 
Figure 7.11 shows a sample fingerprint of good quality, while Figure 7.12 shows a sample fingerprint 
of poor quality. The poor quality fingerprints are difficult to match against anything and cause the 
FRR to become large, but have little affect on the FAR precisely because they are unlikely to match 
anything. 
The tolerances used in deciding if a pair of minutiae match for this test are: 
Tolerance of r = 11 pixels 
Tolerance of e = 11 x ~~r 
Tolerance of a. = 13 x ~~ 0 
Tolerance in the range of rotation = 20 x i~r 
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Figure 7.11: An example of a good quality image. 
Figure 7.12: An example of a poor quality image. 
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Figure 7.13: The FRR and FAR when quality fingerprints are used. 
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The complete 4-tuple representing a minutia was used to compare a pair of minutiae, and no classi-
fication information was used in the comparison process. 
The results from the tests using the qUality images are presented in Figure 7.13. These show a 
significant improvement in the accuracy of the comparison process. There are a significantly larger 
number of minutiae that match between a pair that should match. The graph in Figure 7.13 shows 
that the FRR decreases compared to the poor quality images without having much effect on the 
FAR. 
The results with the quality images have an EER of 41 % if only position is used to compare minu-
tiae. If position and a. is used then this EER drops to 8.8%. It is then further reduced to 5.6% if the 
type of the minutia is also used. This indicates that the more characteristics that are used the better 
the accuracy of the matching process. 
7.3.8 Quality Fingerprints with Classification 
As in the tests with the complete database, global features of the fingerprints can be used to compare 
the fingerprints before they are compared on the minutiae. 
The tolerances used in deciding if a pair of minutiae match for this test are: 
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Tolerance of r = 11 pixels 
360 0 Tolerance of a = 11 x 256 
Tolerance of a = 13 x ~~o 
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Figure 7.14: The FRR and FAR when quality fingerprints are matched with classification informa-
tion. 
The complete 4-tuple representing a minutia was used to compare a pair of minutiae and all the 
classification information was used in the comparison process. This is similar to the test performed 
on the whole database described in Section 7.3.6. 
Figure 7.14 shows the results of using global characteristics of fingerprints to improve the compar-
ison process. This reduces the EER to about 1.5%. A poor quality image will tend to increase the 
FRR, but have little effect on the FAR [38]. 
7.3.9 Consolidation of the Accuracy Analysis 
The accuracy of the matching process has been found to improve when certain sections are included 
in extraction and comparison of the minutiae. 
Table 7.2 shows how the EER changes when the whole database is used, compared with the set 
selected on their qUality. This table demonstrates the effect of allowing rotation and using differing 
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Complete Database EER Selected Pairs EER 
Match on No Rotation Full Rotation Allowed . No Rotation Limited Rotation Allowed 
Position 41.40 43.35 36.58 41.34 • 
Position,S 34.25 34.30 14.11 8.81 
! Position, S, ex: 35.36 32.10 11.51 5.64 
Table 7.2: Comparison of the equal error rates. 
amounts of information to perform the minutiae comparison. This table clearly demonstrates the 
effect of using additional characteristics about each minutia for the comparison. On reasonable 
quality fingerprints the EER is reduced by about 80% by the utilisation of the direction associated 
with each minutia. This is further reduced by about 35% with the inclusion of the type. Additional 
characteristics can be extracted for each minutia and used in the comparison to reduce these error 
rates. 
Algorithmic Stages EER I 
Basic 35.36 i 
Enhancement 29.65 I 
Enhancement and Classification 1 17.60 I 
Quality Set with Enhancement 5.63 i 
Quality Set with Enhancement and Classification 1.56 I 
Table 7.3: Comparison of the equal error rates with different sections included in the comparison 
algorithm. 
The algoritbm used to extract the minutiae can include different sections in the algorithm. Table 7.3 
shows how the EER is reduced when the enhancement stage is included improving the accuracy of 
the minutiae extracted. The classification information further reduces the EER. The affect on the 
high quality fingerprints is also shown in Table 7.3. 
1 The FAR and FRR do not cross in this case. The larger of the two was used as the EER. In this case the FRR is 8.74 
and the FAR is 17.60 
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7.4 Curvature Index Consistency 
The core point of each fingerprint is located at the point of greatest concave curvature. A number 
can be extracted at this point representing the curvature of the ridge at this point, which can be used 
as an indexing mechanism for the fingerprints. The difference in the curvature index between the 
matching pair of fingerprints was calculated. Ideally this difference should be small allowing it to 
be used as an approximate index. 
7.4.1 Without Enhancement 
The first test was performed on the entire set of 2000 fingerprint pairs. The range of values calcu-
lated for the index is from about two up to about nine. The absolute difference between the indexes 
calculated for each of the fingerprints in the pair was recorded. This difference was used to deter-




Standard Deviation 0.85 
Median 0.75 
Table 7.4: The difference in the curvature index from matching fingerprints. 
The results in Table 7.4 show that 50% of the matching pairs have a curvature index less than 0.75 
apart. The variance is quite large as a result of a few outliers as a result of prints with a large 
difference in the index. 
7.4.2 With Enhancement 
The same test was repeated, but this time the fingerprints were enhanced before they the curvature 
was calculated. 
The results in Table 7.5 show that 50% of the matching pairs have a curvature index less than 0.70 
apart. The variance is still on the large side. 
The inclusion of the enhancement stage has made an improvement in the accuracy of the results. 
The mean difference has decreased along with the variance in the difference. 
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Mean 0.91 
Variance 0.62 
Standard Deviation 0.79 
Median 0.70 I 
Table 7.5: The difference in the curvature index from matching enhanced images. 
7.4.3 Quality 
The test was repeated with the same set of quality fingerprints selected to test FAR and FRR. In this 
test the fingerprints were enhanced before the index was extracted. 
Mean 0.26 
Variance 0.03 
! Standard Deviation 0.17 
Median 0.25 
Table 7.6: The difference in the curvature index from quality fingerprints prints. 
The results in Table 7.6 show that on quality fingerprints the mean difference, along with the vari-
ance in this difference, in the curvature index calculated from matching fingerprints substantially 
decreases. Half of the pairs have a difference of less than 0.25. 
7.5 Timing 
The performance of a system needs to meet have specific criteria for it to be a viable option. In the 
system tested here the timing is of critical importance. The timing of the system needs to conform 
to constraints to ensure that a system can be used in real time. 
The process of identity verification can be divided into a number of stages. This first of these stages 
is the process of acquiring the image from the scanner. The total time required for an image capture 
is less than lOOms [44]. The second stage in the process is the extraction of a set of minutiae. The 
third stage is the comparison of the minutiae. The timing for the second and third stages have been 
tested and recorded. 
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7.5.1 Minutiae Extraction 
The process of extracting a set of minutiae and the corresponding characteristics about each minutia 




Standard Deviation 0.32 
Median 3.4s 
Table 7.7: The time taken in seconds to extract a set of points from a fingerprint. 
Figure 7.7 shows the time taken to extract a set of minutiae from a fingerprint. This minutiae 
extraction process is the main contribution to the time taken to perform a comparison. 
7.5.2 Matching On the Smart Card 
The second stage is the comparison of the minutiae. This stage can be divided into two sections. 
The first copies the second set of minutiae to the card and the second compares it to the set already 
on the card. 
1 Mean 11.7s • 
Table 7.8: Time in seconds to copy a set of minutiae to the smart card. 
Table 7.8 shows the times taken to transfer the set of minutiae to the smart card. This time is 
largely due to the time taken to store the minutiae in EEPROM, which is a time consuming step. 
No variance is presented, as it is negligible compared to the time of 1.7 seconds taken to copy the 
minutiae across to the card. 
Table 7.9: Time to compare minutiae on the smart card. 
The results in Table 7.9 show the time required to match two sets of minutiae on a smart card. The 
variance in the time was negligible. Combining the copying to the card and the comparison could 
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reduce the time siuce the write to EEPROM would then be avoided. This combination was not 
implemented since the times are within the acceptable range. 
7.5.3 Matching On the Computer 
In addition to testing the time for comparison on a smart card, the time needed for a comparison on 
the computer was recorded. Computer comparison time would be used if the comparison routine 
were used to search through a database. 
I Mean I 0.00012s 
Table 7.10: Time to compare minutiae on the computer. 
The results in Table 7.10 record the time required to perform the matching routines on a computer 
with an Athion 600 MHz processor. On the same machine if the classification information is used 
to do a quick reject of non-matches then over 70000 comparisons are performed per second. 
From these results one can show that the complete authentication process from the moment the 
smart card is inserted into the reader and the fingerprint is scanned until the moment when it is 
either declared to be a match or non-match takes about five seconds. By implementing additional 
optimisations this process can be reduced to about three seconds. 
7.6 Summary 
The accuracy and the timing of a real-time system are critical to its success. In this chapter these 
performance metrics of the system designed and implemented by the author have been tested. Both 
statistical analysis and empirical testing are presented here. Accuracy results were summarised 
in Table 7.2 and Table 7.3. These results showed that using additional characteristics about each 
minutia reduced the error. Additionally the inclusion of the enhancement stage and the use of the 
classification information improved the accuracy of the verification . 
. A statistical model was developed to predict the level of false acceptance. The set of minutiae ex-
tracted from a fingerprint was expected to have a high level of coherence with other sets of minutiae 
extracted from the same finger, while one would expect a very low level of coherence between sets 
of minutiae extracted from different fingers. 
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The statistical model assumes that the set of minutiae extracted from a scan can be treated as a 
random set of equally likely points. This structure can be modelled with a hypergeometric distri-
bution, where the fingerprint is divided into a number of regions, each of which can have a single 
minutia in it. An attempt to match this with another scan will have the potential for a minutia to be 
in the corresponding region by chance. When this coincidence happens then the minutia is counted 
as being a match. The statistical model is able to predict the FAR when the rotation between the 
fingerprints is kept constant. 
The empirical testing and analysis records the results from executing batch comparisons. These 
comparisons show that using just the position of the minutiae for comparison is insufficient to 
produce accurate results. The addition of direction decreases the FAR, but increases the FRR. The 
net effect, however, is to reduce the overall error. The addition of minutia type did not reduce the 
error rates significantly, on the original set of fingerprints. It did however reduce the EER by about 
half when operated on better quality scans. This effect shows that scan quality has a large effect on 
theFRR. 
The effect of varying the amount of rotation allowed between fingerprints was also examined. It was 
found that allowing a small amount of rotation decreased the FRR significantly, although allowing 
more than about 20 x ~~r had minimal effect on the FRR. Allowing rotation did increase the FAR, 
but the FRR decreased more notably for small rotations. A similar effect was noticed by allowing 
the tolerance between minutiae to vary, which would cause minutiae to be declared as matching. 
Inclusion of an enhancement stage in the minutiae detection algorithm was then tested. This was 
found to reduce the EER by about 5%. There was in addition a significant reduction in the FRR 
and a small reduction in the FAR. The use of classification information in the comparison stage was 
tested and found to improve the accuracy. There was a large reduction in the FAR, but the FRR 
increased due to the misclassification of a few fingerprints. 
Often the inked fingerprints are of a very poor quality, resulting in low signal-to-noise ratios [27]. 
Poor quality prints can be a direct result of the conditions under which the prints were acquired. 
Inclusion of the enhancement stage was able to improve the results on poor quality images. 
Batch comparisons were performed on a selected set of quality image pairs. 200 pairs of images 
were visually selected as good quality images. On these fingerprints the tests showed that using 
just the position to compare minutiae without classification information produced equal error rates 
of around 40%. Including the direction of the minutiae reduced the EER to less than 10% and 
using the type of the minutia further reduced this EER to about 5.6%. The addition of classification 
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infonnation into the comparison process reduced the EER to 1.56%. 
In [37] a computer was set up with 40 user accounts, each with an associated fingerprint. A round-
robin test where each user attempted to gain access to each of the accounts was then perfonned. 
Doing so produced 1600 test queries, of which 40 queries should have been granted and 1560 
denied. The FRR was in the range zero to 44% while the FAR was in the range zero to 0.4%. Most 
of the error in the system originated from poor quality images. 
It was shown that the curvature index calculated at the core point could be used to provide a rough 
indexing scheme into a database. On good quality fingerprints the mean difference in the index 
between fingerprints from the same finger was 0.26. Thus, if a tolerance of 0.5 were used then most 
matching fingerprints would still be declared as matching while eliminating most non-matches. 
Timing infonnation gathered from the batch comparisons showed that the authentication process is 
efficient enough to make it a feasible option. The complete authentication process takes about 5 
seconds. 
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Chapter 8 
Future Work 
The implementation and analysis described in this work demonstrates that performing a fingerprint 
comparison on a smart card is feasible. This method can be used to enhance the privacy and security 
of a system. Testing of the implementation showed that the extraction of the minutiae set was the 
most time consuming part of the authentication process. This aspect could receive optimisations to 
reduce the time delay that it causes. There are a number of related areas that could be researched 
further to extend the themes explored in this dissertation. Some of these are presented here. 
8.1 Identification from a Central Database 
The second phase ol the comparison process as described in Section 6.4 was able to compare over 
70 000 fingerprints per second on a PC with an Athlon 600 MHz processor. These speeds were 
only attainable by caching the minutiae in memory. This is feasible because the biometric template 
is small. This indicates that the system presented here, or some derivative of it, could be used to 
search through large databases of fingerprints. It might even be possible to search through databases 
containing over 100 000 prints in real-time. 
The search through the database could easily be parallelised to give a large improvement in the 
throughput of comparisons. The curvature index that was calculated at the core point could be 
used to provide a rough ordering of the fingerprints. One would expect this heuristic to reduce 
significantly the search space required to locate matching prints. 
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8.2 Generation of the Biometric Template 
The set of minutiae in this system was created from a single fingerprint. The use of multiple input 
fingerprints from the same finger could be used to generate a more accurate template of the minutiae. 
This would also allow the classification of the fingerprint to be performed more accurately. If the 
different scans are classified into different classes then the predominant class can be used as the 
primary classification, while a secondary classification can be stored until it is needed. The use of 
a secondary classification should almost remove the effect of misclassifications from the FRR. The 
use of multiple scans to generate a template should also produce a more accurate curvature index. 
8.3 Protocols Making Use of Distributed Matching 
This study has shown that it is feasible to perform the fingerprint verification on the smart card. 







Figure 8.1: A high level representation of the protocol needed to use fingerprints over the Internet. 
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It would be ideal if a biometric could be used to authenticate a user over the Internet securely. This 
would require that the protocols used are secure. Figure 8.1 shows a high level overview of how 
the protocol would be expected to behave. There would need to be a challenge from the server to 
guarantee the freshness of the response. This system would need to acquire a fingerprint from the 
scanner to forward to the card along with the challenge. If the fingerprint were accepted as a match 
by the card then the response would indicate this. 
The smart card still stores the fingerprints in a distributed fashion allowing the owner to retain 
complete control over their biometric data. The comparison should still also be performed on the 
card. This protocol might be something along the lines of a server sending a challenge, possibly a 
timestamp, through to an Internet browser. The browser would initiate a fingerprint scan at the PC. 
The template extracted from the fingerprint would then be sent to the smart card. The smart card 
might use a private key to sign the response digitally verifying its identity to the server. 
This protocol would need to follow all the major design criteria such that the key stored on the 
card and used to sign the verification process would be protected from unauthorised access. The 
challenge from the server needs to include a timestamp or nonce to ensure the randomness necessary 
to prevent replay attacks. Additionally the implementation needs to withstand side channel attacks 
that monitor the power consumption or timing. The major difficulty in this protocol design would 
be the limitations with respect to what can be performed in reasonable time on the card with its 
limited processing capabilities. 
8.4 Using other Biometrics for the Smart Card Matching 
The smart card has limited CPU and memory resources. These provide challenges complicating 
the process of performing the match on the card. Other biometrics could replace the use of the 
fingerprint in this implementation. The same approach can be taken and privacy goals solved in 
the same way. Questions, which remain though, are how large templates are for other biometric 
techniques and whether they will fit on smart cards. Rapid increase in the capacity of cards suggests 
that this will be viable in the near future. 
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8.5 Embedding a Biometric Sensor into a Cellular Phone 
The system developed here stores a fingerprint template on a smart card. Since most GSM and 
other mobile phones contain a smart card anyway, (the Subscriber Identification Module (SIM)), 
increases in card capacity should also permit use of distributed authentication as proposed in this 
dissertation on such devices. If this system can be built into a cellular phone it could be used to 
perform the authentication in e-commerce systems. 
8.6 Using an adaptive Error Tolerance 
The error tolerances of the paramaters could be adaptive. The use of Cartesian and polar coordinates 
influences the error that is tolerated when a fixed tolerance is used in matching minutiae. Using 
an adaptive tolerance might improve the accuracy of the verification process. There are however 
stringent computational1imits on the algorithms when one uses a smart card. 
Chapter 9 
Conclusion 
In many otherwise secure systems the authentication of the individual is a weak point in the security. 
Authentication is fundamental to all other security related decisions, since an incorrect authentica-
tion would compromise access control, integrity, confidentiality and non-repudiation. 
Currently the primary method of authentication uses a password with a usemame or token. There 
are a number of difficulties with the use of a password. It could be guessed or stolen, allowing 
illegitimate access to sensitive information. Many systems that are operational have a difficulty in 
authenticating the user reliably. 
No one can guarantee 100% security, but the risk can be reduced to an acceptable level. Fraud exists 
in current commerce systems: cash can be counterfeited; cheques altered and credit card numbers 
stolen. However, these systems are successful overall as the overall benefits outweigh the losses -
the risks are considered acceptable. A system using a template of a fingerprint stored on a smart 
card with a secure communications protocol can provide a secure form of authentication, which can 
then be used for financial transactions. The security provided will be considerably higher than that 
currently employed in ATM transactions. 
Strong cryptographic systems can withstand targeted attacks up to the point where it becomes easier 
to get the information some other way. Computer programs, no matter how good, cannot prevent 
an attacker from going through someone's garbage to find passwords that have been written down. 
However, the security risk caused by the careless activities of a valid user with their password can 
be eliminated if they no longer need to use a PIN or password, but rather a biometric. 
Additionally it is important that the granularity is appropriate to the application. Even the best 
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authentication will not ensure non-repudiation if the subjects can leave their workstations for half 
an hour and someone else can impersonate them from their workstations in their absence. For this 
reason it is standard to require a re-authentication every time that a new transaction is conducted. 
This is one method to reduce the risk. 
Biometrics provide a method to authenticate an individual with a very high accuracy. With modern 
equipment it is possible to acquire digital scans of sufficient resolution to allow many different 
biometrics to be used for authentication. However there have been a number of privacy concerns 
raised with respect to the use of biometrics to identify individuals in civilian applications. 
The aim of this research was to investigate the privacy concerns of using biometrics and to develop 
a solution that used biometrics for authentication, which at the same time preserved the individual's 
privacy.. The scope of the system. was constrained by the need Jor. it to be. able to use inexpensive 
equipment to authenticate an individual reliably in real-time. 
Investigation of the privacy of the biometric showed that since a biometric is a unique attribute of 
an individual, many individuals do not want to relinquish control over its use to a third party. There 
is also the perception that it will be used to track the individual's activities. This is mainly due to 
the extensive use of biometrics, (particularly the fingerprint), in forensic research associated with a 
criminal investigation. 
The other less well-known concern with biometric scans is that they contain information. They 
could be used to gain invasive knowledge about the individual. There is a wealth of information 
stored in a biometric scan concerning the owner's medical history. For example a picture of the face 
can indicate the presence of skin diseases and even the fingerprint can provide clues towards the 
owner's gender, age and occupation. 
The approach of this dissertation was to provide the user with a system that would allow complete 
control of the biometric information to remain with the individual, while improving the security 
and accuracy of the authentication process through the use of a biometric. In this research the 
fingerprint was used to provide biometric data with sufficiently unique information to provide an 
accurate verification of identity. From the fingerprint a set of minutiae were extracted and placed 
on a smart card as a template. The later verification of the individual's identity was performed on 
the card, thus removing all reasons requiring any biometric information stored on the card to be 
removed. 
The use of biometrics and smart cards is intended to increase the level of security. For the system to 
be viable it needs to ensure that that the implementation is efficient and that new security loopholes 
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are not introduced. With this aim in system development an implementation was demonstrated 
whereby as much of the verification process as possible is moved onto the smart card, thereby 
removing the need to be able to access the biometric template externally from the card. 
The technology used to produce smart cards has also expanded and improved, resulting in greater 
security in these cards and making it more difficult to gain unauthorized access to the contents. This, 
together with the reasonable price of smart cards, results in a cost effective method of achieving a 
high security authentication. 
The system explained in this work can be used to provide authentication for many different applica-
tions. The card can store a private key, which is protected by a fingerprint. The physical protection 
of the card should protect its contents from unauthorised access if secure communications protocols 
are used. The card in conjunction with a fingerprint can verify a user's identity to an ATM to allow 
a cash-withdrawal or to an Internet site for e-commerce. 
This method of authentication does not require the bank or the Internet site to keep any client's 
biometric data to authenticate them biometrically. In this way the individual's privacy is protected. 
Many users do not want their fingerprints to be stored electronically in databases. This does not 
cause problems is this system as the fingerprints do not need to be stored in databases, but rather 
just a template extracted from the fingerprint is stored on a smart card. The use of the smart card is 
then entirely under the control of the individual. They can have the added security provided by the 
use of a biometric, yet at the same time they can keep the biometric under their control at all times. 
This method does not need to do any searches through huge databases of fingerprints and it does not 
place large demands on network traffic. 
A statistical model was developed to predict the FAR. This model assumed that minutiae sets from 
different fingers could be expected to have very low levels of coherence. The FAR was modelled 
with a hypergeometric distribution. 
The implementation was also tested empirically. These empirical results showed that the minutiae 
were not always extracted perfectly accurately. The effect of varying the range of tolerance used to 
declare two minutiae as a match was examined. It was found that a small tolerance produced the 
best results. 
Inclusion of an enhancement stage in the minutiae detection algorithm was then tested. This was 
found to reduce the EER. There was a significant reduction in the FRR and a small reduction in 
the FAR. The use of classification information in the comparison stage was tested and found to 
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improve the accuracy. There was a large reduction in the FAR, but the FRR increased due to the 
misclassification of a few fingerprints. 
On the set of high quality fingerprint scans it was shown that using just position to match minutiae 
was inadequate as it produced an EER of around 40%. Including the direction of the minutiae 
reduced the EER to less than 10% and using the type of minutiae further reduced it to 5.6%. The 
use of classification information decreased the EER to 1.56%. 
This would be acceptable for some commercial systems. For many access control systems this 
would provide a sufficient level of confidence in the user's identity. Particularly when used in 
conjunction with the fact that the user is in possession of the correct card. For systems like a cash 
dispensing machine this level of confidence in a user's identity would most likely not be sufficient. 
For those systems additional information will need to recorded about each minutiae and used in the 
comparison process. 
It has therefore been demonstrated that it is feasible to store a fingerprint template on a smart card. 
This system outline in this dissertation performs the fingerprint comparison on the card in real-
time thereby countering the privacy objections of individual who want to retain control over their 
biometric data. 
Bibliography 
[1] R Anderson. Why Cryptosystems Fail. Communications of the ACM, 37(11 ):32 - 40, Novem-
ber 1994. 
[2] R Anderson and M. Kuhn. Tamper Resistance - a Cautionary Note. The Second USENIX 
Workshop on Electronic Commerce Proceedings, pages 1 - 11, November 1996. 
[3] E. Biham and A. Shamir. Differential Fault Analysis of Secret KEY Cryptosystems. Advances 
in Crypytology - CRYPTO '97 Proceedings, pages 513 - 525, 1997. 
[4] D. Boneh, RA. DemilIo, and RJ. Lipton. On importance of Checking Cryptographic Proto-
cols for Faults. Cryptology EUROCRYPT '97 Proceedings, pages 37 - 51,1997. 
[5] J.P. Campbell. Speaker Recognition: A Tutorial. Proceedings of the IEEE, 85(9):1437 -1462, 
September 1997. 
[6] Data Protection Act 1998. Her Majesty's Stationery Office, United Kingdom. 
[7] Directive 95 of the European Parliament and of the Council On the protection of individuals 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data. ECO 
291, CODEC 92, European Union, 2 February 1995. 
[8] Federal. Privacy Act of 1974. 5 U.S.C. Section 552a, as amended, United States of America. 
[9] RW. Frischholz and U. Dieckmann. BioID: A Multimodal Biometric Identification System. 
Computer, 33(2):64 - 68, February 2000. 
[10] L. Gong and P.P. Syverson. Fail-Stop Protocols: An Approach to Designing Secure Proto-
cols. In The Fifth International Working Conference on Dependable Computing for Critical 
Applications, pages 44 - 55. Springer-Verlag, September 1995. 
135 
136 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
[11] G.T. Candela, PJ. Grother, C.L Watson, R.A. Wilkinson and C.L. Wilson. PCASYS - A 
Pattern-Level Classification Automation System for Fingerprints. Technical Report NISTIR 
5647, National Institute of Standards and Technology, August 1995. 
[12] U. Halici, L.C. Jain, and A EroI. Introduction to Fingerprint Recognition. In L.c. Jain 
... ret al.], editor, Intelligent Biometrics Techniques in Fingerprint and Face Recognition, 
International Series on Computational Intelligence, chapter 1, pages 1- 34. CRC Press, 1999. 
[13] L. Hong. Automated Personal Identification Using Fingerprints. PhD thesis, Michigan State 
University, June 1998. 
[14] L. Hong, Y. Wan, and A Jain. Fingerprint Image Enhancement Algorithm and Performance 
Evaluation. IEEE Transactions on Pattern Analysis and Machine Intelligence, 20(8):777 -
789, 1998. 
[15] AJ. Howell. Introduction to Face Recognition. In L.C. Jain ... ret al.], editor, Intelligent 
Biometrics Techniques in Fingerprint and Face Recognition, International Series on Compu-
tational Intelligence, chapter 7, pages 217 - 283. CRC Press, 1999. 
[16] Wired Digital Inc. Your Eyes Are Windows to MS. Wired News Report, 2 May 2000. 
[17] A Jain, L. Hong, and R. Bolle. On-line Fingerprint Verification. IEEE Transactions on Pattern 
Analysis and Analysis and Machine Intelligence, 19(4):302 - 314, 1997. 
[18] A Jain, L. Hong, and S. Pankanti. The Uses of Biometrics. Communications of the ACM, 
42(8):136, August 1999. 
[19] A Jain, L. Hong, and S. Pankanti. Biometric Identification. Communications of the ACM, 
43(2):91 - 98, February 2000. 
[20] AK. Jain, L. Hong, S. Pankanti, and R. Bolle. An Identity-Authentication System Using 
Fingerprints. Proceedings of the IEEE, 85(9):1365 -1388, September 1997. 
[21] D. Kahn. The Codebreakers. Macmillian, 1967. 
[22] J. Kelsey, B. Schneier, D. Wagner, and C. Hall. Side Channel Cryptanalysis of Product Ci-
phers. ESORICS '98 Proceedings, pages 97 -110, 1998. 
[23] P. Kocher. Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman. Advances in Cryptology 
CRYPTO '96, pages 104 - 113, 1996. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 137 
[24] P. Kocher. Differential Power Analysis. http://www.cryptography!comldpa, 1998. 
[25] K.L. Kroeker. Biometric Organisations. Computer, 33(2):57, February 2000. 
[26] M. Negin ... ret al.]. An Iris Biometric System for Public and Personal Use. Computer, 
33(2):70 - 75, February 2000. 
[27] H.C. Lee and RE. Gaensslen. Advances in Fingerprint Technology. Elsevier, 1991. 
[28] J. McCormac. European Scrambling Systems. Waterford University Press, 1996. 
[29] RB. Megdal. VSLI Computational Structure Applied to Fingerprint Image Analysis. PhD 
thesis, California Institute of Technology, Pasadena, California, February 1983. 
[30] S. Miller. Vital Signs of Identity. IEEE Spectrum, 31 (2):22 - 30, February 1994. 
[31] A Moenssens. Fingerprint Techniques. Chilton Book Company, London, 1971. 
"-./ 
'~[32] N.Ratha, S. Chen, and A Jain. Adaptive Flow Orientation-Based Feature Extraction in Finger-
print Images. Pattern Recognition, 28(11):1657 1672, 1995. 
[33] L. O'Gorman. Practical Systems for Personal Fingerprint Authentication. Computer, 33(2):58 
- 60, February 2000. 
[34] S. Pankanti, RM. Bolle, and A. Jain. Biometrics: The future of identification. Computer, 
33(2):46 49, February 2000. 
[35] A Penland and T. Choudhury. Face Recognition for Smart Environments. Computer, 33(2):50 
- 55, February 2000. 
[36] S. Percetti. Gemplus implements Veridicom's fingerprint matching algorithm on a smart card. 
http://www.gemplus.com. 24 February 2000. 
[37] PJ. Phillips, A Martin, c.L. Wilson, and M. Przybocki. An Introduction to Evaluating Bio-
metric Systems. Computer, 33(2):56 - 63, February 2000. 
[38] AR Roddy and J.D. Stosz. Fingerprint Features - Statistical Analysis and System Perfor-
mance Estimates. Proceedings of the IEEE, 85(9):1390 - 1421, September 1997. 
[39] B. Schneier. Why Cryptography is Harder than it Looks. Counterpane Systems, 1997. 
138 BIBLIOGRAPHY 
[40] B. Schneier. Biometric: Uses and Abuses. Communications of the ACM, 42(8), August 1999. 
[41] B. Schneier. Crypto-Gram. http://www.counterpane.comlcrypto-gram-0005.html. May 2000. 
Counterpane Internet Security, Inc. 
[42] B. Schneier and A.. Shostack. Breaking Up Is Hard To Do: Modeling Security Threats for 
Smart Cards. First USENIX Symposium on Smart Cards, February 1999. 
[43] W. Shen, M. Surette, and R. Khanna. Evaluation of Automated Biometrics-Based Identifi-
cation and Verification Systems. Proceedings of the IEEE, 85(9):1464 - 1478, September 
1997. 
[44] Siemens. Fingertip CMOS Chip and System, December 1998. 
[45] STMicroelectronics. Instant Java for your smartcard. http://www.st.comJsmartcard. 1999. 
[46] STMicroelectronics. Contactless Smartcards Come of Age. http://www.st.comlsmartcard. 
2000. 
[47] J.D. Stosz and L.A. Alyea. Automated system for fingerprint authentication using pores and 
ridge structure. Department of Defence, Ft. Meade, MD 20755-6000. 
[48J D Thompson, editor. The Concise Oxford Dictionary Ninth Edition. Oxford University Press, 
1995. 
[49J C.l Tilton. An Emerging Biometric API Industry Standard. Computer, 33(2):130 - 132, 
February 2000. 
[50] CardServer V2.02 Technical Documentation, February 1998. 
[51J L. Underhill. Introstat. Juta and Company Ltd., 1987. 
[52] VISA. VISA Security Module Operations Manual. VISA, 1986. 
[53] Price Waterhouse. Technology forecast, 1998. 
[54J C.I. Watson and C.L. Wilson. NIST Special Database 4 Fingerprint Database, March 1992. 
[55] J.L. Wayman. Federal Biometric Technology Legislation. Computer, 33(2):76 - 80, February 
2000. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 139 
[56] R.P. Wildes. Iris Recognition: An Emerging Biometric Technology. Proceedings of the IEEE, 
85(9):1348 1363, September 1997. 
[57] lD. Woodward. Biometrics: Privacy's Foe or Privacy's Friend. Proceedings of the IEEE, 
85(9):1480 -1492, September 1997. 
[58] J. Zbang, Y Yan, and M. Lades. Face Recognition: Eigenface, elastic Matching, and Neural 






access control, 1, 131 
accuracy, 16, 26, 46, 54, 68, 72, 73, 89, 97, 
98, 102, 113, 118, 119, 123, 124, 








rugorithm, 5,47,55, 57, 59,60,65, 70 
algorithms, 2, 18, 26 
alignment, 69 
ruphanumeric, 2 
anruysis, 3, 6, 97, 118, 127, 134 
anomalies, 30 










AthIon, 122, 123, 127 
ATM,3 
attacker, 3 
attacks, 2, 40, 43 
authenticate, 1,9, 12,48,49, 132 
authenticated, 28 
authentication, 1-4,11,15-17,30,33,42,45, 
54, 123, 127, 128, 131, 132 
automated, 10, 19,24 
autonomy, 9,13 
average, 75, 82 
background, 15 
bank, 1, 7 
bankcard, 1 
banks, 36 
batch, 108, 109, 111, 112 
behavioural, 3, 15 
bifurcation, 21, 53,66,90,91, 105 
bifurcations, 20,43, 95 
big brother, 11 
BioID,16 
biologicru, 3 
biometric, 2, 3, 9-11, 13, 15-18, 26, 27, 45, 
46,98,128,129,131,132 




breaks, 74, 89 
card, 12 
Cartesian, 53, 68, 111 
change, 20 
characteristic, 112 
characteristics, 3,20, 21,43, 104 
chemicals, 29 
circumvention, 17 
classification, 15, 22, 25, 28, 58,,62, 104, lB. 
117, 118, 124, 128, 134 











comparison, 10-12, 19,24,43,47,54,56,57, 
62,65,66,92-96,106 
comparisons, 27 
complexity. 27, 43 
compress, 5 
confidence, 46, 47 
confidentiality, 131 





contact, 2, 31, 37 
con tactless, 2, 37, 38 
control, 1, 5, 8, 11, 13, 132 
INDEX 
core, 20,22,43,51,52,57,59,62,67, 76,94 
core point, 67, 76-78, 94, 104, 107, 109, 120 
corrugated, 19 
CPU,S 
credit card, 34 





cryptographic, 35, 38, 131 
cryptography, 40 
curvature, 20, 62, 66, 120, 125, 128 
customers, 7 
dactyloscopy, 19 
data representation, 50 













direction, 67, 78 
discriminating, 20, 30 
disease, 10, 32, 132 
Dissertation Roadmap, 5 






EER, 43, 106, 117-119, 124, 125, 134 
efficiency, 47 
electronic purse, 36 
empirical,6, 102, 104, 107, 123 
empirically, 98 
encrypted, 2 
ending, 90, 91, 105 
endings, 95 
enhanced,50, 51,60, 72,95 
enhancement, 51, 59, 71, 72, 84, 104, 112, 





Equal Error Rate, 43 








Extended Parallel Port, 57 
extracting, 95 
extraction, 56, 70, 91, 93, 113, 122 
face, 3, 16, 132 
failure, 48 
False Acceptance Rate, 17 
false acceptance rate, 47 
False Rejection Rate, 17 
false rejection rate, 47 
143 
FAR, 17,43,47,98, 100-104,106,108-112, 
114, 115, 117, 118, 121,124, 134 
feasible, 16 
feature, 66 
features, 20, 89 
feet, 19 
filter, 83 
finger, 9, 26, 30, 31,93, 128 
fingernail, 31 
fingerprint, 3-5, 9-12, 15, 16, 18-20,22-25, 
27-29, 31-33, 42, 43, 45, 46, 48, 
53-62,65-67,69-73,75-81,86,93, 
95, 97-99, 103, 105, 106, 109, 111, 
112, 128, 129, 132 
fingerprints, 3, 26, 42, 44 
fingers, 22 





























hand geometry, 16 
health, 9 
Henry, 114 
Henry System, 22 
hereditary, 9, 29 
history,S, 15, 19,35 
hole, 84, 85 
hypergeometric, 99, 101, 124 
identification, 12, 16-18,22,24,26,36 









independent ridge, 21 
indexing, 43 
individual, 2, 12, 16,20,26, 132 




Internet, 1, 129 
invalid, 79, 83 
invariant, 18,20 
invasion, 27, 28 
invasive, 9,42 
iris, 3, 10, 13, 16,98 
island,21 
ISO 7816, 3S, 37, 43 
knowledge, 1, 4 
IOpht,2 
10phtcrack, 2 
labour, 28, 29 
lake, 21 







limitations, 15, 26 
live scans, 11 
logs, 8 
loop, 22, 23 
lost, 2, 4 
magnetic strip, 1 
manual, 24 
manual labour, 9 
manually, 19 
masquerade, 3 
match certificate, 46 
matching, 5, 26, 53, 109 
median, 81 
medical, 9, 10, 13 
memory, 5,34,43,62 
memory cards, 37 
microchip, 37 
microprocessor, 34, 36 
microprocessor cards, 38 
minimal, 17 




moisture, 30, 43 
morphologist, 18 
motivation, 5 
multi-application cards, 36 
multiple, 16 
mummies, 18 
naval code book, 35 
network, 1,3, 11,48,49,97 
NIST, 51, 102 














orientation, 31, 50-52, 57, 59, 60, 72, 73, 75-
79, 81, 104, 105 
overview, 45 
owner, 13 
palm prints, 3 
pass phrase, 11 
passport, 27 
password, 1,3, 11,45,46, 131 
password file, 2 
passwords, 2, 42 
patern,28 
pattern, 18, 20, 23, 25, 65 
perception, 27 








physical, 1, 15 
physically, 2 
physiological, 3, 15 





pore, 59,60,66, 72,82-85 
pores, 18, 19, 71 
possession, 2 
postage stamp, 18 
pressure, 30, 31, 86 
privacy, 5, 7,9-12,27,28,36,42,54 
Privacy Motivation, 7 
private, 1, 7, 8, 39 










quality, 28, 30, 32,59,70,71,79-81,86,104, 
115-117, 121, 124, 125 
radio frequencies, 37 











removal, 92, 93 
replay, 39 
replay attack, 3 
report, 8 





resolution, 78, 83 
resource, 16 
results, 6, 103-105, 109, 123 
retina, 3, 10, 13, 16, 17 
INDEX 
ridge, 18, 20, 21, 50, 51, 60, 65,66, 72, 74, 
78,79,81-86,89-91,105 
ridge detection, 59 
ridge ending, 21 
ridge endings, 20 
ridge map, 60 
ridge structure, 76, 77 





robustness, 48, 49 
rotation, 30, 31, 105, 107, 109, 124 
rotor, 35 





scanned, 50, 72 







security, 1-3, 11, 15, 36, 38, 40, 41, 46, 54, 
63, 131 
sharpen, 112 
shear, 30, 31 
shrinking, 86, 88 
Siemens, 53 
signature, 3 
singular points, 22 





smart card, 4, 5, 12, 15, 34-36, 39, 40, 42, 49, 
53, 54, 56, 61-63, 94, 96, 97, 122, 
129, 133 
smart cards, 28, 36, 38-44, 47, 133 




smoothing, 29, 72, 83 
smoothing filter, 72 
smudge, 109 
Sobel,72 

















structure, 9, 19, 29, 74 
surfaces, 19 
sweat, 19 
sweat pore, 66, 83 
sweat pores, 65 
swipe card, 40 




system overview, 49 
system requirements, 46 






template, 11, 12, 46, 49, 53, 56, 58, 59, 61, 
63,76,77,86,98,128 
tent, 23 




thinning, 59, 85, 86, 88, 89 
threshold, 74, 81, 82 
time, 16,28,32,122 






tolerance, 104, 105, 108, 109, 111-113,125 
touch, 19 











unique, 3, 17,26,42 
uniqueness, 9, 16 
universal, 17, 42 
universality, 16 
unusable, 29 
usemame, 1, 2, 4, 48, 131 
utilizes, 8 
valid, 57,60, 78, 79,92 
valley, 82, 85 
valleys, 19, 71 
variance, 120, 121 
variety, 29 
vector, 76, 78 
INDEX 




voice recognition, 16 
vulnerabilities, 3 
water, 19 
weaknesses, 2 
whorl,23 
workstation, 18 
